One very important first step in the establishment of a military command structure for NATO was the North Atlantic Council’s selection of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe in December 1950. After General Eisenhower arrived in Paris in January 1951, he and the other members of the multinational SHAPE Planning Group immediately began to devise a structure for the new Allied Command Europe. They quickly established a basic command philosophy that divided Allied Command Europe into three regions: the North, containing Scandinavia, the North Sea and the Baltic; the Center, with Western Europe, and the South, covering Italy and the Mediterranean (Greece and Turkey were not yet members of NATO). As for the organizational structure, General Eisenhower’s initial concept was to give each region an overall Commander-in-Chief (CINC). Underneath the CINCs there would be separate Land, Air and Naval Commanders for each region. This concept made great sense militarily, but its implementation soon encountered major political problems in two of the three regions.
Increasingly NATO nations are being involved in military operations that are radically different from traditional scenarios, and that involve operations in towns and cities that may be occupied by a combination of non-combatants and hostile forces. This will lead to requirements for new concepts of operations to be developed, and the impact of novel sensors, or novel ways of deploying or using existing sensors to be investigated. Previous studies have looked at the requirements for operations in this new theatre but have not addressed sensor characteristics or limitations specifically.
Naval operations in high latitudes provide unique challenges to planning, seamanship, ingenuity, endurance, and foresight. The elements, always dangerous, become hostile. Mountainous seas, stormforce winds and near-zero visibility for days on end put tremendous strain on men and material. The Arctic has been defined in a variety of ways. For naval considerations, it is considered to be the area surrounding the geographic North Pole consisting of a deep central basin; the peripheral shallow seas (Bering, Chukchi, East Siberian, Laptev, Kara, Barents, and Norwegian); ice-covered portions of the Greenland and Norwegian Seas; Baffin Bay, Canadian Archipelago, Seas of Japan and Okhotsk; the continental margins of Canada and Alaska; and the Beaufort Sea.
Training is a national responsibility and each NATO country undertakes to train its own units with its own facilities to the limits of its own capabilities. Coordination between units of different nationalities is facilitated if training is based on the doctrine promulgated in Allied Tactical Publications. The state of training of submarines taking part in exercises is presumed to be such that antisubmarine operations may be undertaken. Submarines taking part in submarine versus submarine exercises must be given prior approval for advanced anti-submarine exercises by national commanders.
According to a series of classified reports from NATO and the UN recently published by this site, the recent elections in Afghanistan were marred by “unprecedented” levels of violence including voter intimidation, kidnapping of election workers and candidates, as well as attacks on polling stations and ballot distribution systems. A confidential United Nations “Joint Security Analysis” covering the week of the elections states that the country experienced a “massive increase” in violence “due to an unprecedented peak of security incidents recorded on Election Day 18 September.” In fact, there was such a significant and “unprecedented” increase in violence leading up to the elections that this created a significant decrease in subsequent attacks because insurgent forces were literally running out of ammunition.
NATO Anti-Piracy Multinational Doctrine Manual containing 813 pages of material relating to Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations, including information on captured persons, materiel and documents.
Thirteen reports and maps from the NATO Information Dominance Center ranging from NATO UNCLASSIFIED to the NATO RESTRICTED level of classification
(U//FOUO) BLUF: The People of FAQIR KHIEL and AFGHANYA villages are not allowing the Taliban to have a presence in their villages and have even used force to run a Taliban commander and his group out.
(U//FOUO) ISAF Regional Command SIGACTs Maps October 4-10, 2010.
CSTC-A Afghan National Police Training Facility Maintenance and Life Support Services Contractor Work Statement
CSTC-A requires contracted life support services, to include training facility force protection, in the areas identified in the chart below. These efforts directly support the US and NATO missions to develop a trained and professional Afghan police force, enhancing public security, and supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Facilities covered under this requirement support various aspects of the training of the ANP, including providing life support for mentors and trainers of the Afghan government, USFOR-A, and Coalition Forces who support the training of the ANP. Due to the changing nature of combat support requirements, the Contractor shall expect that quantities, types, and/or locations of the services to be required within this geographic area will change over the Period of Performance.
Complete Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program Project Data from July 31, 2009-August 1, 2010.
Primary Route: Turn left at the main gate. Turn left on to the road parallel to the ISAF Southern Wall. Turn right on the intersection with the road that runs parallel with the ISAF’s East wall with the rear gate on it. Move South following the road until you get on to “Indigo” to the roundabout with route “Violet”. At this roundabout go straight (180º), cross Kabul river. After the Olympic Stadium turm left, proceed to the next intersection (5-way) and turn halfright (45º). Follow the street for about 300m. ACCI gate will appear ahead.
Primary Route: Turn left from the main gate. Pass CFC-A on the south side. At the roundabout go left (270º). Follow route ‘indigo’. First roundabout go straight ahead (180º), after 200m at the crossing turn left. Again after 200m turn right on route ‘green’/ ‘Highway 1’. Follow this road for 2.7km (pass the Kabul zoo (left-hand side)) to the roundabout. Turn left at this roundabout (270º). You are still on route Green. After approximately 1.6km MoCI is on your right-hand side (turn right app 20m before the SIEMENS sign).
Several FOUO Google Earth location maps created by NATO and U.S. forces of Georgian infrastructure and damage to the country following the South Ossetia War in August 2008.
Commander, International Security Assistance Force Campaign Overview June 2010.
ISAF Joint Command District Assessments, April 10, 2008.
ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive, August 29, 2009.
ISAF Governance Working Group Brief, May 2010.
Civil-military co-operation is not a new phenomenon within NATO. Traditionally, however, it was seen as presenting little more than a logistic challenge. NATO’s operations beyond its own domestic borders, on territory devoid of fully functioning civil institutions or effective infrastructure present different and more complex challenges. Changes to the environment in which NATO might potentially operate have led to the development of a new Strategic Concept (SC 99)3. This recognises a much wider range of threats to international security than existed hitherto. In addition to continuing to provide for collective defence, the Concept states that the Alliance must stand ready “to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations”.
This document represents the current Concept of Employment (CONEMP) coaltion interoperable intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) system. It provides information for commanders and their staffs on the operational employment of participating network enabled ISTAR systems during coalition operations.
NATO Joint Sea Basing (NJSB) provides the Alliance with another option for the deployment, employment, sustainment and re-deployment of a mission tailored joint force package utilizing a combination of seaborne platforms, strategic sealift and tactical airlift/sealift to rapidly project and sustain multinational forces wherever needed. Simply stated, specified land, air and sea component forces are deployed utilizing existing seaborne platforms resident within NATO member nations’ inventory in conjunction with available strategic sealift assets from the commercial market. Correspondingly, sea basing provides the NATO force commander with a capability to exercise command and control and/or the projection of military and logistics capabilities from seaborne platforms.
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.
“Every action of the counterinsurgent should be anchored in law. Any effort to build a legitimate government through lawless action – including unjustified use of force, unlawful detention, torture or punishment without trial – is self-defeating.”
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency
Kabul International Airport belongs to the MoTCA, which operates KAIA. It is supported by the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). COM KAIA, under the command of COM ISAF, operates the military component of KAIA, assists the Afghan authorities in operating KAIA, and also assumes Air Traffic Control Authority in KABUL Control Zone (CTR).