ATF Law Enforcement Guide to Gun Types, April 2006.
Documents
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives
ATF Southwest Border Gunrunner Weapons of Choice Guide
Law Enforcement Use Only ATF Border Gunrunner Weapons of Choice Guide February 2008.
U.S. Central Command
CENTCOM Engineering Contingency Construction Overview August 2010
FOUO CENTCOM Engineering Contingency Construction Overview, August 2010.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, New York
(U//FOUO) New York CrossFIRE Radio Theft Report
Fire Departments in Warren and Washington County have recently reported thefts of communications equipment
• Thefts include portable and mobile radios, along with software capable of programming this equipment.
• Only newer model, VHF radios have been stolen. Low‐band and older model radios (which aren’t capable of narrowband) have been left untouched.
• Of particular concern: programming software has been stolen. This software could potentially be used to reprogram radios with frequencies of law enforcement agencies, Fire and EMS services, and other public and private sector organizations/businesses.
U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy Carrier Vessel NATOPS Landing Signal Officer Manual
This manual is a single source of LSO information for LSOs, unit commanders, and air crewmembers that contains descriptions of visual landing aids, command relationships, a compendium of LSO-related policies and responsibilities, pilot and LSO training requirements and qualifications, descriptions of visual landing aids, and LSO procedures for recovering fixed-wing non-V/STOL aircraft aboard CV and CVN-class ships.
U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy Carrier Vessel Nuclear (CV/N) NATOPS Manual
This manual issues policy, guidance and information for CV and CV/N commanding officers, air officers, airoperations officers, air wing commanders, squadron commanding officers, aircraft detachment Officers-In-Charge, and aircrews aboard CV/N class ships. The information presented herein includes relationships, responsibilities, training requirements, and selected normal and emergency procedures for conducting flight operations on and in the vicinity of the CV/N.
Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Gas Distribution Pipeline Safety Report
PHMSA made an adjustment to the expected value of property damage occurring from 2001 through 2005, since some of the property damage was caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (an outlier), which skewed the damages above expectations and which this rule was not designed to mitigate. A more accurate expected value of benefits, perhaps reflective of a longer timeline and taking into account risks and consequences not experienced from 2001 through 2005, would show a higher expected benefit of this rule} It is possible for high-consequence accidents to occur, in which there are a disproportionately large number of casualties (Le., deaths and serious injuries), since a portion of gas distribution piping is located in densely populated areas with schools and businesses containing a large number of people.
Afghanistan, Department of Defense
(U//FOUO) US Forces-Afghanistan Private Security Contractor Management
OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN REQUIRE ARMED CONTRACTORS (ACS) AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSCS) TO FULFILL A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND OTHER ENTITIES OPERATING IN THE COMBINED JOINT OPERATIONS AREA – AFGHANISTAN (CJOA-A). INCLUDED IN THESE ARMED CONTRACTORS AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES ARE TRADITIONAL PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES, THE AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS AND DOD CONTRACTORS WHO ARE ARMED FOR PERSONAL PROTECTION. TRADITIONAL PSC’S PERFORM CONVOY ESCORT, STATIC SECURITY AND PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS. AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS (ASG’S) PROVIDE LOCAL STATIC SECURITY TO FOB’S, COP’S AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE WITH LOCAL AFGHAN COMPANIES. DOD CONTRACTORS MAY BE ARMED EITHER AS A FUNCTION THE SERVICE THEY PROVIDE OR THEIR OPERATING LOCATION. THESE AC/PSC’S ARE NOT COMBATANTS; THEY EXECUTE SERVICES TO PROTECT PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT AND FIXED FACILITIES. WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY AC/PSCS ARE FOR PURELY DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY.
Transportation Security Administration
(SSI) TSA Prototype RFID Baggage Tracking Report
This report describes the qualification test conducted at Newark International Airport on a prototype RF identification system for use in passenger baggage identification and tracking applications. The system tested was one made by Avante, which operates at 13.56 MHz. It consisted of a freestanding conveyor belt, an HF antenna array, a long-range reader and baggage tags that incorporate an antenna and an integrated circuit.
United States
Bipartisan Policy Center Report on Assessing Threat of Radicalization and Domestic Terrorism
Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United States. Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. A key shift in the past couple of years is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of Americans attaching themselves to these groups. Another development is the increasing diversification of the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants, and the groups with which those militants have affiliated. Indeed, these jihadists do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile.
Department of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on “Refocusing” Homeland Security
So if 9/11 happened in a Web 1.0 world, terrorists are certainly in a Web 2.0 world now. And many of the technological tools that expedite communication today were in their infancy or didn’t even exist in 2001. So therefore, more than just hardware, we need new thinking. When we add a prominent former computer hacker to our Homeland Security Advisory Council, as I just did, it helps us understand our own weaknesses that could be exploited by our adversaries. And the threats we face are by their very nature asymmetrical. Terrorism more often has become privatized violence—does not rely on links, links to an army or to a sovereign state. We often hear that this is what our globalized era looks like, but what is most salient about today’s environment is that it is also networked. And in a networked world, information true and false moves everywhere all the time. And in that networked world, everyone who is part of the network, meaning all of us, can enjoy the tremendous benefits, but also must be ready and willing to learn about and help address the vulnerabilities that come with these benefits. So the team we put on the field needs to be bigger, better networked and better trained. What are the implications for this network world for the Department of Homeland Security? It means that we must continue to take an all-hazards approach to preparedness, meaning we prepare for natural disasters as well as terrorist attacks. We need to comprehend and anticipate an expanding range of threats.
Department of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano Speech to New York First Responders on “Rebuilding” Homeland Security
At the heart of this are fusion centers. Starting with just one in 2006, there are now 72 fusion centers nationwide, serving as focal points for information-sharing among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. By the end of this year, all 72 fusion centers should be able to analyze information and spot trends in order to effectively share timely intelligence – with local law enforcement, and with DHS, so the information can also be used by others within the Intelligence Community. To support this vision: we’re prioritizing fusion centers in our FY2011 grants, and looking for ways to support them through additional technology and personnel, including the deployment of highly-trained experts in critical infrastructure; we’re deploying experienced DHS analysts to every one of these centers – 64 at last count – and we won’t stop until we have them in every one; and we’re linking them together, and with DHS headquarters, through the classified Homeland Security Data Network.
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Social Media Guide
This guide provides Air Force Public Affairs professionals with basic social media knowledge needed to maneuver in the online information space and the basic-level tactics explained here should be used to compliment the traditional forms of Public Affairs, to include internal communication, community relations and media relations.
Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CSTC-A Afghan National Police Training Facility Maintenance and Life Support Services Contractor Work Statement
CSTC-A requires contracted life support services, to include training facility force protection, in the areas identified in the chart below. These efforts directly support the US and NATO missions to develop a trained and professional Afghan police force, enhancing public security, and supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Facilities covered under this requirement support various aspects of the training of the ANP, including providing life support for mentors and trainers of the Afghan government, USFOR-A, and Coalition Forces who support the training of the ANP. Due to the changing nature of combat support requirements, the Contractor shall expect that quantities, types, and/or locations of the services to be required within this geographic area will change over the Period of Performance.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Warning: Internet Sites Allow Detailed Surveillance and Pre-Attack Planning
(U//FOUO) Detailed video obtained through live Web-based camera feeds combined with street-level and direct overhead imagery views from Internet imagery sites allow terrorists to conduct remote surveillance of multiple potential targets without exposing themselves to detection.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U//FOUO) FBI Warning: Controversies in Muslim Communities Raise Potential for Violence
THE FBI ASSESSES THAT MULTIPLE ONGOING CONTROVERSIES IMPACTING US MUSLIM COMMUNITIES MAY SERVE TO POLARIZE PUBLIC OPINION AND FUEL ISLAMIC EXTREMIST RHETORIC, BOTH IN THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM. THE FBI CURRENTLY HAS NO SPECIFIC CREDIBLE INFORMATION THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE PLANNING ACTION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF THESE EVENTS, ALTHOUGH THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THESE CONTROVERSIES NECESSITATES CONTINUED VIGILANCE FROM STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND PRIVATE SECURITY ENTITIES. MULTIPLE CONTROVERSIES GENERATING HEATED RHETORIC OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS, OPEN SOURCE REPORTING HAS DRAWN ATTENTION TO SEVERAL CONTROVERSIAL EVENTS IMPACTING MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES. WHILE EACH BEGAN AS A SEEMINGLY LOCAL DISPUTE, ALL ARE NOW RAISING NATIONAL-LEVEL QUESTIONS REGARDING CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FREEDOMS AND ISLAMS ROLE IN AMERICA. THE PLANNED BURNING OF QURANS BY A NONDENOMINATIONAL CHURCH IN GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA IN RECOGNITION OF THE NINTH ANNIVERSARY OF 11 SEPTEMBER CONTINUES TO ATTRACT ATTENTION. THE CHURCHS LEADER HAS STATED HE DOES NOT THINK THIS EVENT IF IT OCCURS WILL PRECIPITATE VIOLENCE AGAINST HIM OR HIS FOLLOWERS, DESPITE NUMEROUS DEATH THREATS, WARNINGS FROM OTHERS IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY, INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM COMMUNITY PROTESTS, AND PROTESTS FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Florida
(U//FOUO) FBI Warning: Extremists Likely to Retaliate Against Florida Group’s Planned “International Burn A Koran Day”
(U//FOUO) While the FBI has no information to indicate a specific attack has been planned against the United States or US assets in response to the “International Burn a Koran Day” event, the FBI assesses with high confidencea that, as with past incidents perceived as acts of desecration against Islam, extremist actors will continue to threaten or attempt to harm the leaders, organizers, or attendees the event, scheduled for 6:00-9:00pm on 11 September 2010 in Gainesville, Florida. Depending on the continued national and international publicity the event receives, it may also inspire retaliatory attacks against US facilities overseas.
Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Complete Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program Project Data July 2009-August 2010
Complete Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program Project Data from July 31, 2009-August 1, 2010.
Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, United States
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) August 2010 Draft
U.S. Confidential Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) August 25, 2010 Draft.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, Virginia
(U//LES) Virginia Fusion Center Mara Salvatrucha 13 Report
Mara Salvatrucha 13, or MS-13, is a transnational, mainly Hispanic, street gang notorious for its adherence to a methodology of extreme violence to enforce fear and establish street credibility. MS-13 diverges from the traditional American street gang model in that it maintains cross border organizational ties, and currently poses a serious threat throughout Central America, Mexico, and Canada, as well as domestically in the United States. In Virginia, the influx of Salvadoran immigrants to the Washington. DC metro area has created the second domestic center for the gang’s American presence. Membership has been documented across the National Capitol Region and in central Virginia, making it the major gang threat to Northern Virginia and a major concern for the Commonwealth as a whole. Demographic change in the Commonwealth, combined with the potential expansion of MS-13 membership to non-Hispanic individuals, constitutes a serious potential threat to public safety.
United States
Blackwater/Xe Front Companies Chart
An interactive chart of more than 30 Blackwater/Xe Services LLC Front Companies.
Department of Homeland Security, Nevada
Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy 2010
The purpose of the Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS) is to identify and address statewide priorities to achieve and sustain a strengthened ability to prevent, detect, deter, mitigate against, prepare for, respond to and recover from any natural, manmade and/or technological emergency or disaster up to and including any act of terrorism. The State, through implementation of this strategy, is seeking outcomes that will ensure a safe and secure Nevada through enhanced capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, rapid first response and recovery, the protection of critical infrastructure, and to promote public education and awareness.
Defense Intelligence Agency
(U//FOUO) Defense Intelligence Agency Ammonium Nitrate Threat Warning
(U//FOUO) Terrorists typically favor basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), off-the-shelf technology and readily available resources when planning and carrying out an attack. While simplistic in effort, these factors can be a lethal and destructive combination. Terrorists also continue to explore innovative attack options that take advantage of overlooked vulnerabilities inherent to the civilian sector. One such vulnerability is transporting bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate (AN) via the road, rail and waterway network. Using a region’s bulk AN transportation network to attack critical infrastructure and urban centers would arguably qualify as a high probability — high casualty/destruction threat scenario.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Army Unauthorized Information Dissemination Safeguards in Response to WikiLeaks
(U/FOUO) 1. ALL ARMY ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY REVIEW AND REVALIDATE WHO HAS SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR(SA)/POWER USER PRIVILEGES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) REF A, THESE PERSONNEL SHALL BE GRANTED THE MINIMUM SET OF PRIVILEGES REQUIRED TO PERFORM THEIR JOBS AND NOTHING MORE. ALL ACTIVITIES MUST ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THESE PERSONNEL AND THAT NO OTHER PERSONNEL HAVE THESE PRIVILEGES. THIS IS KEY TO PRECLUDING UNAUTHORIZED DOWNLOADING AND DISSEMINATION OF SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Army WikiLeaks Warning: Classified Public Information
ARMY PERSONNEL MUST BE VIGILANT WITH REGARD TO THE INFORMATION POSTED ON THE WIKILEAKS WEBSITE AND ANY OTHER WEBSITE THAT PURPORTS TO PUBLISH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. VIEWING, DOWNLOADING OR PRINTING INFORMATION FROM THE WEBSITE COULD POTENTIALLY EXPOSE ARMY NETWORKS TO SENSITIVE DATA OR CREATE SITUATIONS IN WHICH DATA IS IMPROPERLY SAFEGUARDED THUS HARMING OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT MISSIONS VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. INFORMATION MARKED AS CLASSIFIED BUT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS NOT CONSIDERED DECLASSIFIED UNTIL ASSESSED BY THE APPROPRIATE ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY AND A DETERMINATION ON ITS DISPOSITION AND CONTINUED CLASSIFICATION IS RENDERED.