Court documents filed by the attorney of Sirhan Sirhan, the alleged assassin of Robert F. Kennedy. The documents claim that Sirhan was a hypno-programmed assassin and that another person fired the gun that killed Kennedy.
The main document used to train California police officers in the use of force.
This policy recognizes that the use of force by law enforcement requires constant evaluation. Even at its lowest level the use of force is a serious responsibility. The purpose of this policy is to provide officers of this department with guidelines on the reasonable use of force. While there is no way to specify the exact amount or type of reasonable force to be applied in any situation, each officer is expected to use these guidelines to make such decisions in a professional, impartial, and safe manner. The use of force by law enforcement personnel is a matter of critical concern both to the public and to the law enforcement community. Officers are involved on a daily basis in numerous and varied human encounters and, when warranted, may use force in carrying out their duties.
The internal “use of firearms” policy for the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department from February 2005.
The internal “use of force” policy for the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department from February 2011.
This Policy is to provide an outline of basic steps to be taken and/or considered by UCPD in the management of campus demonstrations. It is recognized that no policy can completely cover every possible situation and thus we rely on the expertise of the commanders and supervisors to manage the situation utilizing this policy as a guideline. This policy is primarily intended to cover demonstrations on campus and involving primarily University affiliates but many of the elements are applicable to any demonstration. “Demonstration”, for the purposes of this policy, includes a broad range of gatherings. Generally they are events with a significant crowd intending to express a particular point of view to others, often “The University”, and often through highly visible and possibly disruptive means. They are distinguished from peaceful meetings but may spring from them.
The City of Oakland and its police department support and protect the right of all individuals to engage in free speech and their right to assemble. However, this encampment is a violation of the law. You do not have permission to lodge overnight in Frank Ogawa Plaza. You must remove all tents, sleeping bags, tarps, cooking facilities and equipment and any other lodging material from the Plaza immediately. Your continued use of the Plaza for overnight lodging will subject you to arrest. Your activities are injurious to health, obstruct the free use of property, interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of the Plaza, and unlawfully obstruct the free passage or use of a public park or square. (California Penal Code sections 370 and 647(e) and Civil Code section 3479.) You must allow all persons, including Oakland Police officers and other emergency personnel, access to all areas of the Plaza at all times.
A letter published on the website of the Oakland Police Officers’ Association in response to public outrage over the violent police action that took police on October 25, 2011 attempting to suppress a march in support of the Occupy Oakland protest.
We write to express our concern with the recent activity by the Department of Justice against legitimate medical cannabis dispensaries in California that are operating legally under state law. As you know, in October of 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder issued formal guidelines for federal prosecutors in states that have enacted laws authorizing the use of cannabis for medical purposes. The guidelines were spelled out in a memo to United States Attorneys from then Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, saying in part that the Attorneys should not focus federal resources in their state “on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”
Oakland Police Department Crowd Management/Crowd Control Policy revised October 28, 2005.
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center presentation on “Fusion Centers Information Sharing, Analysis and Coordination” from October 2011.
Los Angeles Joint Drug Intelligence Group Intelligence Bulletin on Diverted Pharmaceuticals & Gang Distribution from March 2010.
Los Angeles City Council Resolution unanimously passed October 5, 2011 in support of Occupy LA and the Occupy Wall Street protests.
U.S. District Court of Northern California Christopher Doyon and Joshua John Covelli Anonymous Santa Cruz DDoS Attack Indictment from September 21, 2011.
An email from the Chief Spokesperson for the Bay Area Rapid Transit District Linton Johnson obtained by the San Francisco Bay Guardian from August 11, 2011. In the email, Johnson describes how a script could be written to be given to “volunteers” who would be escorted to a press conference to describe their dissatisfaction with how the recent BART protests are making them late.
This STAC information note is intended to enhance law enforcement community understanding of training venues observed to have been used by gang members and to provide insight into their reasoning for engagement in these observed activities.
The intent of this bulletin is to provide Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) with a general knowledge of ambush tactics used by the Tijuana Cartel against Mexican LEOs in Tijuana, Mexico. The San Diego Police Department (SDPD) Officer Safety Bulletin dated October 3, 2010, outlining Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations’ (DTOs) and San Diego street gangs’ use of Tijuana Cartel tactics in San Diego County, identified a need for a more comprehensive review of cartel tactics used south of the U.S. border.
Large police departments maintain dozens of databases. It is unusual to see these computer systems linked together to enable effective analysis. It is even more unlikely that other information sources, such as gunshot detection systems or dispatch systems, are linked into police analytical or fusion centers. Finally, police departments do not link their operations and information systems to other parts of the justice system or social services system. Thus, poor information sharing prevents good analysis and investigation. Even more troubling, poor information sharing can undermine efforts to intervene with individuals or neighborhoods to stop the cycle of violence. The best way to see the future and act appropriately is to have a complete picture of the current situation. Police must integrate their information and activities to enable situational awareness.
A photo of a 37-year-old schizophrenic homeless man named Kelly Thomas that was taken in the hospital by his father Ron Thomas, a former Orange County Sheriff’s Deputy. Thomas was fatally beaten by Fullerton Police officers on July 5, 2011 following attempts to search his backpack due to reports of someone “looking into cars” in the area. Multiple videos of the beating exist, including surveillance footage that has yet to be released by the Orange County District Attorney, and a large number of witnesses have come forward confirming the extremely excessive use of force by the six officers that were attempting to subdue Thomas. One officer in particular was reportedly responsible for beating Thomas repeatedly in the back of the head with a Taser until Thomas began to bleed profusely, as well as dropping his knee against the back of Thomas’ head leading to fractures in his face and the crushing of his windpipe. This officer has been identified as Jay Cicinelli, a former LAPD officer who was shot within weeks of leaving the academy and now only has one eye. The beating is now being investigated by the FBI.
In April 2011, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported up to 82 percent of all cocaine seized in the United States contained levamisole, a veterinary drug used to de-worm livestock. Law enforcement and public health officials in the United States are warning of serious public health consequences for drug users related to contaminated cocaine use.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department guide to improvised/disguised weapons and other officer safety concerns from June 2009.
U.S. District Court of Northern California indictment of sixteen people filed July 13, 2011 in connection with Anonymous DDoS attacks on PayPal.
Hotels, motels, and other lodging facilities have been used by extremist individuals and groups as locations to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in close proximity to their intended targets. Hotels, specifically rooms with kitchens or kitchenettes, allow these groups or individuals to greatly reduce the potential for a premature detonation. Given the short distance to the intended target the risk of premature detonation during transportation is minimized.
Infiltration of any law enforcement agency by a gang member can have severe ramifications for the agency involved, its employees, the public it serves, and its allied agencies. Gangs employ various tactics to include infiltrating an agency directly or indirectly, to achieve their objective; to counter this threat, law enforcement must remain cognizant of and employ mitigation strategies. Gangs’ motivations for infiltrating agencies vary; thus law enforcement must remain cognizant of suspicious employee behavior, identify possible motivations for infiltration, and employ mitigation strategies to counter infiltration threats.
The San Diego Law Enforcement Center (SD-LECC) convened an analytical task force in Spring 2010 to address the question: “What does cross-border kidnapping in San Diego look like?” Intelligence Analysts from Chula Vista Police Department, San Diego Sheriff’s Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis analyzed statistical, investigative and open source intelligence from local law enforcement agencies, FBI, DHS, ICE, CBP, DEA and the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs to prepare this assessment. There is strong evidence—based on intelligence gathered from traditional and alternative sources, such as banks, hospitals, citizen interviews, wiretaps and private consulting firms—that kidnappings in the San Diego area are widely underreported. Consequently, this assessment offers a strategic baseline only; there is insufficient data to support a definitive study of cross-border kidnapping tactics and techniques. This assessment is intended to support law enforcement executives and practitioners in their efforts to collect additional information and combat this problem.