352 search results for "cell"

(U//FOUO) California State Warning Center Situation Cell Incident Report 2020 novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) February 9, 2020

Outbreaks of novel virus infections among people are always of public health concern. The risk from these outbreaks depends on characteristics of the virus, including whether and how well it spreads between people, the severity of resulting illness, and the medical or other measures available to control the impact of the virus. Investigations are ongoing to learn more, but some degree of person-to-person spread of 2019-nCoV is occurring. It is not clear yet how easily 2019-nCoV spreads from person-to-person. While CDC considers this as a serious public health concern, based on current information, the immediate health risk from 2019-nCoV to the general American public is considered low at this time.

House Oversight Committee Report on Law Enforcement Use of Cell-Site Simulation Technologies

Advances in emerging surveillance technologies like cell-site simulators – devices which transform a cell phone into a real-time tracking device – require careful evaluation to ensure their use is consistent with the protections afforded under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The United States’ military and intelligence agencies have developed robust and sophisticated surveillance technologies for deployment in defense against threats from foreign actors. These technologies are essential to keeping America safe. Increasingly though, domestic law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels are using surveillance technologies in their every-day crime-fighting activities. In the case of cell-site simulators, this technology is being used to investigate a wide range of criminal activity, from human trafficking to narcotics trafficking, as well as kidnapping, and to assist in the apprehension of dangerous and violent fugitives.

Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology

Cell-site simulator technology provides valuable assistance in support of important public safety objectives. Whether deployed as part of a fugitive apprehension effort, a complex narcotics investigation, or to locate or rescue a kidnapped child, cell-site simulators fulfill critical operational needs. As with any law enforcement capability, the Department must use cell-site simulators in a manner that is consistent with the requirements and protections of the Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment, and applicable statutory authorities, including the Pen Register Statute. Moreover, any information resulting from the use of cell-site simulators must be handled in a way that is consistent with the array of applicable statutes, regulations, and policies that guide law enforcement in how it may and may not collect, retain, and disclose data.

Carrier IQ Cellular Phone Intelligence Software Training Materials

A presentation included in a collection of materials related to Trevor Eckhart’s research into the “mobile service intelligence” software produced by Carrier IQ. The document was specifically mentioned in a cease and desist order that the company sent to Eckhart demanding that he remove their “confidential training materials” and take down his analysis of the company’s software. Though the company later withdrew the legal complaint, this presentation remains unavailable from its original location and is only available via a number of mirrors at file-hosting sites.

(U//FOUO) DHS Red Cell Report: How Terrorists Might Infect U.S. Poultry With Bird Flu

This report explores how terrorists or other non-state adversaries could potentially facilitate an avian influenza outbreak within the United States. The report was primarily intended to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security, Chief Intelligence Officer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Chief Medical Officer as they consider the implications of avian influenza to the Homeland. The scenarios explored in this paper are speculative and meant only to broaden the scope of thinking. They are not based on specific evidence or intelligence about terrorists’ plans and capabilities, but are considered scientifically feasible, according to experts that were interviewed.

(U//FOUO) State Department Visa Cancellation Stamps Bulletin February 2003

Consular Affairs has developed a highly penetrative security ink to be used exclusively for cancelling nonimmigrant visas. This unique formulation, designated security ink #297, is specially designed to penetrate TESLIN, the synthetic material used as the basis of visa foils issued since late 1993 until the recent introduction of the Lincoln Visa. The ink finally selected was chosen after extensive laboratory testing undertaken by both the U.S. Secret Service and INS/FDL. Up to now, there existed no genuinely effective means for cancelling a visa permanently short of destructive methods that risked damaging the underlying passport page. To remedy this, CA commissioned the manufacture of two types of visa cancellation stamps in conjunction with the new security ink, and they are being distributed to visa issuing posts worldwide.

(U//LES) New Mexico Investigative Support Center Dual SIM Cell Phone Warning

A recent narcotics investigation led to the arrest of two subjects after they were found to be in possession of sixty (60) pounds of marijuana. During the investigation Agents observed the male subject repeatedly holding a wristwatch to his ear and later found the item to be a cellular phone. A Cellebrite extraction was conducted on this phone which was found to have two SIM cards. Dual SIM cards enable the user to combine different numbers, plans or network carriers. This particular cell phone had one SIM card from A T & T, and the other one from Telcel, New Mexico’s largest mobile phone carrier. An internet search revealed you can purchase these wristwatch cell phones starting at $50.00. There were no markings to identify the brand or carrier of this phone. Law Enforcement is advised to be on the look out for these communication devices when you are in contact with subjects of criminal investigations.

(U//FOUO) DHS “Red Cell” Report: How Terrorists Might Use a Dirty Bomb

An independent, unclassified analytic Red Cell session, sponsored jointly by the U.S. Departments of Energy and Homeland Security, found a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) attack on the U.S. homeland to be highly appealing from a terrorist standpoint. The Red Cell group, which simulated two different terrorist cells, believed an RDD attack would be relatively easy to prepare and mount and could have wide-ranging physical, psychological, political, and economic impacts. The group believed radioactive materials would be easy to procure, especially from abroad, and found a variety of potential targets across the country. Participants expected that public distrust of official guidance would heighten fear and panic.

(U//FOUO) DHS “Red Cell” Report: How Terrorists Might Exploit a Hurricane

A key component of the IAIP/Competitive Analysis and Evaluation Office’s mission is convening a diverse range of governmental and nongovernmental experts who adopt a terrorist mindset to challenge traditional or existing assumptions about how terrorists might attack some aspect of our critical infrastructure. The ideas generated by these “red cells” contribute insights on potential terrorist threats to the homeland for state and local governments, law enforcement, and industry.

HBGary Team Themis Corporate Information Reconnaissance Cell Documents

Internet based communications, most predominately the growing spectrum of social media platforms, allow people to coordinate and communicate in a highly efficient and collaborative manner, even when vastly geographically distributed. These same services and technologies can also make it difficult to attribute information to specific entities. Anonymizing and misattribution technologies used to mask location and identity have become commonplace. In many cases, people and/or organizations use the inherent insecurity in Internet communications to conduct criminal or unethical activities. This represents a paradigm shift in the capability of individuals and small groups to conduct effective planning and execution of asymmetric operations and campaigns that can have major impacts on large organizations or corporations. Despite the increased capability and anonymity that these new communications technologies provide, it is still possible to counter individuals and groups who are leveraging networks, platforms, and/or applications to conduct criminal and/or unethical activities. In such cases, it is necessary to develop a more forward leaning investigative capability to collect, analyze, and identify people or organizations conducting such activities. In order to effectively track and understand the complex, interconnected networks involved in these actions, it becomes critical to utilize proven, cutting-edge tools and analytical processes; applying them in a deliberate, iterative manner against those involved in illicit activities. The most effective way to limit the capability of individuals and/or groups is to develop a comprehensive picture of the entities involved through focused collection, conduct rapid analysis to identify key nodes within the network, and determine the most effective method for influencing/limiting these entities.

U.S. State Department OSAC Cell Phone Video Surveillance Warning

On December 15, 2009, the City of London Police released film footage of hostile reconnaissance conducted in July 2008 by an Algerian national (Subject 1). Subject 1 was stopped by two alert police officers who saw him using his cell phone camera to record video inside Liverpool Street Station in London. When the police officers examined the footage they found 90 minutes of video recording of various sites in and around London and several UK cities to include Tube and mainline rail stations, shopping areas, bars, and restaurants. His detention and the follow-up investigation led to the arrest of Subject 1’s brother (Subject 2) and a third Algerian male (Subject 3). British authorities also looked at 30 other individuals and recovered extremist material supporting al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb in one residence. Police believe the two brothers may have been fundraising and conducting surveillance for a future terrorist operation.

(U//FOUO/LES) U.S. Air Combat Command Threat Information Fusion Cell Reports

The following five reports are from the U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command’s Threat Information Fusion Cell. The “Homeland Defense Information Summary” reports focus entirely on domestic security matters and feature content from local police departments and regional fusion centers. The very existence of the reports should be a matter of scrutiny given the fundamental divide between domestic military affairs and civilian law enforcement necessitated by legislation such as the Posse Comitatus Act.

(U//FOUO) USMC Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations TTPs

In the asymmetrical threat climate of the 21st century, stability and support operations (SASO) are often conducted from a companylevel firm base (FB). These company and platoon size units need immediate, on-scene intelligence support to deal with an enemy that can recruit, rest, and resupply amongst the population in a predominately urban environment. This requires an intense collection and analysis effort by even the smallest unit. And, because of the noncontiguous nature of SASO, it is unrealistic to expect that higher echelon staffs will consistently be available to support them. Therefore, Marines in small units must establish and maintain a limited, but effective, capability for themselves.

(U//FOUO) DHS “Red Cell” Report: Thinking Beyond Mass Transit For Next Homeland Attack

A Homeland strike soon after the London attacks is conceivable but unlikely, and if and when it comes, it could just as well be on other “soft targets” as on mass transit. These were the conclusions of 18 leading academic terrorism experts, former senior National Security Council and DHS officials, mass transit security specialists, and other nongovernmental experts and creative thinkers polled by the DHS Analytic Red Cell immediately after the July 7 attacks.

Your Cellphone is Tracking You

For some time, it has been apparent that wireless telephone providers are storing location data on all of their customers. This information indicates the location of an individual’s cellular phone signal from its corresponding cellular tower to provide an approximate location of the user at any given time. Wireless providers are paid for supplying this information to law enforcement and the companies work to provide user-friendly guides to potential customers indicating what details they can provide. We have previously published law enforcement subpoena guides from Verizon, Nextel, MetroPCS, T-Mobile, AT&T, Sprint, among other service providers. Many of the companies providing this information to law enforcement take steps to hide the reality of their information retention. One guide in particular, regarding the Verizon Wireless Law Enforcement Resource Team, is labeled as being only distributable among law enforcement personnel. The guide advertises a wide variety of services available to law enforcement, including details on any user’s “cell sites” going back nearly one year. Another subpoena guide produced by Verizon offers a price list for these services including $125 an hour for “expert testimony”. Active surveillance using trap and trace is the most lucrative for Verizon with a price of up to $1000 a month, not including setup fees and other administrative costs.

Asymmetric Warfare Group Iran Quick Reference Guide

Since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly disrupted the stability of the Middle East and fostered terrorist threats throughout the world. Iran exploited the power vacuum which followed the Iraq War in 2003 and Arab Spring in 2011 to significantly extend its regional influence, primarily through the establishment of proxy groups and new relationships with existing regional terrorist groups. International sanctions against Iran, levied in response to Iran’s support for terrorism and nuclear activities, constrained Iran’s actions, but did not end them, nor did they stop Iran from enhancing its conventional military enterprise.