U.S. Army TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) report on the Taliban’s use of civilian shields from April 2010.
Firefighters’ roles as a first responder and an emergency medical service allow for unique access to people and information, which can generate invaluable tips and leads. Because the presence and effectiveness of firefighters mitigate the impact of a terrorist incident involving massive human casualties, terrorists have historically conducted preoperational planning that target firefighting agencies in order to limit the effectiveness of their reaction capabilities.
For the National Security Prosecutor’s Unit (NSPU) or a provincial court to prosecute and convict detainees, including Afghan murder suspects or National Security criminals, capturing units must provide evidence and witness statements against the suspects for use in an Afghan court of law. Appropriate evidence collection may result in admissible evidence in support of effective prosecutions. Turn all evidence associated with the suspect over to Afghan authorities and obtain a thoroughly documented receipt for the evidence.
A transcript of a private meeting held in 1968 in the New York Pratt House of the Council on Foreign Relations. The meeting was attended by a number of prominent members of the early U.S. intelligence community, including Richard Bissell and Allen Dulles. The transcript was reportedly discovered by Vietnam War protesters who occupied a building in 1971 housing Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. One of the attendees of the secret meeting, William Harris, served as an associate to the Center for International Affairs and this transcript was found in his personal files. The transcript was published in full in the 1974 book “The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence” by Victor Marchetti, a former special assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and John D. Marks, a former officer of the United States Department of State. The meeting transcript is described in the book as the “most complete description of the CIA’s covert-action strategy and tactics ever made available to the outside world.”
The DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center produced this threat assessment to support implementation of 6 Code of Federal Regulations Part 27, “Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS).” This assessment describes the potential terrorist threat to the chemical and petroleum facilities regulated under CFATS and determined to be high risk by the Secretary of Homeland Security. It does not address facilities that may hold threshold quantities of the chemicals listed in CFATS that fall outside its scope, such as public water facilities or facilities regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Nor does it address the transportation of chemicals, which is regulated under other authorities. Potential terrorist tactics against such facilities—based on DHS’ knowledge of terrorist intentions and capabilities—are included to aid industry security personnel in implementing security measures at their facilities.
U.S. Army Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) Reference Card produced by the Asymmetric Warfare Group in December 2010.
The 2010 tax return for the New York charity American Friends of Bilderberg.
This handbook is a compilation of tools to help all soldiers collect information through tactical questioning and EPW/detainee and document handling in Offensive, Defensive, Stability, and Support operations. However, most of the handbook was developed specific to small unit patrols, traffic control points (TCPs)/ roadblocks, and other interaction with the local population in the Middle East.
This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counterguerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments. It provides a general overview of US counterinsurgency strategy and the impact that strategy has on counterguerrilla operations. It provides planning, training, and operational guidance for commanders and staffs conducting counterguerrilla operations. The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations. In applying these principles, the commander must be aware that the situation in each counterguerrilla operation is unique. Techniques and tactics applied successfully in one situation may not be suitable if applied in the same manner in another situation. The principles in this manual are guides to be adapted to each counterguerrilla situation.
The following photos were produced by NASA via the Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) on NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO). The first few photos depict solar flares occurring over the last several days, which have reportedly created the strongest solar storms in…
This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication will assist in advising foreign forces. It serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. This MTTP is intended to provide units and personnel that are scheduled to advise foreign forces (FF) with viable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so that they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Currently, material regarding advising is found in joint and Service doctrinal treatment of foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), security assistance (SA), and unconventional warfare (UW). Several Services are developing documents that focus on basic survival and common advisor skills, but do not sufficiently cover how an advisor team might function at all levels. This MTTP provides guidance that will help to enhance the activities of some advisor functions and improve inter-Service coordination for this joint mission.
Unconventional warfare, or UW, is defined as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. Inherent in this type of operation are the inter-related lines of operation of armed conflict and subversion. The concept is perhaps best understood when thought of as a means to significantly degrade an adversary’s capabilities, by promoting insurrection or resistance within his area of control, thereby making him more vulnerable to a conventional military attack or more susceptible to political coercion. “UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives.”
Director of National Intelligence 2012 Report on Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay
Based on trends identified during the past 9 years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Posing a particular problem are transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations.
Anonymous/LulzSec Sabu, Kayla, Topiary, Anarchaos, Palladium, Pwnsauce Indictment and Criminal Complaints
Indictments and criminal complaints for Anonymous/LulzSec members Sabu, Kayla, Topiary, Anarchaos, Palladium, Pwnsauce released March 6, 2012.
Understanding the local culture is critical to mission success. This Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG ) will contribute to an initial Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment that should be continuously updated by line companies. It is intended to aid Marines in the identification of key cultural observables during security and atmospherics patrols, while at the same time helping tactical unit leaders identify the information needed to understand and influence their local environment. The intent is to anticipate the second and third order effects of our actions in order to shape and influence events to our advantage.
A collection of “cultural intelligence” reports for the Afghanistan region were created by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA). They represent some of the only known public examples of MCIA cultural intelligence reports available on the web. In 2008, a MCIA cultural intelligence report on Iran’s culture was obtained and published by the Center for Public Integrity. The following reports on Afghan culture were produced in 2002, but are still believed to be in use by advisers and soldiers today.
These principles do not forbid the use of stealth or technologically advanced weapons. In fact, the use of advanced weapons may help to ensure that the best intelligence is available for planning and carrying out operations, and that the risk of civilian casualties can be minimized or avoided altogether. Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces. This is simply not accurate. “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.
Islam is practiced differently in Afghanistan than in any other part of the world. For operations in Afghanistan, it is significant to know the origins of existing cultural influences come from pre-Islamic Central Asian beliefs. This knowledge is necessary for two key reasons. First, understanding the specific cultural-religious mindset of local Afghans is essential to successful operations within the population. Secondly, Afghan cultural Islam conflicts with the fundamentalist Islamic movements that influence the current insurgency. Knowing and exploiting these differences can be beneficial to counteracting insurgent IO campaigns and to discourage local Afghans from identifying with insurgent groups vying for control of the population.
This document represents an effort by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) to equip Army special operations forces (ARSOF) with a better tool for understanding religious considerations in mission planning. Today’s culturally centric warfare places ARSOF Soldiers in high demand. Soldiers trained in the skills of cultural competence and cultural analysis provide an effective mission planning tool for developing an understanding of the operational environment.
Last May, we wrote an unusual piece that went largely unnoticed about how a staggering phenomenon had begun to develop of people sending us mail for Henry Kissinger. Through some sort of confused “identity confusion” many people stumbled across a page on our site containing an unflattering profile of Henry Kissinger and his company’s past activities, including connections to money laundering, weapons trading banks. For some reason, this single posting on the site convinced a large number of people that we were Henry Kissinger and/or his firm Kissinger Associates. So, we wrote an elaborate and slightly comical article about how much mail we receive for Mr. Kissinger and a number of other entities. We detailed how we receive search warrants for criminal proceedings because we’ve published a number of lawful access guides for telecom companies, how we receive NSA purchase orders because we have a single page about the Maryland Procurement Office, and how we received an invitation to a White House event that was intended for Mr. Kissinger. We concluded the article with some useful commentary about the implications of such rampant misidentification even at seemingly high levels of government and business. We even added a large, bold warning at the top of the page about Kissinger Associates to make it emphatically clear that we are not Henry Kissinger.
A 2011 version of the International Security Assistance Force Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) Advisor Guide.
Improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) typically are less expensive to make than improvised explosive devices but still are capable of creating mass casualties and causing widespread fear and panic. Improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) can be constructed easily from everyday materials available at hardware and grocery stores. IIDs can be used against many types of infrastructure targets; violent extremists have used them successfully in attacks in the United States and overseas.
(U//FOUO) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study
The intent of Phase I initial impressions is to provide rapid support to the Warfighter. In parallel, these insights serve as part of a broader Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study, which JCISFA will publish in the spring of 2011. These observations and insights may support planning and decision-making within the NTM-A/CSTC-A as well as joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) organizations responsible for force generation supporting the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission. Specifically, this report addresses contemporary issues and senior leader perspectives within the NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministerial-Level Advisor program to include prospective gaps across joint DOTMLPF-P domains. The following illustrates the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission.
A contract solicitation posted to the Federal Business Opportunities website between February 10 – 24, 2012 concerning the construction of a temporary camp anywhere in the continental United States (CONUS) within 72 hours in a disaster-impacted area or “any other situation where FEMA or an agency working through FEMA needs a RSC” to host up to 2,000 responders and emergency staff as well as displaced citizens.