This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes the United States plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In accordance with subsection (a), it includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the ANSF, with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy and budget, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. This report is the first of the annual reports required through 2010 on the long-term plan for Afghanistan.
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Behsood District, Nangarhar Province District Assessment Report, April 15, 2010.
The purpose of the Business Development and Outreach Program (BDOP) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) is to define the BOOP mission, roles and responsibilities of the Business Development Consultants (SOC) and the J3lDirector, BDOP, U.S. Government contracting procedures, ethical guidelines, BDOP initiatives, education, training and consulting support, vendor engagements, local engagement with government and business leaders, and cultural orientation for u.s. Forces Iraq/Afghanistan and Iraqi/Afghan interlocutors.
In March 2010 Channel 4 News was shown a large consignment of weapons, reportedly destined for Afghan insurgents, which had been intercepted on the Iranian border in Herat province. The weapons seized included landmines, explosives, mortar rounds, RPG rounds and grenades as well as possible IED main charges in cooking pots and jerry cans. Some of the mines had Persian serial numbers. Afghan government records show that 10.5 tonnes of weapons from Iran were intercepted in Herat province during the previous 12 months and Afghanistan claims that 60% of the weaponry came directly from the Iranian government.
Afghanistan Government “London Conference” Pashto Report, January 28, 2010.
ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive, August 29, 2009.
ISAF Governance Working Group Brief, May 2010.
A current method used by the Taliban in Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership, which operates from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan, is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban have recognized the necessity to operate with the cooperation of the local population, with their modus operandi being to gain villagers’ cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary).
Helmand Province‟s political scene is perhaps unique in Afghanistan due to several atypical tribal dynamics produced by the unintended consequences of Western development activities. Projects, like the Helmand Valley Development Authority, led to an uneven tribal resettlement process that introduced outsider ethnic groups into the central portion of the province where they had never resided previously. Second, the potential wealth of the illegal opium industry associated with the reclaimed land from the development project and tribal desires to control it has also been a factor in the development of conflict.
(U//FOUO) JIEDDO Report: Alternative Motivations for IED Use in Afghanistan, December 11, 2009.
(U//FOUO) CIA Open Source Works Report on Afghanistan: Lessons of the Soviet War, March 27, 2009.
The recent capture of the Taliban’s code of conduct manifesto, “Rules and Regulations for Mujahidin,” has offered analysts critical clues into how the Taliban intend to operate as well as how the movement is structured according to the Taliban. Importantly, the new document provides Coalition and Afghan forces a catalog of weak points, vulnerabilities and fears currently entrenched within the Taliban organization and its top echelon of leadership. A thorough examination of the document reveals the Taliban’s attempt to wage a guerrilla campaign implementing a rudimentary population-centric strategy; while calling upon elements of Pashtunwali and Shariat (Islamic) Law into the doctrine as well.
These photos have been released by the Department of Defense and ISAF over the last few years. Some of the photos discuss instances of troops helping with the destruction of poppy fields. Many of the photos do not mention anything…
All of the PRTs in Afghanistan have been under one theater military command (ISAF) since October 5, 2006, when ISAF completed its four-stage geographic expansion throughout the country by assuming responsibility of Region East. Until then, there were two separate military commands – Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) and ISAF – each commanding PRTs in its own separate area of operation. Bringing all the PRTs under one theater commander constituted a major step forward in achieving unity of effort. But even with a single command, achieving coherence among all 26 PRTs remains a challenge, if for no other reason than, as of March 2008, there are 14 different nations leading PRTs.
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are five- to nine-person teams deployed by the Human Terrain System (HTS) to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations. The team is composed of individuals with social science and operational ackgrounds that are deployed with tactical and operational military units to assist in bringing knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework and build relationships with the local power-brokers in order to provide advice and opportunities to Commanders and staffs in the field.
FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Lessons Brief, February 17, 2010.
FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Overview Brief, February 17, 2010.
The following material was extracted from MCCLL reports based on interviews, lessons and observations from operational units that participated in OIF/OEF over the past 36 months. Although this material is based on collections that took place in 2005 through 2007, comments from recent observers and currently deployed individuals indicate that issues on the ground likely remain the same. Content of this paper is grouped in response to specific questions in the TECOM tasking dated 2 April 2008.
The purpose of this guide is to give Commanders, Leaders and Soldiers a training tool representing some of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) used in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation. The intent of this guide is to support readiness, unit training, operational planning, and awareness as well as provide information in relation to Reacting to a Possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED) common task 093-401 -5050. Both training and awareness are a proven and effective force protection tool as well as a combat multiplier.
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) institutions, corruption, lack of economic opportunity and insufficient physical protection.
• Mission can succeed but requires a fundamentally new approach
– Operational culture of ISAF: focus Counter-insurgency (COIN) on winning support of the people.
– Stronger security partnership: accelerate Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and partner at all levels.
– Responsive and accountable governance: an equal priority with security.
– Internal ISAF organizational changes: Unity of Command, Unity of Effort.
• Time is critical. ISAF must be properly resourced to gain and maintain the initiative while ANSF capacity and capability is built.
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.
(SBU) In the early-morning hours of July 7, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) detonated outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. The explosion killed 60 people and injured over 100. This was the deadliest terrorist attack in Kabul since the Taliban government was ousted from power in 2001. This issue of Terrorist Tactics describes how this well-planned attack was carried out and how it possibly could have been avoided if host-country security personnel manning the checkpoint near the embassy were more aggressive in their vehicle inspections. As of this report, no group has claimed responsibility for the attack.