The legal and political environment of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) in which the companies primarily operate and whose laws are required to comply with, requires private companies to cooperate in meeting the interests of the PRC, including participation in intelligence activities etc. At the same time, these companies usually do not refrain from such cooperation with the state; in this environment, efforts to protect customers’ interests at the expense of the interests of the PRC are significantly reduced. According to available information, there is an organizational and personal link between these companies and the state. Therefore, this raises concerns that the interests of the PRC may be prioritized over the interests of the users of these companies’ technologies.
From Multi-Domain Battle to Multi-Domain Operations. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 expands upon the ideas previously explained in Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century. It describes how the Army contributes to the Joint Force’s principal task as defined in the unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy: deter and defeat Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept proposes detailed solutions to the specific problems posed by the militaries of post-industrial, information-based states like China and Russia. Although this concept focuses on China and Russia, the ideas also apply to other threats.
In the 2011 report to Congress on Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive provided a baseline assessment of the many dangers facing the U.S. research, development, and manufacturing sectors when operating in cyberspace, the pervasive threats posed by foreign intelligence services and other threat actors, and the industries and technologies most likely at risk of espionage. The 2018 report provides additional insight into the most pervasive nation-state threats, and it includes a detailed breakout of the industrial sectors and technologies judged to be of highest interest to threat actors. It also discusses several potentially disruptive threat trends that warrant close attention.
In March 2018, an identified financial services corporation received a thumb drive infected with the bank credential-stealing Qakbot malware variant, targeting information from networked computers and financial institution web sites. The financial services corporation purchased bulk thumb drives from a US online retailer of computer hardware. The thumb drives were originally manufactured in China. According to FBI forensic analysis, the Qakbot malware was on the infected thumb drive before the drive arrived in the United States. Qakbot is extremely persistent and requires removal of all malware from every device. Failure to remove even one node of malware may result in re-infecting previously sanitized systems possibly costing the victim hundreds of thousands of dollars in malware removal and system downtime.
(U//LES) ICE Bulletin: Da Jiang Innovations (DJI) Likely Providing U.S. Critical Infrastructure and Law Enforcement Data to Chinese Government
SIP Los Angeles assesses with moderate confidence that Chinese-based company DJI Science and Technology is providing U.S. critical infrastructure and law enforcement data to the Chinese government. SIP Los Angeles further assesses with high confidence the company is selectively targeting government and privately owned entities within these sectors to expand its ability to collect and exploit sensitive U.S. data.
Chinese Talent Programs are a vital part of Chinese industry. Talent programs recruit experts to fill technical jobs that drive innovation and growth in China’s economy. National, provincial, and municipal talent recruitment programs provide opportunities for experts to work in industry and academic organizations supporting key areas deemed critical to China’s development. The talent programs recruit experts globally from businesses, industry, and universities with multiple incentives to work in China. Associating with these talent programs is legal and breaks no laws; however, individuals who agree to the Chinese terms must understand what is and is not legal under US law when sharing information. A simple download of intellectual property (IP) or proprietary information has the potential to become criminal activity.
The FBI is providing the following information with HIGH confidence: The FBI has obtained information regarding one or more groups of cyber actors who have compromised and stolen sensitive business information from US commercial and government networks through cyber espionage. Analysis indicates a significant amount of the computer network exploitation activities emanated from infrastructure located within China. Any activity related to these groups detected on a network should be considered an indication of a compromise requiring extensive mitigation and contact with law enforcement.
Today the Western District of Pennsylvania unsealed an indictment naming five members of the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China on 31 counts, including conspiring to commit computer fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1030), accessing a computer without authorization for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(B)), damaging computers through the transmission of code and commands (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)), aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A), economic espionage (18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1)), and theft of trade secrets (18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1)). Each of the defendants provided his individual expertise to a conspiracy to penetrate the computer networks of six US companies while those companies were engaged in negotiations or joint ventures with or were pursuing legal action against state-owned enterprises in China. The following technical details are indicators released in the indictment related to these actors’ activity.
China’s Military Culture Field Guide is designed to provide deploying military personnel an overview of China’s military cultural terrain. In this field guide, China’s military cultural history has been synopsized to capture the more significant aspects of China’s military cultural environment, with emphasis on factors having the greatest potential to impact operations. The field guide presents background information to show China’s military mind-set through its history, values, and internal dynamics. It also contains practical sections on lifestyle, customs, and habits. For those seeking more extensive information, MCIA produces a series of cultural intelligence studies on China’s military that explores the dynamics of China’s military culture at a deeper level.
This handbook provides basic reference information on China, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to China.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Analysis of Chinese Investments in the U.S. Economy
Once hardly noticeable, Chinese investments in U.S. companies are now rising sharply. Cumulative Chinese investments in U.S. companies remain modest compared to those of other major countries. However, a combination of “push and pull” factors are moving China’s annual investment levels closer to levels consistent with China’s current economic stature.
The PLA’s sustained modernization effort over the past two decades has driven remarkable transformation within the force and put the creation of modern command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure at the heart of the PLA’s strategic guidelines for long term development. This priority on C4ISR systems modernization, has in turn been a catalyst for the development of an integrated information warfare (IW) capability capable of defending military and civilian networks while seizing control of an adversary’s information systems during a conflict.
The People’s Republic of China is one of the global leaders in vaccine research and production, and an active participant in international PI initiatives, but despite steps to improve influenza surveillance and ministerial coordination, major challenges remain to Chinese PI response preparedness. Substantial global concern has emerged in recent years regarding China’s ability to effectively monitor, prevent, and contain infectious disease threats within its borders. Factors including potential Avian Influenza (AI) outbreaks in poultry, China’s immense size and population, a largely underdeveloped health care infrastructure, and a sizable poultry industry all contribute to make China a global PI hotspot and an important area of focus for the potential emergence of human influenza pandemics that threaten the rest of the world.
Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China’s technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China’s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a “key supplier” of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran.
我国腐败分子向境外转移资产的 途径及监测方法研究 Confidential People’s Bank of China Report on Billions in Theft by Government Officials from June 2008.
The recent social unrest and subsequent government overthrows in Egypt and Tunisia have had deep reverberations not only around the Middle East, but throughout the world. While speculation proliferates about which country will be the next to experience such tumult, a critical analysis of important variables present in both countries should be applied to any other country when making this assessment. In this report, those variables will be analyzed with respect to the People’s Republic of China, and the probability it will be the next country to experience social unrest.
Wang Qishan (Chinese: 王岐山; pinyin: Wáng Qíshān; born July 1948 in Qingdao, Shandong) is a politician in the People’s Republic of China who currently serves as the Vice-Premier in charge of economic, energy and financial affairs under premier Wen Jiabao.…
Examples of weekly reports created by the Director of National Intelligence’s Open Source Center analyzing the organization’s continual monitoring of People’s Republic of China internet users’ discussions and online postings.
(U//FOUO) Open Source Center Cuban Officials, Media Celebrate People’s Republic of China Anniversary
Cuban officials and state media marked the recent celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Communist Party rule in China by emphasizing China’s economic might and the importance of bilateral ties. State media also extensively covered the PRC ambassador’s praise for China’s economic achievements under Communist rule, but may have intended this and other coverage more to justify the Cuban Government’s chosen limited economic measures than to signal any shift in Cuba’s economic policy. Cuban officials have continued to cultivate close Chinese ties since the November 2008 visit by President Hu Jintao.
Authoritative PRC media reports of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s live online appearances illustrate authorities’ expanding use of the Internet to set and control policy discourse in Chinese-language virtual space. They also suggest ongoing efforts to manage leaders’ images and portray them as accessible and soliciting online public opinion. While some apparent missteps suggest a cautious, evolving approach to interactive Internet media in relation to top leaders, reported leadership statements indicate sustained attention to the goal of incorporating new technologies into the propaganda system.
This report surveys 10 prominent PRC commentators on military affairs who appear to write blogs hosted on PRC and PRC-owned Hong Kong websites. All of these commentators appear to maintain an online presence using these blogs to promote their viewpoints. Commentators cover such topics as PRC military strategy, air defense, navy issues, army aviation, information technology, defense spending, foreign military developments, military-to-military relations, political education, military history, training, and exercises. These blogs appear on China’s authoritative government websites, popular PRC commercial portal sites, and independent Hong Kong news websites.