The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)/Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) assesses that unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) provide malicious actors an additional method of gaining undetected proximity to networks and equipment within critical infrastructure sectors. Malicious actors could use this increased proximity to exploit unsecured wireless systems and exfiltrate information. Malicious actors could also exploit vulnerabilities within UASs and UAS supply chains to compromise UASs belonging to critical infrastructure operators and disrupt or interfere with legitimate UAS operations.
(U//LES) ICE Bulletin: Da Jiang Innovations (DJI) Likely Providing U.S. Critical Infrastructure and Law Enforcement Data to Chinese Government
SIP Los Angeles assesses with moderate confidence that Chinese-based company DJI Science and Technology is providing U.S. critical infrastructure and law enforcement data to the Chinese government. SIP Los Angeles further assesses with high confidence the company is selectively targeting government and privately owned entities within these sectors to expand its ability to collect and exploit sensitive U.S. data.
(U//FOUO) California Fusion Center: California Leads in Unauthorized UAS Encounters, Risk to Public Safety
California has had more disclosed unauthorized Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) encounters than any other state between October 2015 and September 2016—accounting for 21 percent of the reported encounters nationwide—according to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). These encounters continue to pose a direct risk to public safety air assets.
This manual identifies the individual MOS training requirements for soldiers in MOS 96U. Commanders, trainers, and soldiers should use it to plan, conduct, and evaluate individual training in their unit. This manual is the primary MOS reference to support the self-development and training of every 96U soldier.
Department of Justice Procedures for Direct Actions Against Terrorists Outside U.S. and Areas of Active Hostilities
This Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) establishes the standard operating procedures for when the United States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture operations, against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hostilities.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Summary of U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities
In accordance with the President’s direction and consistent with the President’s commitment to providing as much information as possible to the American people about U.S. counterterrorism activities, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is releasing today a summary of information provided to the DNI about both the number of strikes taken by the U.S. Government against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities and the assessed number of combatant and non-combatant deaths resulting from those strikes. “Areas of active hostilities” currently include Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
Encounters in 2015 of unauthorized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), also known as drones, with public safety aircraft during emergency events underscore the potential threats UAS pose to response efforts—notably search-and-rescue, firefighting and police air assets—as well as the lives, property and natural resources already at risk.
Model Aircraft are custom built or commercially produced unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that meet the statutory definition of Model Aircraft and operate in accordance with the statutory requirements for Model Aircraft. These are sometimes referred to as radio controlled airplanes or aircraft and usually require one individual for operational control. Some Model Aircraft are capable of sustained flight for approximately 2 hours or less depending on the type of Model Aircraft (Rotary or Fixed Wing) and power source (e.g. nitromethane, lithium ion, and lithium polymer batteries). Model Aircraft must be flown within visual line of sight of the operator; however, there is an increasing use of first person view technology that allows operation to occur beyond line of sight and at altitudes in excess of several hundred feet.
(U//LES) Northern California Fusion Center Bulletin: Recreational Drones Create Problems for Law Enforcement
The expansion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations for military purposes in the last decade has driven growth in the commercial UAV industry where. the casual enthusiast can now purchase a ready-to-fly system for less than $300. These UAVs can be accessorized for varied purposes such as cinematography, agricultural monitoring, wildlife tracking, site surveillance, and potentially even for kinetic attacks with a firearm or improvised explosive. This Advisory Bulletin addresses an observed increase in UAV use by ordinary citizens, outlining capabilities and implications for the law enforcement community. The NCRIC has not received any specific or credible UAV threats in our 15-county AOR and presents the following information for situational awareness purposes.
National Counterterrorism Center Flyer: College Drone Programs Can Be Targeted by Violent Extremists
College programs in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are susceptible to potential penetration or attack plotting by violent extremists. Enhanced information and operational security practices can reduce the likelihood of a violent extremist infiltrating UAS programs or planning an attack against students and faculty. There are potential indicators that a student or faculty member may possess ulterior motives for their interest in unmanned aircraft.
Purpose of This Notice. This notice provides information and interim guidance on air traffic policies and prescribes procedures for the planning, coordination, and services involving the operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the NAS. These policies and procedures reflect current written directives and regulations and do not reflect any major changes. The intent of this notice is to consolidate all current directives and regulations into one document to assist with understanding UAS operations in the NAS.
Operations involving DI support using ISR/OPSRECCE/RPA involve a balancing of fundamental interests: conducting aircrew training in support of national security objectives and providing incident awareness and assessment support when requested while also protecting individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the U.S. The primary objective of the ACCI is to ensure that ACC units conducting DI missions within U.S. do not infringe on or violate the Constitutional or privacy rights of U.S. persons. Commanders, inspectors general, and judge advocates at all levels must be cognizant of DI policies.
The US government has described drone airstrikes in operations outside declared theaters of armed conflict as surgical and causing minimal civilian casualties. Analysis of air operations in Afghanistan, combined with a review of open-source reports for drone strikes in Pakistan, suggest that these fell short of intended goals. Specifically, drone strikes in Afghanistan were seen to have close to the same number of civilian casualties per incident as manned aircraft, and were an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement. Specific causal factors were identified that contributed to the relative propensity of drones to cause civilian casualties. Tailored training that addresses these causal factors could aid in reducing civilian casualties in engagements involving drones. While processes and operating forces in Afghanistan can differ from those in operations outside declared theaters of armed conflict, the factors above suggest that a dedicated analysis of civilian casualties in such operations would be worthwhile.
Both the current fiscal and future operational environments facing the Air Force influence the landscape for investments in the development and fielding of new technologies. This document refines the Air Force strategic vision for the future of RPA and reemphasizes the inherent potential and emerging capabilities of small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS). The RPA Vector outlines concepts and capabilities needed over the next 25 years. It can inform the capabilities planning and requirements development process as well as inform the CFLIs as they execute their responsibilities for implementation planning in the plans, programming, budgeting and execution process.
Over the past twenty years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has acquired a diverse portfolio of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) across the Military Services to meet its national security needs. Newly emergent threats and evolving national security requirements are prompting the DoD to re-evaluate its entire portfolio of systems, while at the same time, seeking to reduce the total ownership costs including lifecycle sustainment costs of these systems. The anticipated reduction in defense spending in concert with advances in information technology provides ample opportunity for DoD to rethink how it acquires, designs, and builds its systems. As a result, DoD is adopting and exploiting open system design principles and architectures to increase competition, foster reuse across systems, and increase interoperability. This new acquisition model requires access to multi-vendor solutions to enable rapid insertion of new technologies to counter emerging threats, avoid technology obsolescence, and decrease time to field new capabilities. DoD is adopting an Open Business Model (OBM) to support the implementation of an Open Architecture (OA) for UAS Ground Control Stations (GCS) in order to drive greater acquisition efficiencies and reduce the total ownership costs. This new model is built upon several lessons learned from the Navy’s own open architecture efforts in the submarine community when it radically changed its approach to building weapon systems due to an emerging threat from an adversary in conjunction with declining budget.
The purpose of this Roadmap is to articulate a vision and strategy for the continued development, production, test, training, operation, and sustainment of unmanned systems technology across DoD. This “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap” establishes a technological vision for the next 25 years and outlines actions and technologies for DoD and industry to pursue to intelligently and affordably align with this vision.
The intent of this study is to identify and assess the technology effort required to bring the civil uses of RPVs to fruition and to determine whether or not the potential market is real and economically practical, the technologies are within reach, the operational problems are manageable, and the benefits are worth the cost.
This report assesses opportunities, risks, and challenges attendant to future development and deployment of UAS within the National Airspace System (NAS) affecting UAS forecast growth from 2015 to 2035. Analysis of four key areas is performed: technology, mission needs, economics, and existing or anticipated challenges to routine use in NAS operations. Forecast effects of emerging technologies as well as anticipating new technological innovations in areas of airframes, powerplants, sensors, communication, command and control systems, and information technology and processing are evaluated. Anticipated mission needs include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as new areas such as stores delivery, cargo transport, search and rescue, and pilot augmentation; example business case models are developed for each of these areas. Challenges to routine UAS usage in the NAS include: absence of legislation and regulations for safe flight in integrated airspace; pilot training and certification; regulatory, policy, and procedural issues; social issues, such as privacy and nuisance concerns; environmental issues, such as noise and emissions; and safety.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction Modifies Language on Collateral Damage Estimates for Drone Strikes
An updated instruction issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 2012 incorporates significantly modified language in numerous sections of the document that describe the process for estimating collateral damage prior to conducting drone strikes and other military actions. These subtle, but important changes in wording provide insight into the military’s attempts to limit expectations in regards to minimizing collateral damage and predicting the lethal effects of military operations.