U.S. Confidential Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) August 25, 2010 Draft.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, Virginia
(U//LES) Virginia Fusion Center Mara Salvatrucha 13 Report
Mara Salvatrucha 13, or MS-13, is a transnational, mainly Hispanic, street gang notorious for its adherence to a methodology of extreme violence to enforce fear and establish street credibility. MS-13 diverges from the traditional American street gang model in that it maintains cross border organizational ties, and currently poses a serious threat throughout Central America, Mexico, and Canada, as well as domestically in the United States. In Virginia, the influx of Salvadoran immigrants to the Washington. DC metro area has created the second domestic center for the gang’s American presence. Membership has been documented across the National Capitol Region and in central Virginia, making it the major gang threat to Northern Virginia and a major concern for the Commonwealth as a whole. Demographic change in the Commonwealth, combined with the potential expansion of MS-13 membership to non-Hispanic individuals, constitutes a serious potential threat to public safety.
United States
Blackwater/Xe Front Companies Chart
An interactive chart of more than 30 Blackwater/Xe Services LLC Front Companies.
Department of Homeland Security, Nevada
Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy 2010
The purpose of the Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS) is to identify and address statewide priorities to achieve and sustain a strengthened ability to prevent, detect, deter, mitigate against, prepare for, respond to and recover from any natural, manmade and/or technological emergency or disaster up to and including any act of terrorism. The State, through implementation of this strategy, is seeking outcomes that will ensure a safe and secure Nevada through enhanced capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, rapid first response and recovery, the protection of critical infrastructure, and to promote public education and awareness.
Defense Intelligence Agency
(U//FOUO) Defense Intelligence Agency Ammonium Nitrate Threat Warning
(U//FOUO) Terrorists typically favor basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), off-the-shelf technology and readily available resources when planning and carrying out an attack. While simplistic in effort, these factors can be a lethal and destructive combination. Terrorists also continue to explore innovative attack options that take advantage of overlooked vulnerabilities inherent to the civilian sector. One such vulnerability is transporting bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate (AN) via the road, rail and waterway network. Using a region’s bulk AN transportation network to attack critical infrastructure and urban centers would arguably qualify as a high probability — high casualty/destruction threat scenario.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Army Unauthorized Information Dissemination Safeguards in Response to WikiLeaks
(U/FOUO) 1. ALL ARMY ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY REVIEW AND REVALIDATE WHO HAS SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR(SA)/POWER USER PRIVILEGES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) REF A, THESE PERSONNEL SHALL BE GRANTED THE MINIMUM SET OF PRIVILEGES REQUIRED TO PERFORM THEIR JOBS AND NOTHING MORE. ALL ACTIVITIES MUST ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THESE PERSONNEL AND THAT NO OTHER PERSONNEL HAVE THESE PRIVILEGES. THIS IS KEY TO PRECLUDING UNAUTHORIZED DOWNLOADING AND DISSEMINATION OF SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Army WikiLeaks Warning: Classified Public Information
ARMY PERSONNEL MUST BE VIGILANT WITH REGARD TO THE INFORMATION POSTED ON THE WIKILEAKS WEBSITE AND ANY OTHER WEBSITE THAT PURPORTS TO PUBLISH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. VIEWING, DOWNLOADING OR PRINTING INFORMATION FROM THE WEBSITE COULD POTENTIALLY EXPOSE ARMY NETWORKS TO SENSITIVE DATA OR CREATE SITUATIONS IN WHICH DATA IS IMPROPERLY SAFEGUARDED THUS HARMING OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT MISSIONS VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. INFORMATION MARKED AS CLASSIFIED BUT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS NOT CONSIDERED DECLASSIFIED UNTIL ASSESSED BY THE APPROPRIATE ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY AND A DETERMINATION ON ITS DISPOSITION AND CONTINUED CLASSIFICATION IS RENDERED.
Department of Homeland Security
DHS Suspicious Activity Reporting Selection Standards
DHS Suspicious Activity Reporting Selection Standards, August 2010.
Transportation Security Administration
(U//FOUO) TSA Transportation Suspicious Incident Report (TSIR) August 2010
(U//FOUO) The vast majority of suspicious incidents are not terrorism related. Incident reporting continues to reveal most involve members of the traveling public who do not have intent to cause harm. Intoxicated passengers, people traveling without proper identification or with propaganda materials, and persons with mental health needs are generally not considered suspicious and are generally not included in the weekly summary. However, some incidents are more serious and are reported for situational awareness. Incidents involving notable drug or weapons concealment, possible surveillance, laser targeting of aircraft, possible insider collusion, exploitable gaps in security, and some unusual behaviors at transportation venues are discussed as they may involve technologies or tactics which may lend insight to future terrorist tradecraft.
Headline
War Dead Soldier Coffin Photos August 2010
Texas
Nuevo Laredo Mexican Drug Cartel Gun Battle Extreme Carnage Overview
Nuevo Laredo Mexican Drug Cartel Gun Battle Extreme Carnage Overview, July 22, 2010.
U.S. Air Force
(U//FOUO) Air Force Wing Leadership Guide to the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF)
The basic concept of the AEF we use today was born of necessity after years of rotations between Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. High operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) forced us to update our Air Force-wide system of organizing, scheduling and presenting our forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs). Launched in 1998 by Gen Mike Ryan, CSAF, Cycle 1 of the AEF was 15 months long and included approximately 60,000 Airmen. Today the AEF operates on a 24-month schedule and includes over 300,000 Airmen. It remains fl exible to accommodate CCDR’s needs, whether for 4 months, 6 months, or 365 days.
United States
James Lee Website, Manifesto and Reality Show Treatment
This is an idea for a reality-game show called “Race to Save the Planet.” This is a show where contestants would come from all over to compete with each other and come up with ideas to save the planet. The idea here is to use human inventiveness to save the planet from the environmental destruction it’s facing. People competing can either have completely new ideas on how to save the planet, or they can build on another person’s idea and make that original idea better. The persons coming up with the good ideas will win cash prizes as incentives. People who build on another person’s ideas will also receive prizes for doing so, AND the persons whose idea was built on will also receive a commission for his original idea and future commissions whenever his idea is used or improved.
Department of Defense
Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS)
The Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) is a tethered aerostat-based system that has been in use by the U.S. Army since 2004. According to the PTDS is equipped with multi-mission sensors to provide long endurance intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and communications in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to information provided by the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, the PTDS “leverages a wide-area, secure communications backbone for the integration of threat reporting from multiple available sensors. The system’s sensor integration architecture supports the automated interoperability between tactical/theater surveillance assets and the dissemination of threat data to operational forces to aid interdiction of hostile fires and unconventional threats.”
Department of Defense
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) Tethered Aerostat Specifications
This document specifies the performance of the Baseline and Tactical Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS). Section 3 specifies the requirements for the Baseline PTDS and Section 4 specifies the requirements for the Tactical PTDS (T-PTDS). Throughout this specification, the acronym PTDS (without B- or T-) applies to both the Baseline PTDS and Tactical PTDS.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS “Red Cell” Report: Thinking Beyond Mass Transit For Next Homeland Attack
A Homeland strike soon after the London attacks is conceivable but unlikely, and if and when it comes, it could just as well be on other “soft targets” as on mass transit. These were the conclusions of 18 leading academic terrorism experts, former senior National Security Council and DHS officials, mass transit security specialists, and other nongovernmental experts and creative thinkers polled by the DHS Analytic Red Cell immediately after the July 7 attacks.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) OEF/OIF Legal Services Support To Operational Commanders
Marine Corps Judge Advocates have been providing wartime legal support to operational commanders since the Vietnam War. Judge Advocates who deployed to Operation DESERT STORM reported an increased need for operational law support and a diminished need for traditional military justice (court-martial) support. Observations by Judge Advocates and infantry commanders who served in OEF/OIF between 2003 and 2006 show that the need for operational law support of ground commanders has continued to expand and is now required on a consistent basis at the infantry battalion level.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, New Jersey
(U//FOUO) New Jersey Cyber-Terror Threat Warning
Cyberterrorism is an attractive option for foreign-born and domestic terrorists who value its anonymity, potential to inflict massive damage, psychological impact and media appeal. As a new, more computer-savvy generation of terrorists comes of age, the threat of cyber-terror attack is likely to increase.
Department of Justice
(U//LES) DoJ “Paths to Radicalization” Briefing
(U//LES) DoJ “Paths to Radicalization” Briefing, June 2010.
U.S. Central Command
(U//FOUO) Concept of Operations for Biometrics in U.S. Central Command AOR
(U) Purpose. This Concept of Operations (CONOP) documents concepts and procedures for the use of biometric technologies to support identity superiority, protection and management in the entire USCENTCOM AOR. This CONOP focuses on the biometrics process and key systemic enablers. This CONOP contains UNCLASSIFIED and CLASSIFIED 100 annexes. The body of the CONOP is UNCLASSIFIED however, Annex E, “HUMINT Biometrics Management”, is CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN.
Afghanistan, United Nations, World Bank
UN/World Bank Afghanistan Drug Industry Report
The magnitude and importance of Afghanistan’s opium economy are virtually unprecedented and unique in global experience —it has been roughly estimated as equivalent to 36% of licit (i.e. non-drug) GDP in 2004/05, or if drugs are also included in the denominator, 27% of total drug-inclusive GDP (see Chapter 2). The sheer size and illicit nature of the opium economy mean that not surprisingly, it infiltrates and seriously affects Afghanistan’s economy, state, society, and politics. It generates large amounts of effective demand in the economy, provides incomes and employment including in rural areas (even though most of the final “value” from Afghan opium accrues outside the country), and supports the balance of payments and indirectly (through Customs duties on drug-financed imports) government revenues. The opium economy by all accounts is a massive source of corruption and undermines public institutions especially in (but not limited to) the security and justice sectors. There are worrying signs of infiltration by the drug industry into higher levels of government and into the emergent politics of the country. Thus it is widely considered to be one of the greatest threats to state-building, reconstruction, and development in Afghanistan.
Headline
“Ground Zero” Mosque Protest Islam Freakout Photos
Barbara Lee, defending her decision as the only representative to vote against the initial funding of the war in Afghanistan (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, 420-1), on September 14, 2001: We must not rush to judgment. For…
News
Washington Post Censors Article About Half of Karzai’s Palace Being On CIA Payroll
The Washington Post has changed significant portions of an article published earlier today regarding the CIA’s payment of large numbers of people within Hamid Karzai’s administration in Afghanistan. These changes occur mostly in the beginning of the article and substantially manipulate its content. Most notable among the changes is the complete elimination of a quote describing how “half of Karzai’s palace” is on the CIA payroll. This quote, from an anonymous U.S. government official, was replaced with a paraphrased statement that “a significant number” of officials in Karzai’s administration are paid by the CIA. This alteration is followed by a quote from a CIA spokesman, which does not appear in the original article, who says that the “anonymous source appears driven by ignorance, malice or both.” Another significant quote from this anonymous source, detailing how Kazai is “blind to about 80 percent of what’s going on below him”, was also completely eliminated from the article. There are also a number of smaller changes all of which are designed to eliminate the perception of ignorance, malfeasance, and public perception that the Afghan government is almost wholly owned by the CIA.
Washington
(U//LES) Northwest HIDTA Washington State Gang Intelligence Bulletin
Outlaw Motorcycle (OMG) and Street Gangs have been active for several years in Washington State. Both Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMG) and Street Gangs have now become entrenched in the region. Street Gangs are involved in a variety of crimes to include drug trafficking, fraud, and prostitution, and have formed alliances with other gangs. They often serve as distribution networks for Mexican National Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). Gang membership and affiliation continue to rise in Washington State. Many gangs have infiltrated Indian Country and cooperated with DTOs, which has enabled them to recruit additional members. Both street gangs and OMGs pose a serious threat to the safety of law enforcement personnel and to the safety of local communities.
Department of Homeland Security, Florida
Florida Multi-Year Training & Exercise Plan 2011-2013
The purpose of the Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (MYTEP) is to provide a follow-on companion document to Florida‟s Domestic Security Strategic Plan. It is a living document that will be updated and refined annually. The MYTEP provides a roadmap for Florida to follow in accomplishing the priorities and goals described in the Florida‟s Domestic Security Strategic Plan. Each State Priority is linked to a corresponding National Priority, and, if applicable, an Improvement Plan (IP) action. The priority is further linked to the associated target capabilities that would facilitate accomplishment of the priority and the training and exercises that will help the jurisdiction obtain those capabilities and achieve that priority.