International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Standard Operating Procedures for Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel from August 2006.
There is likely to be an IED threat in all military deployments and this should be a key consideration when undertaking the preparation, planning and execution of current and future NATO deployed operations. Generic detail of the threat environments and the C-IED approach are described in Reference A but for each deployment further specific operational analysis must be undertaken to ensure a mission focussed approach. Key to this is the generation of C-IED awareness and capability within the staff at every level of command. This handbook sits under References A and B and is intended to be complimentary to existing NATO doctrinal publications and formation HQ operational planning and capability development. It should be noted that although the handbook is aligned with the AJP 3.15A, it seeks only to provide an operational and tactical level staff perspective. It is designed for use within military HQs at all levels and is equally applicable for National C-IED capability development. It will be a living document and updated and amended in conjunction with NATO publications and the lessons identified/ lessons learned process.
Comprehensive Agreements on Security of Information Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed in June 2002.
One very important first step in the establishment of a military command structure for NATO was the North Atlantic Council’s selection of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe in December 1950. After General Eisenhower arrived in Paris in January 1951, he and the other members of the multinational SHAPE Planning Group immediately began to devise a structure for the new Allied Command Europe. They quickly established a basic command philosophy that divided Allied Command Europe into three regions: the North, containing Scandinavia, the North Sea and the Baltic; the Center, with Western Europe, and the South, covering Italy and the Mediterranean (Greece and Turkey were not yet members of NATO). As for the organizational structure, General Eisenhower’s initial concept was to give each region an overall Commander-in-Chief (CINC). Underneath the CINCs there would be separate Land, Air and Naval Commanders for each region. This concept made great sense militarily, but its implementation soon encountered major political problems in two of the three regions.
Increasingly NATO nations are being involved in military operations that are radically different from traditional scenarios, and that involve operations in towns and cities that may be occupied by a combination of non-combatants and hostile forces. This will lead to requirements for new concepts of operations to be developed, and the impact of novel sensors, or novel ways of deploying or using existing sensors to be investigated. Previous studies have looked at the requirements for operations in this new theatre but have not addressed sensor characteristics or limitations specifically.
Naval operations in high latitudes provide unique challenges to planning, seamanship, ingenuity, endurance, and foresight. The elements, always dangerous, become hostile. Mountainous seas, stormforce winds and near-zero visibility for days on end put tremendous strain on men and material. The Arctic has been defined in a variety of ways. For naval considerations, it is considered to be the area surrounding the geographic North Pole consisting of a deep central basin; the peripheral shallow seas (Bering, Chukchi, East Siberian, Laptev, Kara, Barents, and Norwegian); ice-covered portions of the Greenland and Norwegian Seas; Baffin Bay, Canadian Archipelago, Seas of Japan and Okhotsk; the continental margins of Canada and Alaska; and the Beaufort Sea.
NATO Anti-Piracy Multinational Doctrine Manual containing 813 pages of material relating to Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations, including information on captured persons, materiel and documents.
(U//FOUO) ISAF Regional Command SIGACTs Maps October 4-10, 2010.
ISAF Joint Command District Assessments, April 10, 2008.
Civil-military co-operation is not a new phenomenon within NATO. Traditionally, however, it was seen as presenting little more than a logistic challenge. NATO’s operations beyond its own domestic borders, on territory devoid of fully functioning civil institutions or effective infrastructure present different and more complex challenges. Changes to the environment in which NATO might potentially operate have led to the development of a new Strategic Concept (SC 99)3. This recognises a much wider range of threats to international security than existed hitherto. In addition to continuing to provide for collective defence, the Concept states that the Alliance must stand ready “to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations”.
This document represents the current Concept of Employment (CONEMP) coaltion interoperable intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) system. It provides information for commanders and their staffs on the operational employment of participating network enabled ISTAR systems during coalition operations.
NATO Joint Sea Basing (NJSB) provides the Alliance with another option for the deployment, employment, sustainment and re-deployment of a mission tailored joint force package utilizing a combination of seaborne platforms, strategic sealift and tactical airlift/sealift to rapidly project and sustain multinational forces wherever needed. Simply stated, specified land, air and sea component forces are deployed utilizing existing seaborne platforms resident within NATO member nations’ inventory in conjunction with available strategic sealift assets from the commercial market. Correspondingly, sea basing provides the NATO force commander with a capability to exercise command and control and/or the projection of military and logistics capabilities from seaborne platforms.
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) institutions, corruption, lack of economic opportunity and insufficient physical protection.
• Mission can succeed but requires a fundamentally new approach
– Operational culture of ISAF: focus Counter-insurgency (COIN) on winning support of the people.
– Stronger security partnership: accelerate Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and partner at all levels.
– Responsive and accountable governance: an equal priority with security.
– Internal ISAF organizational changes: Unity of Command, Unity of Effort.
• Time is critical. ISAF must be properly resourced to gain and maintain the initiative while ANSF capacity and capability is built.
HQ International Security Assistance Force Support Group Engineers Brief to the Joint Engineer Training Conference. May 20, 2009.
Map of all ISAF RC and PRT Locations in Afghanistan as of October 22, 2009.
Kabul International Airport belongs to the MoTCA, which operates KAIA. It is supported by the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). COM KAIA, under the command of COM ISAF, operates the military component of KAIA, assists the Afghan authorities in operating KAIA, and also assumes Air Traffic Control Authority in KABUL Control Zone (CTR).
Map of ISAF Afghanistan PRT/FSB Locations as of October 2007.