FOUO Iraq Improvised Explosive Device Smart Card from October 27, 2004.
Human terrain teams (HTTs) consist of five to nine personnel deployed by the HTS to support field commanders. HTTs fill the socio-cultural knowledge gap in the commander’s operational environment and interpret events in his AO. The team, individuals with social science and operational backgrounds, deploys with military units to bring knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework. The teams also assist in building relationships with the local community in order to provide advice and opportunities to commanders and staffs in the field.
The Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) is a tethered aerostat-based system that has been in use by the U.S. Army since 2004. According to the PTDS is equipped with multi-mission sensors to provide long endurance intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and communications in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to information provided by the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, the PTDS “leverages a wide-area, secure communications backbone for the integration of threat reporting from multiple available sensors. The system’s sensor integration architecture supports the automated interoperability between tactical/theater surveillance assets and the dissemination of threat data to operational forces to aid interdiction of hostile fires and unconventional threats.”
To establish a single source of facts documenting the 728th Expeditionary Air Control Squadron‘s deployment to Baghdad in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). This final report is based on information collected from each of the squadron’s work centers in garrison, prior to deployment and during operations at Camp Griffin, Baghdad International Airport, Iraq.
The purpose of the Business Development and Outreach Program (BDOP) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) is to define the BOOP mission, roles and responsibilities of the Business Development Consultants (SOC) and the J3lDirector, BDOP, U.S. Government contracting procedures, ethical guidelines, BDOP initiatives, education, training and consulting support, vendor engagements, local engagement with government and business leaders, and cultural orientation for u.s. Forces Iraq/Afghanistan and Iraqi/Afghan interlocutors.
A key aspect of our Economic Line of Operation is the creation of economic expansion, employment, and skills development opportunities for the people of Iraq. The “Iraqi First” program seeks to leverage this command’s resources to accomplish this critical task. I expect all commanders to be creative and focused on supporting this program, and to make sound, riskbased decisions that provide economic opportunities for the Iraqi people, without compromising mission critical logistics capabilities, force protection, or safety.
More than 1200 pages listing individual dossiers of detainees currently being held by Coalition Forces inside of Iraq. Each dossier contains a list of reasons for detention, along with the time and place that the individual was detained. The dossiers range in classification level from “For Official Use Only” to “Secret” and are believed to be current as of April 14, 2010. This document was originally made available by the pro-Islamic, Arabic News site al-raeed.net.
OIF is a dynamic, full spectrum operation encompassing both kinetic and non-kinetic operations and is arguably the most complex and challenging fiscal environment in our nation’s history. The dollar amounts spent supporting or are substantial and represent the treasure of our nation. Leaders must know what funding resources are available and how to best apply them in order to gain the maximum operational effectiveness. This “Money as a Weapons System” (MAAWS) SOP is published to educate and advise you on how to financially resource operations here in Iraq. It will serve as a financial road map to assist you in navigating the myriad of funding challenges and issues that will arise during your time in Iraq.. recommend you keep a copy readily available, and ensure the appropriate leadership in your organizations has access to a copy as necessary.
Kirkuk Provincial Reconstruction Team Overview, May 10, 2008.
Eight FOUO documents comprising the U.S. Forces – Iraq Armed Civilian Contractor Oversight Operations Orders from January-March 2010.
1. (U) SITUATION: USF-I, DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND NUMEROUS OTHER ENTITIES IN IRAQ HAVE CONTRACTED SECURITY OPERATIONS FOR FORWARD OPERATING BASES (FOB) AND PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS (PSD) TO PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS (PSC). GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI) HAS IN RECENT MONTHS INDICATED THAT CONTRACTED SECURITY COMPANIES ARE NOT OPERATING WITH THE THE PURVIEW OF ESTABLISHED LAW.
The following material was extracted from MCCLL reports based on interviews, lessons and observations from operational units that participated in OIF/OEF over the past 36 months. Although this material is based on collections that took place in 2005 through 2007, comments from recent observers and currently deployed individuals indicate that issues on the ground likely remain the same. Content of this paper is grouped in response to specific questions in the TECOM tasking dated 2 April 2008.
The purpose of this guide is to give Commanders, Leaders and Soldiers a training tool representing some of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) used in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation. The intent of this guide is to support readiness, unit training, operational planning, and awareness as well as provide information in relation to Reacting to a Possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED) common task 093-401 -5050. Both training and awareness are a proven and effective force protection tool as well as a combat multiplier.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Iraq Office Locations Map, November 1, 2009.
* (U) To discuss the current status and capabilities of the 505th and 506th ING BNs.
* (U) To discover how the Fallujah Insurgency threatened and „beheaded‟ the leadership of these two BNs causing mass desertions from the two units.
* (U) To inform deploying units on AIFs methods of influencing the allegiance of Iraqi Security Forces (ISFs) personnel.
Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. The efforts of PRTs take place every day during a time when major conflict is commonplace in both countries. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the indigenous people. Integrated appropriately, PRTs serve as combat multipliers for maneuver commanders engaged in governance and economics, as well as other critical lines of operation. In addition, PRTs serve as force multipliers for U.S. Government (USG) development agencies engaged across the stability and reconstruction sectors.
CJTF Troy exercises command and control of specialized Joint Counter-IED and CBRNE forces to neutralize the CBRNE/IED threat; conducts weapons technical intelligence collection and exploitation to defeat IED networks.
All personnel are to be moved away from the suspect item. Mark your location and note the direction and distance to the device. Move to a minimum distance of 300 meters from the suspect item. The Convoy Commander or Patrol Leader at the scene makes the decision on how large an area to clear based on METT-TC. Detonation may be imminent if the device was armed before being located. Personnel should make maximum use of hard cover, ensuring they are out of the direct Line of Site (LOS) from the suspect area to cleared positions. If cover cannot be obtained, maximize distance from the device.
This report presents various governmental and nongovernmental estimates of Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces fatalities. The Iraq government is releasing increasingly regular data on these deaths. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) releases the monthly pattern of Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces deaths, and it regularly updates total U.S. military deaths and wounded statistics from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as reflected in CRS Report RS21578, Iraq: U.S. Casualties, by Susan G. Chesser. Because the estimates contained in this report are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using them and should look to them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.
The concept of strategic communication is an often-discussed topic within government policy circles and at all levels of professional military education. Doctrinal definitions are continually updated and refined to the point that few appear to agree upon the role that strategic communication should play as either a diplomatic function, an aspect of military operational planning, or a process to be executed in the course of national policy. There are, however, a set of key points that all sides seem to agree upon.
You may DETAIN civilians based upon a reasonable belief that the person: (1) must be detained for purposes of self-defense; (2) is interfering with CF mission accomplishment; (3)is on a list of persons wanted for questioning, arrest or detention; (4)is or was engaged in criminal activity; or (5)must be detained for imperative reasons of security.Anyone you detain MUSTbe protected. Force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized to protect detainees in your custody. You MUST fill out a detainee apprehension card for EVERY person you detain.
Welcome to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). OIF is a dynamic, full spectrum operation encompassing both kinetic and non-kinetic operations and is arguably the most complex and challenging fiscal environment in our Nation’s history. The dollar amounts spent supporting OIF are substantial and represent the treasure of our nation. Leaders must know what funding resources are available and how to best apply them in order to maximize their use.
The following casualty data were compiled by the Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Table 1 provides statistics on fatalities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began on March 19, 2003, and is ongoing, as well as on the number of fatalities since May 1, 2003, plus statistics on those wounded, but not killed, since March 19, 2003.
Planned, programmed, designed over 1,000 projects, valued over $2.03 billion at 19 installations
* Over $645 in MILCON and O&M, Contingency Construction in progress
* Another $344.9M pending award
The Joint Prosecution and Exploitation Center (JPEC) synchronizes coalition force (CF) intelligence and criminal prosecution efforts associated with detainees, detainee related evidence, and other battlefield material while also supporting Iraqi Security Forces development of internationally accepted criminal investigative and forensic practices IOT facilitate the growth and development of the Anbar Criminal Justice System and the establishment of the Rule of Law within the province.