Department of Defense

Terms and Definitions of Interest for Counterintelligence Professionals

This Glossary is designed to be a reference for counterintelligence (CI) professionals within the Department of Defense (DoD); however other CI professionals may find it of use. It provides a comprehensive compilation of unclassified terms that may be encountered when dealing with the dynamic discipline of counterintelligence and related activities. Where some words may several meanings within the counterintelligence or intelligence context, a variety of definitions are included.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Strategic Command Cyber Warfare Lexicon

Since the 2006 signing of the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO), the emerging US cyber warfare community continues to mature and its capabilities increasingly compete for consideration when US forces plan operations. Computer network attack (CNA) and electronic attack (EA) technologies have progressed to the point where their use could be routinely considered in the context of existing and developing OPLANS. In order to effectively integrate and standardize use of these non-traditional weapons, the developers, testers, planners, targeteers, decision-makers, and battlefield operators require a comprehensive but flexible cyber lexicon that accounts for the unique aspects of cyber warfare while minimizing the requirement to learn new terms for each new technology of the future. Without a shared understanding of the accurate meanings of a significant number of frequently used terms, it will be difficult to make progress on the more complex and unresolved technical and operational issues for non-traditional weapons: actionable requirements, technical and operational assurance, effective mission planning techniques, and meaningful measures of effectiveness. In fact, the Secretary of Defense’s Information Operations (IO) Roadmap listed its first benefit to the combatant commanders as “a common lexicon and approach to IO, including support to integrated information campaign planning.” Although the focus of cyberspace operations is not the same as that of IO, they share some technologies and until now, no such lexicon (for IO, or any portion of IO) has been published.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Handbook

This handbook provides basic reference information on Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Singapore Cultural Field Guide

Singapore is made up of three main ethnic groups: Chinese, Malays, and Indians. The Chinese ethnic group makes up the majority (75 percent) of the population, followed by the Malays (15 percent) and the Indians (8 percent). Each ethnic group is internally diverse. However, in the view of most Singaporeans, the divisions within each ethnic group are far less significant than those between groups.

U.S. Air Force Instruction: Domestic Imagery Requests for U.S. Missions

Operations involving DI support using ISR/OPSRECCE/RPA involve a balancing of fundamental interests: conducting aircrew training in support of national security objectives and providing incident awareness and assessment support when requested while also protecting individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the U.S. The primary objective of the ACCI is to ensure that ACC units conducting DI missions within U.S. do not infringe on or violate the Constitutional or privacy rights of U.S. persons. Commanders, inspectors general, and judge advocates at all levels must be cognizant of DI policies.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Tactical Combat Casualty Care Handbook August 2013

Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) is the pre-hospital care rendered to a casualty in a tactical, combat environment. The principles of TCCC are fundamentally different from those of traditional civilian trauma care, which is practiced by most medical providers and medics. These differences are based on both the unique patterns and types of wounds that are suffered in combat and the tactical environment medical personnel face in combat. Unique combat wounds and tactical environments make it difficult to determine which intervention to perform at what time. Besides addressing a casualty’s medical condition, responding medical personnel must also address the tactical situation faced while providing casualty care in combat. A medically correct intervention performed at the wrong time may lead to further casualties. Stated another way, “good medicine may be bad tactics,” which can get the rescuer and casualty killed. To successfully navigate these issues, medical providers must have skills and training focused on combat trauma care, as opposed to civilian trauma care.

Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Drone Strikes Civilian Casualty Considerations

The US government has described drone airstrikes in operations outside declared theaters of armed conflict as surgical and causing minimal civilian casualties. Analysis of air operations in Afghanistan, combined with a review of open-source reports for drone strikes in Pakistan, suggest that these fell short of intended goals. Specifically, drone strikes in Afghanistan were seen to have close to the same number of civilian casualties per incident as manned aircraft, and were an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement. Specific causal factors were identified that contributed to the relative propensity of drones to cause civilian casualties. Tailored training that addresses these causal factors could aid in reducing civilian casualties in engagements involving drones. While processes and operating forces in Afghanistan can differ from those in operations outside declared theaters of armed conflict, the factors above suggest that a dedicated analysis of civilian casualties in such operations would be worthwhile.

Restricted U.S. Army Civil Affairs Soldier Training Manual

This manual provides the information necessary for Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers to train for military occupational specialty (MOS) proficiency and includes self-development information that can assist the Soldier in lifelong learning and career development. An overview of the Army training process details the linkage and importance of the various elements that comprise the Army training process.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Cordon and Search Lessons Learned Report

Cordon and search missions have been an almost daily activity in conjunction with other tactical operations within Stability and Support Operations (SASO) in both OEF and OIF. As in all tactical operations, units refined individual tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to meet the requirements of the situations they encountered. Cordon and search activities were not always conducted as discreet missions but as supporting operations within SASO, and can begin as less invasive “cordon and knock” efforts to gain information, and rapidly evolve into “cordon and raid” or “cordon and destroy” as the tactical situation dictates. While these terms may not be found in doctrinal references, units in their observations use them.

U.S. Marine Corps Irregular Warfare Capability Based Assessment Report

Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division (CIWID) was directed to conduct a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) on Irregular Warfare (IW) to ensure that the Marine Corps is properly postured to conduct IW operations and activities in the future. This document provides the results of the analysis and the recommended way ahead. The IW CBA message directed CIWID to “provide insights/observations after each phase of the study which may be used in support of future force structure deliberations.”

U.S. Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Vector Report 2013-2038

Both the current fiscal and future operational environments facing the Air Force influence the landscape for investments in the development and fielding of new technologies. This document refines the Air Force strategic vision for the future of RPA and reemphasizes the inherent potential and emerging capabilities of small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS). The RPA Vector outlines concepts and capabilities needed over the next 25 years. It can inform the capabilities planning and requirements development process as well as inform the CFLIs as they execute their responsibilities for implementation planning in the plans, programming, budgeting and execution process.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan

Biometrics capabilities on the tactical battlefield enable a wide variety of defensive and offensive operations. Biometrics help ensure enemy personnel, criminals, and other undesirable elements are not allowed access to our facilities, hired to provide services, or awarded contracts. Biometrics is used to vet members of the Afghan government and military with whom our forces interact. Unfortunately, biometrics capabilities we put in the hands of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen — and that we ask unit commanders to employ — are relatively recent additions to the list of capabilities our military employs on the battlefield today.

DoD Open Business Model for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ground Control Stations

Over the past twenty years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has acquired a diverse portfolio of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) across the Military Services to meet its national security needs. Newly emergent threats and evolving national security requirements are prompting the DoD to re-evaluate its entire portfolio of systems, while at the same time, seeking to reduce the total ownership costs including lifecycle sustainment costs of these systems. The anticipated reduction in defense spending in concert with advances in information technology provides ample opportunity for DoD to rethink how it acquires, designs, and builds its systems. As a result, DoD is adopting and exploiting open system design principles and architectures to increase competition, foster reuse across systems, and increase interoperability. This new acquisition model requires access to multi-vendor solutions to enable rapid insertion of new technologies to counter emerging threats, avoid technology obsolescence, and decrease time to field new capabilities. DoD is adopting an Open Business Model (OBM) to support the implementation of an Open Architecture (OA) for UAS Ground Control Stations (GCS) in order to drive greater acquisition efficiencies and reduce the total ownership costs. This new model is built upon several lessons learned from the Navy’s own open architecture efforts in the submarine community when it radically changed its approach to building weapon systems due to an emerging threat from an adversary in conjunction with declining budget.