Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Justice Sector Strategy, 2008.
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes the United States plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In accordance with subsection (a), it includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the ANSF, with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy and budget, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. This report is the first of the annual reports required through 2010 on the long-term plan for Afghanistan.
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Behsood District, Nangarhar Province District Assessment Report, April 15, 2010.
Afghanistan Government “London Conference” Pashto Report, January 28, 2010.
ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive, August 29, 2009.
Helmand Province‟s political scene is perhaps unique in Afghanistan due to several atypical tribal dynamics produced by the unintended consequences of Western development activities. Projects, like the Helmand Valley Development Authority, led to an uneven tribal resettlement process that introduced outsider ethnic groups into the central portion of the province where they had never resided previously. Second, the potential wealth of the illegal opium industry associated with the reclaimed land from the development project and tribal desires to control it has also been a factor in the development of conflict.
The recent capture of the Taliban’s code of conduct manifesto, “Rules and Regulations for Mujahidin,” has offered analysts critical clues into how the Taliban intend to operate as well as how the movement is structured according to the Taliban. Importantly, the new document provides Coalition and Afghan forces a catalog of weak points, vulnerabilities and fears currently entrenched within the Taliban organization and its top echelon of leadership. A thorough examination of the document reveals the Taliban’s attempt to wage a guerrilla campaign implementing a rudimentary population-centric strategy; while calling upon elements of Pashtunwali and Shariat (Islamic) Law into the doctrine as well.
These photos have been released by the Department of Defense and ISAF over the last few years. Some of the photos discuss instances of troops helping with the destruction of poppy fields. Many of the photos do not mention anything…
FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Lessons Brief, February 17, 2010.
FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Overview Brief, February 17, 2010.
The following material was extracted from MCCLL reports based on interviews, lessons and observations from operational units that participated in OIF/OEF over the past 36 months. Although this material is based on collections that took place in 2005 through 2007, comments from recent observers and currently deployed individuals indicate that issues on the ground likely remain the same. Content of this paper is grouped in response to specific questions in the TECOM tasking dated 2 April 2008.
In order to assist Canadians, and particularly financial institutions, in continuing to cooperate with authorities and in complying with the United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regulations and the United Nations Afghanistan Regulations, the Government of Canada has prepared the attached consolidated list of individuals and entities whose property should be frozen and reported to the relevant authorities.
The Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan for Afghanistan provides guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. The Plan represents the collaborative effort of all the USG Departments and Agencies operating in Afghanistan and the range of different equities, resources, and approaches. The Plan is based on close collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and partner nations to build effective civilian and military mechanisms for integrated assistance.
Map of all ISAF RC and PRT Locations in Afghanistan as of October 22, 2009.
Kabul International Airport belongs to the MoTCA, which operates KAIA. It is supported by the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). COM KAIA, under the command of COM ISAF, operates the military component of KAIA, assists the Afghan authorities in operating KAIA, and also assumes Air Traffic Control Authority in KABUL Control Zone (CTR).
The first 100 days of any deployment are the most dangerous. It is the time when you know the least about your environment, the time when most of the team really comes together. The enemy knows the first 100 days are when units are the most vulnerable. This handbook is written for Soldiers and leaders. It is intended to help you accomplish your mission and stay alive during the most dangerous and uncertain period. The information presented in this handbook was collected from combat experienced Soldiers, company leaders, and battalion leaders, and it will help you develop your leadership and training skills before deployment and during the first 100 days after deployment.
Clear Evacuate an area of approx 300 meter
• Evacuate the area as quickly as possible.
• Move people away from the device and not past it.
• Mark your location and note the direction and distance to the device. Move to a minimum distance of 200 meters from the suspect item.
• The On-Scene Commander will make the decision on how large an area to clear. The below danger areas are from ISAF SOP 10370:
• 200 meters – small device/postal bomb
• 300 meters – car bomb
• 600 meters – large device e.g. truck bomb. If an open area, then increase to 1000m.
• Identify and establish an Incident Control Point which must always be searched.
• Make maximum use of hard cover, and ensure personnel are out of the direct Line of Site (LOS) from the suspect area to cleared positions. If cover cannot be obtained, maximize distance from the device.
1 – Do you agree with the proposed limitations on individual, daily and monthly transactions? If not, what limitations would you propose, and what are your justifications for these limitations from an AML/CFT perspective?
Generally, Vodafone supports a risk based approach to transaction limits, with higher limits granted where KYC levels are increased. This has been applied for M-PESA in Kenya.
Article 18.104.22.168 – anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism
The restriction against corporations should be removed. There does not appear to be a valid policy objective behind the restriction and no other jurisdiction of which we are aware has imposed such a restriction. One of DAB’s policy objectives is to increase access to financial services. Banks and micro-finance institutions may use EMI services to provide their services and products to large sections of the Afghan population, thereby increasing access to financial services. Given that banks and financial institutions are corporations, the proposed ban will prevent them from using such EMI services. This totally undermines DAB’s stated objective of increasing financial access. The proposed rule is manifestly disproportionate to the risks arising from EMI practices and is inconsistent with the practices of regulators in other jurisdictions.
Afghanistan’s political transformation, implemented according to the 200 1 Bonn Agreement was successfully concluded in late 2005. As a result o f that historic process, Afghanistan has developed a Constitution, conducted nationwide elections for a President and most recently has elected a Parliament and Provincial Councils. Notwithstanding these timely and commendable achievements, the normalization o f political culture still has a long way to go.