(U//LES) Gang members and criminals nationwide are targeting law enforcement officials, military, government vehicles, and residences in search of weapons, equipment, police badges, body armor, and uniforms.a These incidents suggest that some gangs are becoming more brazen, tactical, and willing to engage law enforcement and rival gang members in potentially lethal encounters. The National Gang Intelligence Center assesses that these thefts could also allow gang members and criminals to impersonate law enforcement officers to gain better access to their targets.
Tag Archive for For Official Use Only
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Project 12 Report: Critical Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships
The United States relies on critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) for government operations and the health and safety of its economy and its citizens. The President issued National Security Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD-54)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (HSPD-23), which formalized the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). NSPD-54/HSPD-23 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the heads of other Sector-Specific Agencies, to submit a report detailing the policy and resource requirements for improving the protection of privately owned U.S. critical infrastructure networks. The report is required to detail how the u.S. Government can partner with the private sector to leverage investment in intrusion protection capabilities and technology, increase awareness about the extent and severity of cyber threats facing critical infrastructure, enhance real-time cyber situational awareness, and encourage intrusion protection for critical information technology infrastructure.”
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO//LES) DHS Law Enforcement Information Sharing (LEIS) Service
Simply stated, the LEIS Service is the “pipe” used to connect state and local law enforcement with DHS law enforcement.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) Insurgent Tactics in Southern Afghanistan 2005-2008
This short book provides an up-to-date introduction to the tactics employed by insurgents in southern Afghanistan during the years 2005-2008. It includes vignettes and maps on 19 different tactically significant engagements. The book covers three types of attacks: ambushes, attacks on fixed positions, and defensive engagements. The intended audience is Marines and soldiers going into theatre.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U//FOUO) FBI Civil Aviation Security Program Brief
FOUO FBI Civil Aviation Security Program Brief, April 15, 2010.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
(U//FOUO) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Needs Analysis
This document presents the results of the Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solutions Analysis (FNA/FSA) for the functional area of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND). The FNA/FSA are structured in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01D, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and its companion manual, CJCSM 3170.01A, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
Department of Defense
(U//FOUO) Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) Roadmap Version 1.0
This roadmap will be the vehicle for prioritizing, aligning, and synchronizing Service JBMC2 architectural and acquisition efforts. Where policy and other acquisition initiatives are defined to drive JBMC2 developments and related activities, the specific means of application to JBMC2 will be via updates to this roadmap and decisions made by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to ensure overall harmonization across affected efforts and programs. This roadmap provides a strategy with three major parts for integrating current and planned JBMC2 capabilities.
Department of Defense
(U//FOUO) Joint Battle Management Command and Control Roadmap 2003 Draft
Central to the transformation of U.S. Forces are development and fielding of integrated Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) capabilities to enable U.S. forces to collaboratively plan and rapidly share an accurate picture of the battlespace. This roadmap provides an overview of JBMC2 capability and Global Information Grid (GIG) development efforts in the Department of Defense. It is intended to assist policymakers and decisionmakers in aligning and integrating Service and Combatant Command doctrine, concept development and acquisition efforts. The goal of this roadmap is to provide a coherent and executable plan for fielding integrated JBMC2 capabilities to U.S. Forces.
New Jersey
(U//FOUO) New Jersey Bangstick Warning
This device, which is a “bangstick,” measuring 4 5/8” in length with a 1 ¾” barrel and capable of firing either a single .38 cal. short Colt, .38 special or .357 magnum cartridge, is intended for use by fishermen and scuba divers to kill sharks and alligators. When used in such a way it is attached to a threaded pole and then used as a prod to hit the target. A very slight tap at the end of the barrel will cause the device to discharge. The “bangstick” is considered a firearm. ATF has classified this device as an “any other weapon” that is prosecutable by 10 years in prison and up to $10,000 in fines under Title 26, Section 5871. These devices can be found at almost any scuba or diving accessories shop.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, New Jersey
(U//FOUO) New Jersey Suspicious Activity Reporting Brief
FOUO New Jersey Suspicious Activity Reporting Brief, January 28, 2010.
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center
(U//FOUO) DHS, NCTC, FBI Homegrown Extremist Threat Reporting Brochure
The attempted bombing in Times Square on 1 May 2010 highlights the need to identify Homegrown Violent Extremists before they carry out a terrorist act. The ability of the bomber to operate under the radar demonstrates the difficulties associated with identifying terrorist activity and reinforces the need for law enforcement, at all levels, to be vigilant and identify individuals who are planning violence or other illegal activities in support of terrorism.
FEMA
(U//FOUO) FEMA Haiti Earthquake Response Report
The United States (U.S.) Government, along with other nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, rushed to provide critical life-saving and other assistance to Haiti. President Barack Obama directed the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead the coordination of the U.S. Government assistance to Haiti. USAID worked with other Federal agencies to organize and deliver assistance to the victims of the earthquake. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deployed over 1,000 personnel from various components to support U.S. assistance in Haiti. As of April 2, 2010, the U.S. Government had provided over $1 billion in assistance to Haiti.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, Maryland, Virginia
(U//FOUO//LES) Johns Hopkins Hospital Shooting Update
Initial News sources had reported that the Baltimore Police Department had responded to a call for service for a single male shooter at the Johns Hopkins hospital located in Baltimore, MD. Initial reports indicated that a doctor was shot by the unknown suspect and was in critical condition. The suspect suspect was believed to be barricaded on the eighth floor of the Nelson Building on the Johns Hopkins Hospital Campus. There are reports that the shooter could be barricaded in the room with a relative. Baltimore Police Department reports that only certain areas of the hospital campus are cordoned off. Baltimore Police Department officers are on the scene, the suspect is not in custody, and the Baltimore Police is reporting that the situation is contained. The areas of the Hospital not cordoned off are operating normally.
U.S. Central Command
CENTCOM Engineering Contingency Construction Overview August 2010
FOUO CENTCOM Engineering Contingency Construction Overview, August 2010.
Afghanistan, Department of Defense
(U//FOUO) US Forces-Afghanistan Private Security Contractor Management
OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN REQUIRE ARMED CONTRACTORS (ACS) AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSCS) TO FULFILL A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND OTHER ENTITIES OPERATING IN THE COMBINED JOINT OPERATIONS AREA – AFGHANISTAN (CJOA-A). INCLUDED IN THESE ARMED CONTRACTORS AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES ARE TRADITIONAL PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES, THE AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS AND DOD CONTRACTORS WHO ARE ARMED FOR PERSONAL PROTECTION. TRADITIONAL PSC’S PERFORM CONVOY ESCORT, STATIC SECURITY AND PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS. AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS (ASG’S) PROVIDE LOCAL STATIC SECURITY TO FOB’S, COP’S AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE WITH LOCAL AFGHAN COMPANIES. DOD CONTRACTORS MAY BE ARMED EITHER AS A FUNCTION THE SERVICE THEY PROVIDE OR THEIR OPERATING LOCATION. THESE AC/PSC’S ARE NOT COMBATANTS; THEY EXECUTE SERVICES TO PROTECT PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT AND FIXED FACILITIES. WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY AC/PSCS ARE FOR PURELY DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY.
Transportation Security Administration
(SSI) TSA Prototype RFID Baggage Tracking Report
This report describes the qualification test conducted at Newark International Airport on a prototype RF identification system for use in passenger baggage identification and tracking applications. The system tested was one made by Avante, which operates at 13.56 MHz. It consisted of a freestanding conveyor belt, an HF antenna array, a long-range reader and baggage tags that incorporate an antenna and an integrated circuit.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Warning: Internet Sites Allow Detailed Surveillance and Pre-Attack Planning
(U//FOUO) Detailed video obtained through live Web-based camera feeds combined with street-level and direct overhead imagery views from Internet imagery sites allow terrorists to conduct remote surveillance of multiple potential targets without exposing themselves to detection.
Department of Homeland Security, Nevada
Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy 2010
The purpose of the Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS) is to identify and address statewide priorities to achieve and sustain a strengthened ability to prevent, detect, deter, mitigate against, prepare for, respond to and recover from any natural, manmade and/or technological emergency or disaster up to and including any act of terrorism. The State, through implementation of this strategy, is seeking outcomes that will ensure a safe and secure Nevada through enhanced capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, rapid first response and recovery, the protection of critical infrastructure, and to promote public education and awareness.
Defense Intelligence Agency
(U//FOUO) Defense Intelligence Agency Ammonium Nitrate Threat Warning
(U//FOUO) Terrorists typically favor basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), off-the-shelf technology and readily available resources when planning and carrying out an attack. While simplistic in effort, these factors can be a lethal and destructive combination. Terrorists also continue to explore innovative attack options that take advantage of overlooked vulnerabilities inherent to the civilian sector. One such vulnerability is transporting bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate (AN) via the road, rail and waterway network. Using a region’s bulk AN transportation network to attack critical infrastructure and urban centers would arguably qualify as a high probability — high casualty/destruction threat scenario.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Army Unauthorized Information Dissemination Safeguards in Response to WikiLeaks
(U/FOUO) 1. ALL ARMY ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY REVIEW AND REVALIDATE WHO HAS SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR(SA)/POWER USER PRIVILEGES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH (IAW) REF A, THESE PERSONNEL SHALL BE GRANTED THE MINIMUM SET OF PRIVILEGES REQUIRED TO PERFORM THEIR JOBS AND NOTHING MORE. ALL ACTIVITIES MUST ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THESE PERSONNEL AND THAT NO OTHER PERSONNEL HAVE THESE PRIVILEGES. THIS IS KEY TO PRECLUDING UNAUTHORIZED DOWNLOADING AND DISSEMINATION OF SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Army WikiLeaks Warning: Classified Public Information
ARMY PERSONNEL MUST BE VIGILANT WITH REGARD TO THE INFORMATION POSTED ON THE WIKILEAKS WEBSITE AND ANY OTHER WEBSITE THAT PURPORTS TO PUBLISH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. VIEWING, DOWNLOADING OR PRINTING INFORMATION FROM THE WEBSITE COULD POTENTIALLY EXPOSE ARMY NETWORKS TO SENSITIVE DATA OR CREATE SITUATIONS IN WHICH DATA IS IMPROPERLY SAFEGUARDED THUS HARMING OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT MISSIONS VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. INFORMATION MARKED AS CLASSIFIED BUT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS NOT CONSIDERED DECLASSIFIED UNTIL ASSESSED BY THE APPROPRIATE ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY AND A DETERMINATION ON ITS DISPOSITION AND CONTINUED CLASSIFICATION IS RENDERED.
Transportation Security Administration
(U//FOUO) TSA Transportation Suspicious Incident Report (TSIR) August 2010
(U//FOUO) The vast majority of suspicious incidents are not terrorism related. Incident reporting continues to reveal most involve members of the traveling public who do not have intent to cause harm. Intoxicated passengers, people traveling without proper identification or with propaganda materials, and persons with mental health needs are generally not considered suspicious and are generally not included in the weekly summary. However, some incidents are more serious and are reported for situational awareness. Incidents involving notable drug or weapons concealment, possible surveillance, laser targeting of aircraft, possible insider collusion, exploitable gaps in security, and some unusual behaviors at transportation venues are discussed as they may involve technologies or tactics which may lend insight to future terrorist tradecraft.
U.S. Air Force
(U//FOUO) Air Force Wing Leadership Guide to the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF)
The basic concept of the AEF we use today was born of necessity after years of rotations between Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. High operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) forced us to update our Air Force-wide system of organizing, scheduling and presenting our forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs). Launched in 1998 by Gen Mike Ryan, CSAF, Cycle 1 of the AEF was 15 months long and included approximately 60,000 Airmen. Today the AEF operates on a 24-month schedule and includes over 300,000 Airmen. It remains fl exible to accommodate CCDR’s needs, whether for 4 months, 6 months, or 365 days.
Department of Defense
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) Tethered Aerostat Specifications
This document specifies the performance of the Baseline and Tactical Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS). Section 3 specifies the requirements for the Baseline PTDS and Section 4 specifies the requirements for the Tactical PTDS (T-PTDS). Throughout this specification, the acronym PTDS (without B- or T-) applies to both the Baseline PTDS and Tactical PTDS.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS “Red Cell” Report: Thinking Beyond Mass Transit For Next Homeland Attack
A Homeland strike soon after the London attacks is conceivable but unlikely, and if and when it comes, it could just as well be on other “soft targets” as on mass transit. These were the conclusions of 18 leading academic terrorism experts, former senior National Security Council and DHS officials, mass transit security specialists, and other nongovernmental experts and creative thinkers polled by the DHS Analytic Red Cell immediately after the July 7 attacks.