Understanding the local culture is critical to mission success. This Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG ) will contribute to an initial Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment that should be continuously updated by line companies. It is intended to aid Marines in the identification of key cultural observables during security and atmospherics patrols, while at the same time helping tactical unit leaders identify the information needed to understand and influence their local environment. The intent is to anticipate the second and third order effects of our actions in order to shape and influence events to our advantage.
A collection of “cultural intelligence” reports for the Afghanistan region were created by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA). They represent some of the only known public examples of MCIA cultural intelligence reports available on the web. In 2008, a MCIA cultural intelligence report on Iran’s culture was obtained and published by the Center for Public Integrity. The following reports on Afghan culture were produced in 2002, but are still believed to be in use by advisers and soldiers today.
These principles do not forbid the use of stealth or technologically advanced weapons. In fact, the use of advanced weapons may help to ensure that the best intelligence is available for planning and carrying out operations, and that the risk of civilian casualties can be minimized or avoided altogether. Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces. This is simply not accurate. “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.
Islam is practiced differently in Afghanistan than in any other part of the world. For operations in Afghanistan, it is significant to know the origins of existing cultural influences come from pre-Islamic Central Asian beliefs. This knowledge is necessary for two key reasons. First, understanding the specific cultural-religious mindset of local Afghans is essential to successful operations within the population. Secondly, Afghan cultural Islam conflicts with the fundamentalist Islamic movements that influence the current insurgency. Knowing and exploiting these differences can be beneficial to counteracting insurgent IO campaigns and to discourage local Afghans from identifying with insurgent groups vying for control of the population.
This document represents an effort by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) to equip Army special operations forces (ARSOF) with a better tool for understanding religious considerations in mission planning. Today’s culturally centric warfare places ARSOF Soldiers in high demand. Soldiers trained in the skills of cultural competence and cultural analysis provide an effective mission planning tool for developing an understanding of the operational environment.
Last May, we wrote an unusual piece that went largely unnoticed about how a staggering phenomenon had begun to develop of people sending us mail for Henry Kissinger. Through some sort of confused “identity confusion” many people stumbled across a page on our site containing an unflattering profile of Henry Kissinger and his company’s past activities, including connections to money laundering, weapons trading banks. For some reason, this single posting on the site convinced a large number of people that we were Henry Kissinger and/or his firm Kissinger Associates. So, we wrote an elaborate and slightly comical article about how much mail we receive for Mr. Kissinger and a number of other entities. We detailed how we receive search warrants for criminal proceedings because we’ve published a number of lawful access guides for telecom companies, how we receive NSA purchase orders because we have a single page about the Maryland Procurement Office, and how we received an invitation to a White House event that was intended for Mr. Kissinger. We concluded the article with some useful commentary about the implications of such rampant misidentification even at seemingly high levels of government and business. We even added a large, bold warning at the top of the page about Kissinger Associates to make it emphatically clear that we are not Henry Kissinger.
A 2011 version of the International Security Assistance Force Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) Advisor Guide.
Improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) typically are less expensive to make than improvised explosive devices but still are capable of creating mass casualties and causing widespread fear and panic. Improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) can be constructed easily from everyday materials available at hardware and grocery stores. IIDs can be used against many types of infrastructure targets; violent extremists have used them successfully in attacks in the United States and overseas.
(U//FOUO) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study
The intent of Phase I initial impressions is to provide rapid support to the Warfighter. In parallel, these insights serve as part of a broader Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study, which JCISFA will publish in the spring of 2011. These observations and insights may support planning and decision-making within the NTM-A/CSTC-A as well as joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) organizations responsible for force generation supporting the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission. Specifically, this report addresses contemporary issues and senior leader perspectives within the NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministerial-Level Advisor program to include prospective gaps across joint DOTMLPF-P domains. The following illustrates the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission.
A contract solicitation posted to the Federal Business Opportunities website between February 10 – 24, 2012 concerning the construction of a temporary camp anywhere in the continental United States (CONUS) within 72 hours in a disaster-impacted area or “any other situation where FEMA or an agency working through FEMA needs a RSC” to host up to 2,000 responders and emergency staff as well as displaced citizens.
Tattoos are useful indicators to identify individuals who are members of a gang or a criminal organization. It is important to note that an image may have several different, occasionally innocuous, meanings, depending on the interpretation of the individual or gangs using it. The Organized Crime Section (OCS) is providing the following tattoos and their definitions as a tool to assist officers in detecting gang members or members of a criminal organization. It is important that Border Services Officers contact their Regional Intelligence Officers to assist in determining a subject’s admissibility to Canada.
What information from its most recent gang threat assessment does the FBI want to keep only for the eyes of law enforcement? Thanks to the publication of the full “law enforcement sensitive” version of the assessment on the website of the California Gang Investigator’s Association, we now know the answer to that question. The full version of the document contains approximately twenty additional pages of information regarding gang threats across the U.S. including details on the incredible proliferation of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Most of the content derived from non-public reporting sources, such as FBI field reports, concerns specific incidents that are described more generally in the public version of the document. There are also some rather startling statistics omitted from the public version. For example, the fact that 36% of law enforcement report that gangs in their jurisdiction have ties to Mexican criminal gangs and drug trafficking organizations is omitted from the public version of the report.
Gang members armed with high-powered weapons and knowledge and expertise acquired from employment in law enforcement, corrections, or the military will likely pose an increasing nationwide threat, as they employ these tactics and weapons against law enforcement officials, rival gang members, and civilians. Associates, friends, and family members of gangs will continue to play a pivotal role in the infiltration and acquisition of sensitive information.
The National ICT R&D Fund invites proposals from academia/research institutions, companies, organizations for the development, deployment and operation of a national level URL Filtering and Blocking System. Institutions/organizations/companies desirous of developing, deploying and managing the proposed system are requested to submit their proposals to the ICT R&D Fund Islamabad by 1500 hrs on 2nd March, 2012 as per the prescribed format.
A manual for the Department of Homeland Security’s Media Monitoring Capability that was reportedly obtained by EPIC via a FOIA request. The manual has been slightly redacted by DHS to remove names and contact information and the URL of the Network Operations Center Media Monitoring Capability reporting website. This website has been listed in three of the four publicly available manuals as an example of a website monitored by DHS.
A manual for the California-based outsourcing company oDesk is used by “live content” moderators of Facebook to provide standards for monitoring photos and postings in accordance with Facebook’s abuse and inappropriate content provisions. The manual was originally provided to Gawker by a 21-year-old Moroccan man who says he was paid $1 dollar an hour to scan Facebook for illicit content.
Fully understanding the imperative to balance employment of fires to defeat the enemy with the necessity to protect civilian lives, the Marine Corps has modified the training / education of ground commanders, aviators, forward air controllers (FACs), joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), and others in the fire support approval chain. This incorporates lessons and guidance contained in the USJFCOM investigation into the Farah incident and the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) tactical directive issued in July 2009.
The release of a toxic industrial chemical (TIC) by a terrorist group or lone actor represents a significant threat. TICs are readily available in large quantities, routinely shipped by commercial carriers, and often stored in bulk containers. Most TICs are generally less toxic than chemical warfare (CW) agents, but a large volume of TICs can be equally dangerous. The release of a TIC in a populated area is capable of generating numerous casualties and deaths; the toxic effects would be more dangerous if release occurred in an enclosed space.
A video taken by a friend of California artist Thomas Flournoy who was beaten by officers with the Santa Rosa Police Department during a violent arrest for obstructing officers following a local event. Sonoma County Deputy District Attorney Andrew Lukas has reportedly requested that a judge produce a court order to demand the removal of this video from YouTube. Lukas claims that the video depicts a “limited view” of the incident and could cause a bias among potential jurors. We have re-uploaded the video and and are making he original MP4 file available for download so that others may share the video as they wish.
Two reports from the U.S. TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) regarding suicide attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan going back as far as 2007.
Like Damocles’ sword, this global interconnectivity both strengthens us and moderates us at the same time. We are strengthened because we are better connected to others than ever before and thus capable of spreading the seeds of liberty and opportunity to populations that yearn for it and where the lack of it is still being justified. We are moderated by this interconnectivity because others can more easily exploit the seams and turn our freedoms against us to infect with vitriolic propaganda that violently radicalizes populations across this interconnected web. It is the matter of moderation of our strength that brought together the remarkable group of thinkers whose words are reflected within this report. We are concerned here with the problem of deterring violent non-state actors from doing harm to our nation and to our allies. The questions of extending freedom through access while mitigating the misuse of that freedom to harm us were the dominant questions we took up in this workshop.
An unnamed representative of the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives has requested the removal of a document from this website. The document in question was published more than 2 years ago in January 2010 when this website was less than six months old. The document is effectively one page in length, with a cover and an information page listing a phone number and contact information. The one page of content in the document describes an incident in September 2008 when a quantity of “Magnum Ultra” explosive detonator material from a supply store in Concord, North Carolina.
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) produces Infrastructure Protection Notes to address issues impacting the infrastructure protection community’s risk environment from terrorist threats and attacks, natural hazards, and other events. Based on the analysis within the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis product Evolution of the Terrorist Threat to the United States this IP Note outlines the evolution of terrorist threats and impacts to the Nation’s critical infrastructure.
Criminal complaint against Amine El Khalifi, a Moroccan man accused of attempting to bomb the U.S. Capitol building. The complaint was filed February 17, 2012.