The following are psychological operations (PSYOP) leaflets dropped over Afghanistan and Iraq during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The leaflets are taken from a booklet released commercially by Giovanni Carmine and Christoph Büchel in 2006. The leaflets are written…
Section 215 is designed to enable the FBI to acquire records that a business has in its possession, as part of an FBI investigation, when those records are relevant to the investigation. Yet the operation of the NSA’s bulk telephone records program bears almost no resemblance to that description. While the Board believes that this program has been conducted in good faith to vigorously pursue the government’s counterterrorism mission and appreciates the government’s efforts to bring the program under the oversight of the FISA court, the Board concludes that Section 215 does not provide an adequate legal basis to support the program. There are four grounds upon which we find that the telephone records program fails to comply with Section 215. First, the telephone records acquired under the program have no connection to any specific FBI investigation at the time of their collection. Second, because the records are collected in bulk — potentially encompassing all telephone calling records across the nation — they cannot be regarded as “relevant” to any FBI investigation as required by the statute without redefining the word relevant in a manner that is circular, unlimited in scope, and out of step with the case law from analogous legal contexts involving the production of records. Third, the program operates by putting telephone companies under an obligation to furnish new calling records on a daily basis as they are generated (instead of turning over records already in their possession) — an approach lacking foundation in the statute and one that is inconsistent with FISA as a whole. Fourth, the statute permits only the FBI to obtain items for use in its investigations; it does not authorize the NSA to collect anything.
The following documents were obtained via a public records request made by members of Occupy Oakland. The documents concern the Oakland Police Department response to protests against the 2013 Urban Shield homeland security exercise held in Alameda County. Urban Shield is an annual exercise series that features nearly fifty different training scenarios for law enforcement ranging from terrorist attacks conducted by “homegrown extremists” to hostage situations, fires and even natural disasters. The 2013 Urban Shield exercise involved dozens of federal, state and local law enforcement organizations, representatives of foreign countries such as Switzerland, Brazil, Bahrain, Jordan, as well as more than a dozen corporations including FedEx, Cisco Systems and Verizon Wireless. The documents are heavily redacted and include an operations plan, a presentation on Occupy Oakland, arrest reports and other miscellaneous documentation related to the protests.
In the first weeks of 2013, police officers were combing through a bloody scene in the Indian state of Jharkhand where a dozen security personnel had died in a shootout with local rebels. The Naxalite fighters, who promote a Maoist ideology through their ongoing guerrilla conflict with the Indian government, had killed the men, including five Central Reserve Police Force members, in a gun battle days before. When local villagers and police tried to remove the bodies, a bomb went off killing four more people. After the incident, a group of doctors in nearby Ranchi were performing an autopsy on one of the bodies when they encountered something metal lodged inside the body. A bomb squad was called in and an explosive device triggered by shifts in pressure that had been sewn into the police officer’s body was successfully defused.
In January 2013, insurgents in India placed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the bodies of two police officers who were killed during an ambush; these devices probably were designed to target first responders, medical personnel, and medical facilities.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Uzbekistan, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Uzbekistan.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Jordan, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Jordan.
This handbook provides basic reference information on the Senegal, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to the Senegal.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Djibouti, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Djibouti.
This handbook provides basic reference information on Botswana, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to Botswana.
This CONOPS describes an overarching concept of operations for the 2012-2018 timeframe that provides a framework for “Unified Exploitation (UE)” operations and the basis to develop supporting capabilities. It establishes linkages to other Army concepts and describes how UE enables decisive action in support of unified land operations. This CONOPS describes the operational context and how commanders integrate supporting UE capabilities through Mission Command to produce an operational advantage. This CONOPS addresses the central military problem: the Army lacks a systematic approach to effectively integrate multiple organizations, disciplines, functions, and processes that support exploitation through their application of tactical, technical, and scientific capabilities. The absence of an organized exploitation framework to develop facts, actionable information or intelligence from collected enemy information, materials, or people, results in a knowledge void. This lack of knowledge may compromise our ability to execute commander directed, follow-on actions and represents tactical and perhaps even strategic opportunities lost.
At the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn in December 2011 and again at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the international community made a commitment to support Afghanistan in its Transformation Decade beyond 2014. Thus, as Afghan authorities assume the lead for security in all regions, and the NATO-led combat mission changes in scope, ministerial and institutional development will likely continue as an enduring mission. This mission is currently being conducted under the authority of Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) as a U.S. mission through bilateral agreements with Canada and the UK. Within the NTM-A/CSTC-A organization, the Deputy Commander- Army (DCOM-A), in coordination with the Ministry of Defense (MoD), generates and sustains the Afghan National Army (ANA), assists in the development of its leaders, and guides the establishment of an enduring institutional capacity in order to deliver a competent and capable Afghan security force. This plan will be reviewed and revised on an annual basis (in November of each year) to ensure that the advising effort and personnel resources are properly adjusted, as the institutional capability and capacity of the MoD and GS c:continues to develop.
From November through December 2013, CDC has received a number of reports of severe respiratory illness among young and middle-aged adults, many of whom were infected with influenza A (H1N1) pdm09 (pH1N1) virus. Multiple pH1N1-associated hospitalizations, including many requiring intensive care unit (ICU) admission, and some fatalities have been reported. The pH1N1 virus that emerged in 2009 caused more illness in children and young adults, compared to older adults, although severe illness was seen in all age groups. While it is not possible to predict which influenza viruses will predominate during the entire 2013- 14 influenza season, pH1N1 has been the predominant circulating virus so far. For the 2013-14 season, if pH1N1 virus continues to circulate widely, illness that disproportionately affects young and middle-aged adults may occur.
Threats to Federal information systems are rising as demands for sharing of information and intelligence between Federal Departments and Agencies increase. It is essential that the Federal Government devise an approach that addresses both challenges without compromising the ability to achieve either objective. Developing a common governance framework and set of Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) capabilities that enhance the security of our systems by ensuring that only authorized persons and systems from different Federal components have access to necessary information is a high priority. The Federal Identity, Credential and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation Guidance was developed to address the need for secure information sharing capabilities across the breadth of the Federal Government.
Over the past ten years, the Federal Government has made concerted advances in the development and implementation of Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM). This progress includes capabilities designed to promote interoperability, assured information sharing, and efficiencies of scale across all agencies within the Federal Government. Recently, several high-visibility events have focused attention on classified networks with a renewed emphasis on information protection within the information sharing paradigm. Organizations must strive to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information by employing advanced capabilities that enable a common level of assurance in information handling and sharing while ensuring the interoperability required to satisfy mission requirements.
Law enforcement officers are often searching for vehicles that have been reported stolen, are suspected of being involved in criminal or terrorist activities, are owned by persons who are wanted by authorities, have failed to pay parking violations or maintain current vehicle license registration, and any of a number of other factors. Law enforcement agencies throughout the nation are increasingly adopting automated license plate recognition (ALPR) technologies, which function to automatically capture an image of the vehicle’s license plate, transform that image into alphanumeric characters, compare the plate number acquired to one or more databases of vehicles of interest, and alert the officer when a vehicle of interest has been observed, all within a matter of seconds.
This Note analyzes the recent use of arson by anarchist extremists targeting urban development sites they describe as negatively impacting lower income residents through “gentrification.” This information is provided to enable federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement; first responders; and private sector security officials to identify, preempt, prevent, or respond to intentional acts targeting urban development sites by anarchist extremist campaigns.
The purpose of this Roadmap is to articulate a vision and strategy for the continued development, production, test, training, operation, and sustainment of unmanned systems technology across DoD. This “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap” establishes a technological vision for the next 25 years and outlines actions and technologies for DoD and industry to pursue to intelligently and affordably align with this vision.
Public Intelligence has obtained the most recent version of the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, the second revision of the document dated August 2013, detailing the U.S. government’s goals and priorities for rebuilding Afghan society. Issued by the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan James Cunningham and signed by the commander of U.S. forces Joseph Dunford, the framework covers U.S. priorities related to governance, the rule of law, socioeconomic development as well as the gradual transfer of authority to the Afghan government. When compared with a previous version of the framework from March 2012, also obtained by Public Intelligence, the document solidifies the prospect of long-term U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, removing optimistic statements about turnover dates and self-sustaining funding estimates and replacing them with measured assessments reinforcing the notion that U.S. and international forces will be present in Afghanistan far into the next decade.
The U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan outlines U.S. priorities through the Transformation Decade (2015-2024). It is meant to be adaptive, giving decision makers in Kabul and Washington, and policy implementers throughout Afghanistan, the flexibility needed to respond to changing conditions while advancing a set of commonly stated strategic goals and priorities.
It is to be expected that nations will continue to require assistance from other states and organizations in order to recover from natural disasters, conflict, or chronic societal problems. Such assistance ends as the host nation (HN) transitions back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency and other actors transition out of their assumed roles and responsibilities. As the HN transitions back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency, it will be faced with issues involving sovereignty, legitimacy, dependency, and social reform. Managing transitions at all levels requires close cooperation between the HN, other governments, militaries, and civil society. Although many of the lessons and best practices used in this guide are derived from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn, the intent is to provide a guide that is flexible enough to be used for transition planning of a military campaign or crisis of any size or scope.
In the year since Sandy Hook, there have been a combined total of 22 actual school attacks and disrupted plots nationwide with some of the attacks resulting in the deaths of students and school personnel. The New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) has examined recent reporting on the Sandy Hook attack and the incidents over the last year and provides the following analysis to law enforcement, school resource officers (SROs), and administrators to assist in school security planning efforts.
A total area of over 62,000 hectare of opium poppy cultivation took place in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar and Thailand in 2013. In order to assess the scope of opium poppy cultivation and opium production in the region, UNODC has been conducting opium surveys in cooperation with the Government of Lao PDR since 1992 and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (GOUM) since 2002, while Thailand established its own monitoring system. This report contains the results of the 2013 UNODC-supported opium poppy cultivation surveys in Lao PDR and Myanmar. In addition, the results from the opium poppy surveys implemented by the Government of Thailand are presented in this regional overview.
Several one page profiles of Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups that are part of a series produced by the New York State Intelligence Center.
In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this study makes an assessment of the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of surveillance practices at stake, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the study contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The study argues that these surveillance programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be engaged from an EU law perspective via (i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights standards and judicial oversight constitute key standards; (ii) the risks presented to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners, and (iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The study then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.