The United Arab Emirates Cultural Field Guide is designed to provide deploying military personnel an overview of UAE’s cultural terrain. In this field guide, UAE’s cultural history has been synopsized to capture the more significant aspects of the country’s cultural environment, with emphasis on factors having the greatest potential to impact operations.
This handbook provides basic reference information on the United Arab Emirates, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to the United Arab Emirates.
Any Internet-connected organization can fall prey to a disruptive network intrusion or costly cyber attack. A quick, effective response to cyber incidents can prove critical to minimizing the resulting harm and expediting recovery. The best time to plan such a response is now, before an incident occurs.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Egypt, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Egypt.
The Egypt Cultural Field Guide is designed to provide deploying military personnel an overview of Egypt’s cultural terrain. In this field guide, Egypt cultural history has been synopsized to capture the more significant aspects of the Egypt cultural environment, with emphasis on factors having the greatest potential to impact operations.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Guatemala, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Guatemala.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 describes how future Army forces, as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational efforts, operate to accomplish campaign objectives and protect U.S. national interests. It describes the Army’s contribution to globally integrated operations, and addresses the need for Army forces to provide foundational capabilities for the Joint Force and to project power onto land and from land across the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The Army Operating Concept guides future force development through the identification of first order capabilities that the Army must possess to accomplish missions in support of policy goals and objectives.
In concert with other agencies, the United States’ Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for defending the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests from attack, including attacks that may occur in cyberspace. In a manner consistent with U.S. and international law, the Department of Defense seeks to deter attacks and defend the United States against any adversary that seeks to harm U.S. national interests during times of peace, crisis, or conflict. To this end the Defense Department has developed capabilities for cyber operations and is integrating those capabilities into the full array of tools that the United States government uses to defend U.S. national interests, including diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, and law enforcement tools.
This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) prepared by the FBI and DHS is intended to provide law enforcement with a summary of significant domestic extremist incidents occurring during the previous 15 months. This product highlights the breadth and frequency of current domestic extremist threats against Homeland targets, and places them in the context of the 20th anniversary of the1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. This information is provided to support the activities of the FBI and DHS and to assist other federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and private sector security officials in identifying existing or emerging threats to homeland security.
The following Army Techniques Publication is an update to a previous Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures publication titled “Law and Order Operations” released in June 2011. A version of the document from January 1945 (FM 19-10) was titled “Military Police in…
Over the last decade, the states of Pennsylvania and Delaware have experienced a sharp increase in prescription opioid abuse and related overdoses, many resulting in death. In an effort to identify potential sources and demonstrate the availability of these abused pharmaceuticals, the DEA Philadelphia Division Intelligence Program conducted a review and analysis of oxycodone, hydrocodone, and buprenorphine orders by registrants in Pennsylvania and Delaware for the years 2010-2013.
As of early March 2015, several extremist hacking groups indicated they would participate in a forthcoming operation, #OpIsrael, which will target Israeli and Jewish Web sites. The FBI assesses members of at least two extremist hacking groups are currently recruiting participants for the second anniversary of the operation, which started on 7 April 2013, and coincides with Holocaust Remembrance Day. These groups, typically located in the Middle East and North Africa, routinely conduct pro-extremist, anti-Israeli, and anti-Western cyber operations.
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Plattsburgh Resident Office (RO) and the New York State Police (NYSP) received credible reporting that Tannerite is being used as a substitute for ammonium nitrate using the “one-pot” methamphetamine manufacturing method. Tannerite, an explosive powder, is otherwise used in the making of exploding firearms targets. This is the first time this particular process has been reported in the New York Division’s area of responsibility (AOR).
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) uses information obtained from license plate readers (LPR) as one investigatory tool in support of its criminal investigations and civil immigration enforcement actions. Because LPR information can be combined with other data to identify individuals and therefore meets the definition of personally identifiable information (PII), ICE is conducting this Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) to describe how it intends to procure the services of a commercial vendor of LPR information in order to expand the availability of this information to its law enforcement personnel. ICE is neither seeking to build nor contribute to a national public or private LPR database.
This issuance updates the Functional Standard for ISE-SARs and is one of a series of Common Terrorism Information Sharing Standards (CTISS) issued by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). While limited to describing the ISE-SAR process and associated information exchanges, information from this process may support other ISE processes, to include alerts, warnings, and notifications; situational awareness reporting; and terrorist watchlisting.
Sovereign Citizen (SC) activity typically involves criminal behavior that is generally non-violent but has lead to threats and plots against Court Officials by the more extremist adherents. Below are some indicators that you have encountered a SC during your normal duties and be a signal that additional precautions against fraudulent filings and personal harm be used.
The vision of the 2014–2017 National Strategy is to connect the geographic and public safety diversity of over 38,000 states, counties, cities, and towns together in a way that creates a national information sharing asset that is coordinated with and contributes to federal information sharing efforts. Federal efforts to connect the knowledge and capabilities of the Intelligence Community (IC) often involve state and local law enforcement joining federal efforts. The NNFC is the reversal and broadening of this framework, inviting federal partners to join state and local public safety information sharing efforts. In carrying out this strategy, IC professionals have an opportunity and avenue to bring their knowledge and capabilities to state and major urban area fusion centers, designated by governors and staffed by state and local professionals. As a unique national asset, this state and local network must work seamlessly with field-based intelligence and information sharing entities, providing geographic and interdisciplinary knowledge and perspective without interrupting or replicating federal efforts. The 2014–2017 National Strategy integrates with other criminal intelligence sharing efforts supported by the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council.
This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide information on a continuing trend of Western youth being inspired by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) messaging via social media to travel to Syria to participate in the conflict. This JIB is provided to support the activities of FBI and DHS to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and private sector security partners in deterring, preventing, or disrupting terrorist attacks in the United States.
An article from volume 20 of the NSA’s internal publication Cryptologic Quarterly discussing the transmission of data via power lines.
The Virginia Fusion Center (VFC) has observed via open sources that actors affiliated with the Anonymous hacktivist movement released a video which purportedly identifies a Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) vehicle as a tool for law enforcement wiretapping efforts by police and fusion center personnel in Chicago, Illinois. The VFC is sharing this information for situational awareness, as emergency management vehicles operating near protest areas may be targeted by precipitating violent or malicious activity.
The open Internet drives the American economy and serves, every day, as a critical tool for America’s citizens to conduct commerce, communicate, educate, entertain, and engage in the world around them. The benefits of an open Internet are undisputed. But it must remain open: open for commerce, innovation, and speech; open for consumers and for the innovation created by applications developers and content companies; and open for expansion and investment by America’s broadband providers. For over a decade, the Commission has been committed to protecting and promoting an open Internet.
Since the May 2010 publication of the Roll Call Release “Terrorist Use of Propane Cylinders,” terrorists have continued to advocate the use of propane cylinders in building improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Throughout 2014, al-Qa‘ida-inspired violent extremists posted on the Internet English-language instructions for building and using propane IEDs and encouraged attacks in the United States. The posts recommended military, commercial, and financial sector targets, major metropolitan areas, and mass gatherings.
Early in 2014, as it became clear that the rise of the so-called “Islamic State” was becoming a significant menace to Regional Stability and US Interests, SOCCENT began a dialogue with Dr. Hriar Cabayan and his co-workers regarding a topic that has been at the core of the struggle against Violent Extremism. That question has been, and remains today, a perplexing one for those of us from Western cultures and societies: “What precisely are we contesting, and what is it that fuels the adversary’s power?” The contents of this paper reflect some of the work that Dr. Cabayan and his colleagues are doing to help us understand and comprehend this “intangible power” across a unique enterprise of academicians, scientists, policy intellectuals, current and former Foreign Service, military, and intelligence professionals. Most importantly, their efforts to improve our comprehension will enable us to adjust our efforts, our operations, our investments, and our risk-‐calculations to more effectively contest it and the organization that wields it. I am grateful for their tireless work in this regard, and I commend it to the reader.
Supervisors and coworkers are willing to report on behaviors that have a clear connection to security, such as transmitting classified documents to unauthorized personnel, but they are unwilling to report on colleagues’ personal problems, such as alcohol abuse. Because it was difficult to discern which reporting requirements were clearly related to security, there was very little reporting. PERSEREC, in collaboration with counterintelligence professionals, developed a clear, succinct list of “Coworker Reporting Essentials” (CORE) behaviors that could pose a possible threat to national security and thus should be reported if observed. The draft CORE was reviewed and edited by counterintelligence professionals at the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), and was coordinated by the DoD Investigative Working Group (IWG).
The world is evolving into an increasingly interconnected environment. The Army of 2020 will operate in a complex world where cloud-based computers receive data from tens of billions of devices. These computers will have the capacity to digest, correlate, contextualize, process and then present data back to humans in a way that assists our decision-making process. The Army is modernizing its network to prepare for the impending data-driven, cloud-based world, as depicted in Figure 1. While legacy networking architectures stored and protected data locally, cloud-based architectures will store and protect data in a centralized yet distributed repository that enables global access. The Army Network Campaign Plan outlines current efforts that posture the Army for success in a cloud-based world.