Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 required the Inspectors General (IGs) of the elements of the Intelligence Community that participated in the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP) to conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The IGs of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence participated in the review required under the Act. The Act required the IGs to submit a comprehensive report on the review to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Committee on the Judiciary.
USNORTHCOM has been assigned the Force Protection (FP) mission and AT Program responsibility for the USNORTHCOM AOR. The purpose of the FP mission is to defend, detect, and mitigate against terrorist attacks directed at DoD personnel, infrastructure, resources, and information to ensure DoD’s continued warfighting capability. The scope of this mission extends to all DoD Elements and personnel in the USNORTHCOM AOR, whether assigned or unassigned to USNORTHCOM. While the FP mission supports USNORTHCOM’s primary missions of Homeland Defense (HLD) and Civil Support (CS), it is a separate task assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) (ref. a.) and is executed through a different chain of command from the specified USNORTHCOM missions of HLD and CS. The successful execution of the USNORTHCOM FP mission enables the USNORTHCOM HLD and CS missions, and assures availability of DoD assets in support of other Combatant Command-assigned missions.
1.1. Reissues Reference (a) to update policies and guidance on the United States Security Authority for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Affairs (USSAN).
1.2. Outlines the method for transmitting NATO security policies within the Department of Defense and assigns responsibilities for maintaining NATO security worldwide.
The Headquarters of the National Security Agency is located on Route 32 just south of the Baltimore/Washington Parkway, on Fort Meade. No formal means of visiting the NSA headquarters exists, but a look at the historic side of code breaking is provided at the neighboring National Cryptologic Museum located north of the headquarters on Route 32.
Cyberspace and its associated technologies offer unprecedented opportunities to the United States and are vital to our Nation’s security and, by extension, to all aspects of military operations. Yet our increasing dependency on cyberspace, alongside a growing array of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, adds a new element of risk to our national security. To address this risk effectively and to sccure freedom of action in cyberspace, the Department of Defense requires a command that posscsses the required technical capability and remains fbcused on the integration or cyberspace operations. Further, this command must be capable or synchronizing wartIghting effects across the global security environment as well as providing support to civil authorities and intemnational partners.
This product characterizes the risk of the currently circulating new H1N1 influenza virus to U.S. forces. It is written primarily for the use of military commanders, medical officers, and operational planners.
The 11 Star Memo, signed in 2005 By CGs FORSCOM, AMC and TRADOC also addressed this gap with specific recommendations to “Realign CONUS DOIMS from IMA to NETCOM for a more unified support similar to OCONUS; optimize C2 for IT management; provide central oversight for IT resources and support; provide MACOMs single POC; and provide adequate investment in DOIM operations” CSA has specifically directed that “ protecting the Army’s networks is not just G6 or G3 business, but rather it is Cdr’s business at all levels (MSG 161304Z Aug 04). Yet, there is no single commander responsible for security and quality of service ensuring CONUS LWN capabilities are prioritized and available to support warfighting, business, and intelligence domains. And, no one is responsible to represent the Information Needs of the Unit and User through all Operational Phases and ensure access to the global collaborative environment.
This site is in Washington, D.C. on the National Mall just south of the railroad bridge that runs beside Route 1 and I-395, approximately 2 miles northeast of the Pentagon. The site is comprised of 2 large temporary buildings, one of which has large exhaust fans on the roof. As of 2006, there were signs at the site for Kiewet, a prominent tunneling firm. According to a Washington Post article from November 26, 2004, the Navy controls the site and describes it as a “utility assessment and upgrade”. The article says that “theories abound about the four-acre complex, which is dead center in a ring that includes the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, Reagan National Airport and the National War College. Is it a sophisticated sensor station, guarding the 14th Street bridge and other Potomac River crossings? Is it an excavation point for underwater barriers to protect the Washington Channel and Potomac River from submarines? Is it a staging area for Navy Seabees securing underwater cables between the White House and the Pentagon, across the river?”
Recent involvement by the U.S. military with hurricane relief and comments by the President on expanding the DOD’s role in disaster relief indicates increased missions for an already stretched military. The next national disaster facing the U.S. could be an influenza pandemic. The bird flu virus H5N1 currently threatening Asia and Europe can potentially mutate into a deadly human influenza pandemic with global consequences. The last major flu pandemic in 1918 killed 50 million people worldwide and 600,000 in the U.S. alone. The United States is not prepared for a human pandemic and the military will have a significant role in any national response. While some departmental level planning has been accomplished recently, interdepartmental coordination and clear identification of the lead federal agency is still lacking. This project explains possible effects of a pandemic on the U.S. and current responsibilities of federal departments involved in disaster relief. Analysis is presented on the evolving role the DOD plays should this event become reality and finally recommends preparations that should be accomplished to prepare the nation for this very real threat. An ad-hoc approach to a pandemic will have severe negative and far reaching affects on our nation and must be avoided.
Care should be taken to protect the quality of information available for friendly decisions and public dissemination. This will ensure the JFC has accurate information by not allowing staffs to unknowingly perceive the joint task force’s (JTF’s) MILDEC efforts as accurate information. This will also ensure the information made public by the JFC is not part of any MILDEC action and lose the public’s trust.
This regulation provides Army policy and guidance for establishing civilian inmate labor programs and civilian prison camps on Army installations. Sources of civilian inmate labor are limited to on– and off–post Federal corrections facilities, State and/or local corrections facilities operating from on–post prison camps pursuant to leases under Section 2667, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2667), and off–post State corrections facilities participating in the demonstration project authorized under Section 1065, Public Law (PL) 103–337. Otherwise, State and/or local inmate labor from off–post corrections facilities is currently excluded from this program.
Biometric capabilities shall be developed to be interoperable with other identity management capabilities and systems, both internal and external to the Department of Defense, to maximize effectiveness. System development and capability implementation strategies shall be harmonized, integrated, and unified with identity protection and management stakeholder organizations to ensure consistency with DoD identity management principles, directives, and vision.
a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.
b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05 (Reference (b)).
c. Conduct IW independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare.
(1) IW can include a variety of steady-state and surge DoD activities and operations:
counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state.
(2) While these activities may occur across the full range of military operations, the balance or primary focus of operations gives a campaign its predominant character.
All DoD continuity planning and programming shall:
(1) Be based on the assumption that no warning of attack or event will be received.
(2) Ensure the performance of MEFs during any emergency for a period of up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed. The capability to perform MEFs at alternate sites must be fully operational as soon as possible, but no later than 12 hours after COOP activation.
(3) Be based on risk-management assessments to ensure that appropriate operational readiness decisions consider the probability of an attack or incident and its consequences.
(4) Emphasize the permanent and routine geographic distribution of leadership, staff, and infrastructure in order to increase survivability and maintain uninterrupted capability to accomplish DoD MEFs.
These regulations conform to regulations of the United States Departments of Health and Human Services; Agriculture; Treasury; Interior; and Commerce. The regulations are intended to prevent the introduction and dissemination, domestically or elsewhere, of diseases of humans, plants and animals, prohibited or illegally taken wildlife, arthropod vectors, and pests of health and agricultural importance. Introduction and dissemination may occur by movements of vessels, aircraft, or other transport of the Armed Forces arriving at or leaving Armed Forces installations in the United States and foreign countries or ports or other facilities under the jurisdiction of the above Federal agencies in the United States and its territories, commonwealths, and possessions.