As-Sahab video released December 12, 2009 and featuring Adam Gadahn, who claims that the mujahideen is not responsible for attacks on civilians in Afghanistan.
Originally appeared in a banner ad on an Islamic militant website regularly used by Al-Qaeda on September 6, 2007. The ad carried a picture of Osama bin Laden and the logo of Al-Qaeda’s media production company As-Sahab. An accompanying translated message read “Soon, with the permission of God, a new visual tape, the Sheikh, the Lion, Osama bin Laden. May God protect him.”
HQ International Security Assistance Force Support Group Engineers Brief to the Joint Engineer Training Conference. May 20, 2009.
In order to assist Canadians, and particularly financial institutions, in continuing to cooperate with authorities and in complying with the United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regulations and the United Nations Afghanistan Regulations, the Government of Canada has prepared the attached consolidated list of individuals and entities whose property should be frozen and reported to the relevant authorities.
“Every action of the counterinsurgent should be anchored in law. Any effort to build a legitimate government through lawless action – including unjustified use of force, unlawful detention, torture or punishment without trial – is self-defeating.”
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency
The Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan for Afghanistan provides guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. The Plan represents the collaborative effort of all the USG Departments and Agencies operating in Afghanistan and the range of different equities, resources, and approaches. The Plan is based on close collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and partner nations to build effective civilian and military mechanisms for integrated assistance.
Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. The efforts of PRTs take place every day during a time when major conflict is commonplace in both countries. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the indigenous people. Integrated appropriately, PRTs serve as combat multipliers for maneuver commanders engaged in governance and economics, as well as other critical lines of operation. In addition, PRTs serve as force multipliers for U.S. Government (USG) development agencies engaged across the stability and reconstruction sectors.
The New Silk Road: The Challenge
– Support the imminent doubling of US Forces (primarily in the south and west) and the upgrade of Operating Bases throughout the country, without impacting on‐going sustainment operations or force‐rotations in the north and east regions.
– Security and Risk of theft along the existing route
– Fragile and fractured political climate within Pakistan
– Limited ground routes through Pakistan
– Bureaucratic processes at the AFG‐PAK Border vic Peshawar
– Limited maturity of physical Infrastructure,
– Constrained air network in Afghanistan, particularly the south
Map of all ISAF RC and PRT Locations in Afghanistan as of October 22, 2009.
Kabul International Airport belongs to the MoTCA, which operates KAIA. It is supported by the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). COM KAIA, under the command of COM ISAF, operates the military component of KAIA, assists the Afghan authorities in operating KAIA, and also assumes Air Traffic Control Authority in KABUL Control Zone (CTR).
The first 100 days of any deployment are the most dangerous. It is the time when you know the least about your environment, the time when most of the team really comes together. The enemy knows the first 100 days are when units are the most vulnerable. This handbook is written for Soldiers and leaders. It is intended to help you accomplish your mission and stay alive during the most dangerous and uncertain period. The information presented in this handbook was collected from combat experienced Soldiers, company leaders, and battalion leaders, and it will help you develop your leadership and training skills before deployment and during the first 100 days after deployment.
Map of ISAF Afghanistan PRT/FSB Locations as of October 2007.
Clear Evacuate an area of approx 300 meter
• Evacuate the area as quickly as possible.
• Move people away from the device and not past it.
• Mark your location and note the direction and distance to the device. Move to a minimum distance of 200 meters from the suspect item.
• The On-Scene Commander will make the decision on how large an area to clear. The below danger areas are from ISAF SOP 10370:
• 200 meters – small device/postal bomb
• 300 meters – car bomb
• 600 meters – large device e.g. truck bomb. If an open area, then increase to 1000m.
• Identify and establish an Incident Control Point which must always be searched.
• Make maximum use of hard cover, and ensure personnel are out of the direct Line of Site (LOS) from the suspect area to cleared positions. If cover cannot be obtained, maximize distance from the device.
1 – Do you agree with the proposed limitations on individual, daily and monthly transactions? If not, what limitations would you propose, and what are your justifications for these limitations from an AML/CFT perspective?
Generally, Vodafone supports a risk based approach to transaction limits, with higher limits granted where KYC levels are increased. This has been applied for M-PESA in Kenya.
Article 126.96.36.199 – anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism
The restriction against corporations should be removed. There does not appear to be a valid policy objective behind the restriction and no other jurisdiction of which we are aware has imposed such a restriction. One of DAB’s policy objectives is to increase access to financial services. Banks and micro-finance institutions may use EMI services to provide their services and products to large sections of the Afghan population, thereby increasing access to financial services. Given that banks and financial institutions are corporations, the proposed ban will prevent them from using such EMI services. This totally undermines DAB’s stated objective of increasing financial access. The proposed rule is manifestly disproportionate to the risks arising from EMI practices and is inconsistent with the practices of regulators in other jurisdictions.
Afghanistan’s political transformation, implemented according to the 200 1 Bonn Agreement was successfully concluded in late 2005. As a result o f that historic process, Afghanistan has developed a Constitution, conducted nationwide elections for a President and most recently has elected a Parliament and Provincial Councils. Notwithstanding these timely and commendable achievements, the normalization o f political culture still has a long way to go.
USCENTCOM Civilian and Contractor Arming Policy and Delegation of Authority for Iraq and Afghanistan
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 070902Z Nov 06 DOD, CENTCOM, ORGANIZATIONS, COS USCENTCOM(MC) Subject: MODIFICATION TO USCENTCOM CIVILIAN AND CONTRACTOR ARMING POLICY AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
• Enemy will focus on irregular warfare using asymmetric means to attack and influence advanced nations
• Conventional, unconventional, lethal, non-lethal, state supported, non-state, hybrid organizations, extremism… produce a very complex environment