The purpose of this study is to provide a synthesis of the prevailing issues and analysis concerning the legal status of persons in resistance. This document refers broadly to resistance and those involved in it, meaning those individuals comprising the resistance element, US personnel supporting or countering the resistance, and the standing government. In alignment with this focus, the document explores the status of personnel particularly in foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and unconventional warfare (UW) operations. When originally conceived, this manuscript was to be an updated volume of the 1961 American University Special Operations Research Office (SORO) study, The Legal Status of Participants in Unconventional Warfare. The National Security Analysis Department (NSAD) of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) was asked by the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), G-3X Special Programs Division, to review and analyze the historical use of international law, the law of land warfare, and applicable international conventions and update the SORO study accordingly and also include unique legal considerations regarding the status of irregular forces. Because many aspects of both law and policy have changed since the 1961 publication, particularly within the context of US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, USASOC requested that this manuscript be a new document to account for these changes, highlight key legal questions, and position these questions within the context of hypothetical scenarios and historical examples.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Map: ISIS Disposition and Ethnic Groups in Syria and Iraq
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army
Joint Staff Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment on Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement
The underlying concept of this paper is how bio-psycho-social approaches to cognitive engagement, described in greater depth by DeGennaro, may be put to use to collect, analyze, and/or apply information to meet a tactical, operational, or strategic end. This White Paper will focus on the proverbial “rubber meets the road” approaches of behavioral operations in the human domain where the former is “the study of attributes of human behavior and cognition that impact the design, management, and improvement of operating systems, and the study of the interaction between such attributes and operating systems and processes” and the latter is “the presence, activities (including transactions both physical and virtual), culture, social structure/organization, networks and relationships, motivation, intent, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of humans (single or groups) across all domains of the operational environment (Space, Air, Maritime, Ground, and Cyber).” Information Operations (IO) doctrine defines the cognitive domain as the component of the information environment (IE) that encompasses the gray matter of those who transmit, receive, and act upon information. Cognitive operations such as information processing, perception, judgment, and decision-making are the most vital aspect of the IE. Cognition is influenced by individual and cultural beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities, motivations, emotions, experiences, morals, education, mental health, identities, and ideologies and thus requires research and analysis methods from the bio-psycho-social sciences to understand and manipulate. When, how, and most importantly why to apply that understanding to US advantage at the tactical, operational, and strategic level is the focus of this effort.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Commanders Guide to Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Army commanders rely upon timely, relevant, and accurate combat information and intelligence in order to successfully plan, prepare, and execute operations. Human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) are two critical assets commanders have, either organic to their unit’s table of organization and equipment (TOE) or through attachment from a supporting command, which can provide input to both combat information and intelligence. While there are similarities between the methodology and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by HUMINT and CI, their training and missions are separate and distinct.
U.S. Army
Restricted U.S. Army Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator Training Manual
This manual identifies the individual MOS training requirements for soldiers in MOS 96U. Commanders, trainers, and soldiers should use it to plan, conduct, and evaluate individual training in their unit. This manual is the primary MOS reference to support the self-development and training of every 96U soldier.
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army
Joint Staff Strategic Assessment: Counter-Da’esh Influence Operations Cognitive Space Narrative Simulation Insights
When planning to deal with any adversary or potential adversaries, it is essential to understand who they are, how they function, their strengths and vulnerabilities, and why they oppose us. Events over the course of the last year and a half highlight the importance of those factors as they relate to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’esh). One of Da’esh’s obvious strengths is its ability to propagate tailored messages that resonate with its audiences. If the US Government and our allies are to counter Da’esh effectively, we must attack this center of gravity.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Report: Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns
This data set consists of twenty-one teleoperated weapons systems used by terrorist and insurgent groups. It is worth noting that there are many more systems’ images available, but no group affiliation could be associated with them, which is why they were not included in this research project. The plethora of videos and photos on social media indicates that terror and insurgent groups are increasingly turning to improvised weaponry use on the battlefield. One class of improvised weapon that is emerging is remote controlled sniper rifles and machine guns. They are being used across Syria, Iraq, and a lone case in Libya as early as 2011. Typically, rifles or machine guns are improvised to be secured on a base—either mobile or stationary—and linked to cables, which are connected to a remote and screen. Some systems are more refined than others, such as with cameras, but all have at least proven to be somewhat effective.
U.S. Army
Restricted U.S. Army Geospatial Intelligence Handbook
This training circular provides GEOINT guidance for commanders, staffs, trainers, engineers, and military intelligence personnel at all echelons. It forms the foundation for GEOINT doctrine development. It also serves as a reference for personnel who are developing doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; materiel and force structure; and institutional and unit training for intelligence operations.
Russia, U.S. Army
Asymmetric Operations Working Group Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic States
Russia’s strategic objectives in the Baltic region do not focus on the Baltic States as final targets, but on using the Batlic States to discredit and dismantle the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and undermining the European Union (EU) by using the Baltic States. Experts in Russia and European security from the United States and the Baltic region agree that Russia could use the Baltic States toward this end by employing any one of a spectrum of actions, to include direct invasion with conventional forces, an incursion and occupation using irregular forces like the one witnessed in Crimea in 2014, or longterm fostering of social, political, and economic instability. Disagreement existed among experts as to which approach was more likely.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Cultural Assessment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
What follows is an assessment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from a socio-cultural perspective. We have employed a modified PMESII-PT framework for analysis (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Terrain, Time). We have modified PMESII-PT in three ways to emphasize the socio-cultural aspect of this analysis. First, we have expanded the concept of Military to cover all coercive forces in the area of interest. The expanded category includes law enforcement, pro and anti-government paramilitaries, militias, external forces, etc. Second, we added Population and Culture as separate categories. Arguably, these categories could be covered in PMESII-PT under Society, but we saw them as sufficiently important to merit separate chapters. Third, we have expanded the concept of Information, which we have titled Communications, to account for both how information is communicated and how it is received within the society under analysis. With that as background, here is a synopsis of our major findings by category in our modified PMESII-PT framework.
Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army
Joint Staff Strategic Assessment: Maneuver and Engagement in the Narrative Space
This paper was produced in support of the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) led by Joint Staff J39 in support of the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). The paper leverages and melds the latest thinking of academic and operational subject matter experts in fields of organizational and social dynamics, network analysis, psychology, information operations and narrative development, social media analysis, and doctrine development related to aspects of maneuver and engagement in the narrative space.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army TRADOC Report: Syria Threat Tactics
Syria and its ongoing civil war represent an operational environment (OE) that includes many of the characteristics illustrative of the complexities of modern warfare. Now in its fourth year, the civil war in Syria has lured a variety of threat actors from the Middle East and beyond. What began as a protest for improved opportunities and human rights has devolved into a full-scale civil war. As the Syrian military and security forces fought to subdue the civil unrest across the country, these protest groups responded with increasing violence aided by internal and external forces with a long history of terrorist activity. Ill-suited for the scale of combat that was unfolding across the country, Syrian forces turned to their allies for help, including Hezbollah and Iran. The inclusion of these forces has in many ways transformed the military of President Bashar al Assad from a conventional defensive force to a counterinsurgency force.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army TRADOC Report: The Battle for Sinjar, Iraq
This Tactical Action Report (TAR) provides information on the capture and subsequent recapture of Sinjar, a town at the foot of the Sinjar Mountains. The Nineveh Offensive, of which Sinjar was a key target, led to the capture of a large part of northern Iraq and included the occupation of Mosul. ISIL pushed Peshmerga forces from the area and threatened Erbil, the government seat of the KRG in 2014. A growing humanitarian crisis developed as ISIL began purging villages in the Sinjar area of the minority group known as Yazidis. Thousands were killed, kidnapped, or forced to flee their homes. Many Yazidis retreated to the Sinjar Mountains where they were besieged by ISIL fighters. These circumstances led to President Barack Obama ordering air strikes to protect Erbil, where US military advisors were headquartered, and to relieve the displaced Yazidi civilians. Over a year later Peshmerga fighters, with the help of other Kurdish factions, pushed ISIL forces out of Sinjar and other surrounding areas and severed a key supply route connecting ISIL-held Raqqa, Syria, with Mosul, Iraq.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army North Commander Testimony: The Role of the Army in the Homeland
Our history is replete with examples where both Guard and Active forces were employed to respond to our Nation’s disasters. In the recent era, the defining disaster was Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3 hurricane that forced the breach of levies and the subsequent massive flooding of New Orleans. It rapidly overwhelmed the capabilities of Louisiana that saw the C, NGB send upwards of 50,000 Guardsmen from other States and the President send in the 82nd Airborne Division. There have been other similar incidents in our lifetime: Hurricane Andrew (1992) where President Bush sent 2,000 to 5,000 Troops from Ft Bragg, Hurricane Hugo (1989) where over 3,000 Service members were sent in support, and the 1988 Yellowstone Fires where approximately 1,000 active duty Soldiers and Marines provided direct fire line support as part of JTF Yellowstone. These show that there are those potential catastrophic disasters (New Madrid Seismic Zone, Cascadia Subduction Zone, Cyber Attack, or even an Improvised Nuclear Detonation) that can hit the United States where the President will not hesitate to call upon Federal Forces.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Document and Media Exploitation Manual
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Intelligence Support to Urban Operations
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiments (AEWE) Systems Book 2016
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Protection of Civilians Techniques Publication
ATP 3-07.6 discusses the importance of civilian protection during unified land operations and presents guidelines for Army units that must consider the protection of civilians during their operations. Protection of civilians refers to efforts to protect civilians from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term. ATP 3-07.6 describes different considerations including civilian casualty mitigation and mass atrocity response operations.
U.S. Army
Restricted U.S. Army Cryptologic Linguist Training Manual
This publication is for soldiers holding military occupation specialty (MOS) 98G and their trainer/first-line supervisor. It contains standardized training objectives in the form of task summaries that support unit missions during wartime. Soldiers holding MOS 98G should be issued or have access to this publication. It should be available in the soldier’s work area, unit learning center, and unit libraries. Trainers and first-line supervisors should actively plan for soldiers to have access to this publication. It is recommended that each 98G soldier be issued an individual copy.
Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army
Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) Assessment of ISIL Influence and Resolve
During FY 2014, the SOCCENT Commander requested a short-term effort to understand the psychological, ideological, narrative, emotional, cultural, and inspirational (“intangible”) nature of ISIL. As shown below, the SMA1 team really addressed two related questions: “What makes ISIL attractive?” or how has the idea or ideology of ISIL gained purchase with different demographics; and “What makes ISIL successful?” or which of the organization’s characteristics and which of the tactics it has employed account for its push across Syria and Iraq. The effort produced both high-level results and detailed analyses of the factors contributing to each question. The central finding was this: While military action might degrade or defeat factors that make ISIL successful, it cannot overcome what makes ISIL’s message and idea attractive.
U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy
U.S. Military Multi-Service Defense Support of Civil Authorities Manual September 2015
This publication identifies multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). At the tactical level, it assists military planners, commanders, and individual Department of Defense (DOD) components employing military resources and integrating with National Guard Civil Support activities while responding to domestic emergencies in accordance with United States (US) law.
U.S. Army
Restricted U.S. Army Foreign Internal Defense Manual
FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (Joint Publication [JP] 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense). This publication depicts the integrated theater efforts that include ARSOF and conventional forces roles in joint, multinational, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations working in a collaborative environment. It provides an overview of selected sources of power applied through the instruments of national power brought to bear for supporting FID and the impact and interaction of Army units with the other instruments of national power. In addition, it illustrates how FID is a key component of a host nation’s (HN’s) program of internal defense and development (IDAD), and that the focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support that IDAD program to build capability and capacity to free and protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Mastering the Human Domain: Identity Operations for Strategic Landpower
Today, Strategic Landpower faces a complex and interconnected global operational environment characterized by a multitude of actors with unknown identities. This presents a wider range of possible threats than encountered before. Our operational environment has fewer well-defined friends and foes with most actors presented along a continuum of: unknown to partially known to known, throughout the range of military operations. Many found in the middle are susceptible to persuasion. Each of these actors has an agenda, often at odds with our objectives, those of other actors, and the goals of the existing political order. Besides a broad range of readily available conventional weapons, state and non-state actors can select from an array of affordable technologies, adapting them to create unexpected and lethal weapons. Social media enables even small groups to mobilize people and resources in ways that can quickly constrain or disrupt operations. This complex operating environment continuously evolves as conditions change and test our ability to innovate and adapt. The complexity reconfirms the imperative to understand, plan, and employ Identity processes and capabilities within land operations.
Syria, U.S. Army
U.S. Army TRISA Report: The Battle for al Qusayr, Syria
Al Qusayr, a village in Syria’s Homs district, is a traditional transit point for personnel and goods traveling across the Lebanon/Syria border. Located in the southern half of the Orontes valley known as the al Assi basin, its proximity to northern Lebanon has made this region an important logistical area for the rebel forces of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), in what has become known as the Homs front. A typical border region, the al Assi basin’s inhabitants are multinational as well as multi-ethnic with a complex makeup of Sunni, Shia, Alawi, and Christian religions that claim both Lebanese and Syrian Citizenship. Due to the proximity to the border region, and the main north and south highway from Homs to Damascus, al Qusayr is a pivotal point in the Syrian conflict for both the FSA and the pro-regime SAA.