Department of Defense

7th Signal Command (T)

The 11 Star Memo, signed in 2005 By CGs FORSCOM, AMC and TRADOC also addressed this gap with specific recommendations to “Realign CONUS DOIMS from IMA to NETCOM for a more unified support similar to OCONUS; optimize C2 for IT management; provide central oversight for IT resources and support; provide MACOMs single POC; and provide adequate investment in DOIM operations” CSA has specifically directed that “ protecting the Army’s networks is not just G6 or G3 business, but rather it is Cdr’s business at all levels (MSG 161304Z Aug 04). Yet, there is no single commander responsible for security and quality of service ensuring CONUS LWN capabilities are prioritized and available to support warfighting, business, and intelligence domains. And, no one is responsible to represent the Information Needs of the Unit and User through all Operational Phases and ensure access to the global collaborative environment.

Unknown Navy Project

This site is in Washington, D.C. on the National Mall just south of the railroad bridge that runs beside Route 1 and I-395, approximately 2 miles northeast of the Pentagon. The site is comprised of 2 large temporary buildings, one of which has large exhaust fans on the roof. As of 2006, there were signs at the site for Kiewet, a prominent tunneling firm. According to a Washington Post article from November 26, 2004, the Navy controls the site and describes it as a “utility assessment and upgrade”. The article says that “theories abound about the four-acre complex, which is dead center in a ring that includes the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, Reagan National Airport and the National War College. Is it a sophisticated sensor station, guarding the 14th Street bridge and other Potomac River crossings? Is it an excavation point for underwater barriers to protect the Washington Channel and Potomac River from submarines? Is it a staging area for Navy Seabees securing underwater cables between the White House and the Pentagon, across the river?”

Avian Influenza Pandemic May Expand the Military Role in Disaster Relief

Recent involvement by the U.S. military with hurricane relief and comments by the President on expanding the DOD’s role in disaster relief indicates increased missions for an already stretched military. The next national disaster facing the U.S. could be an influenza pandemic. The bird flu virus H5N1 currently threatening Asia and Europe can potentially mutate into a deadly human influenza pandemic with global consequences. The last major flu pandemic in 1918 killed 50 million people worldwide and 600,000 in the U.S. alone. The United States is not prepared for a human pandemic and the military will have a significant role in any national response. While some departmental level planning has been accomplished recently, interdepartmental coordination and clear identification of the lead federal agency is still lacking. This project explains possible effects of a pandemic on the U.S. and current responsibilities of federal departments involved in disaster relief. Analysis is presented on the evolving role the DOD plays should this event become reality and finally recommends preparations that should be accomplished to prepare the nation for this very real threat. An ad-hoc approach to a pandemic will have severe negative and far reaching affects on our nation and must be avoided.

Military Deception

Care should be taken to protect the quality of information available for friendly decisions and public dissemination. This will ensure the JFC has accurate information by not allowing staffs to unknowingly perceive the joint task force’s (JTF’s) MILDEC efforts as accurate information. This will also ensure the information made public by the JFC is not part of any MILDEC action and lose the public’s trust.

Civilian Inmate Labor Program

This regulation provides Army policy and guidance for establishing civilian inmate labor programs and civilian prison camps on Army installations. Sources of civilian inmate labor are limited to on– and off–post Federal corrections facilities, State and/or local corrections facilities operating from on–post prison camps pursuant to leases under Section 2667, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2667), and off–post State corrections facilities participating in the demonstration project authorized under Section 1065, Public Law (PL) 103–337. Otherwise, State and/or local inmate labor from off–post corrections facilities is currently excluded from this program.

DoD Directive 8521.01E

Biometric capabilities shall be developed to be interoperable with other identity management capabilities and systems, both internal and external to the Department of Defense, to maximize effectiveness. System development and capability implementation strategies shall be harmonized, integrated, and unified with identity protection and management stakeholder organizations to ensure consistency with DoD identity management principles, directives, and vision.

DoD Directive 3000.07

a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.
b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05 (Reference (b)).
c. Conduct IW independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare.
(1) IW can include a variety of steady-state and surge DoD activities and operations:
counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state.
(2) While these activities may occur across the full range of military operations, the balance or primary focus of operations gives a campaign its predominant character.

DOD Directive 3020.26

All DoD continuity planning and programming shall:
(1) Be based on the assumption that no warning of attack or event will be received.
(2) Ensure the performance of MEFs during any emergency for a period of up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed. The capability to perform MEFs at alternate sites must be fully operational as soon as possible, but no later than 12 hours after COOP activation.
(3) Be based on risk-management assessments to ensure that appropriate operational readiness decisions consider the probability of an attack or incident and its consequences.
(4) Emphasize the permanent and routine geographic distribution of leadership, staff, and infrastructure in order to increase survivability and maintain uninterrupted capability to accomplish DoD MEFs.

Quarantine Regulations of the Armed Forces

These regulations conform to regulations of the United States Departments of Health and Human Services; Agriculture; Treasury; Interior; and Commerce. The regulations are intended to prevent the introduction and dissemination, domestically or elsewhere, of diseases of humans, plants and animals, prohibited or illegally taken wildlife, arthropod vectors, and pests of health and agricultural importance. Introduction and dissemination may occur by movements of vessels, aircraft, or other transport of the Armed Forces arriving at or leaving Armed Forces installations in the United States and foreign countries or ports or other facilities under the jurisdiction of the above Federal agencies in the United States and its territories, commonwealths, and possessions.