CSTC-A requires contracted life support services, to include training facility force protection, in the areas identified in the chart below. These efforts directly support the US and NATO missions to develop a trained and professional Afghan police force, enhancing public security, and supporting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Facilities covered under this requirement support various aspects of the training of the ANP, including providing life support for mentors and trainers of the Afghan government, USFOR-A, and Coalition Forces who support the training of the ANP. Due to the changing nature of combat support requirements, the Contractor shall expect that quantities, types, and/or locations of the services to be required within this geographic area will change over the Period of Performance.
Complete Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program Project Data from July 31, 2009-August 1, 2010.
The magnitude and importance of Afghanistan’s opium economy are virtually unprecedented and unique in global experience —it has been roughly estimated as equivalent to 36% of licit (i.e. non-drug) GDP in 2004/05, or if drugs are also included in the denominator, 27% of total drug-inclusive GDP (see Chapter 2). The sheer size and illicit nature of the opium economy mean that not surprisingly, it infiltrates and seriously affects Afghanistan’s economy, state, society, and politics. It generates large amounts of effective demand in the economy, provides incomes and employment including in rural areas (even though most of the final “value” from Afghan opium accrues outside the country), and supports the balance of payments and indirectly (through Customs duties on drug-financed imports) government revenues. The opium economy by all accounts is a massive source of corruption and undermines public institutions especially in (but not limited to) the security and justice sectors. There are worrying signs of infiltration by the drug industry into higher levels of government and into the emergent politics of the country. Thus it is widely considered to be one of the greatest threats to state-building, reconstruction, and development in Afghanistan.
The purpose of the CERP program is to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their Area of Responsibility (AOR) by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population. “Urgent” is defined as any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that, in the judgment of the local commander, calls for immediate action. CERP is intended for projects that can be sustained by the local population or government and cost less than $500K per project. Projects equal to or greater than $500K are expected to be relatively few in number. Commanders are required to verify that local, national, donor nation, nongovernmental organizations or other aid or reconstruction resources are not reasonably available before using CERP funds.
Kandahar Provincial Development Plan (Dari), September 2008.
The human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan is escalating in 2010. In the first six months of the year civilian casualties – including deaths and injuries of civilians – increased by 31 per cent over the same period in 2009. Three quarters of all civilian casualties were linked to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), an increase of 53 per cent from 2009. At the same time, civilian casualties attributed to Pro-Government Forces (PGF) decreased by 30 per cent compared to the first half of 2009.
Primary Route: Turn left at the main gate. Turn left on to the road parallel to the ISAF Southern Wall. Turn right on the intersection with the road that runs parallel with the ISAF’s East wall with the rear gate on it. Move South following the road until you get on to “Indigo” to the roundabout with route “Violet”. At this roundabout go straight (180º), cross Kabul river. After the Olympic Stadium turm left, proceed to the next intersection (5-way) and turn halfright (45º). Follow the street for about 300m. ACCI gate will appear ahead.
Primary Route: Turn left from the main gate. Pass CFC-A on the south side. At the roundabout go left (270º). Follow route ‘indigo’. First roundabout go straight ahead (180º), after 200m at the crossing turn left. Again after 200m turn right on route ‘green’/ ‘Highway 1’. Follow this road for 2.7km (pass the Kabul zoo (left-hand side)) to the roundabout. Turn left at this roundabout (270º). You are still on route Green. After approximately 1.6km MoCI is on your right-hand side (turn right app 20m before the SIEMENS sign).
(U//FOUO) BLUF: This facility is in dire need of assistance. Daily there are hundreds of children in admittance to this hospital suffering from the following ailments: malnutrition, burns, blast trauma, and the need for urgent surgical intervention. There are very few medical supplies available (few families of the patients can afford the medicine), minimal food (limited to one meal a day), and no consumable medical materials available to adequately treat these patients. The inevitability of death for many of these patients becomes a reality.
(U//FOUO) ATMOSPHERIC VALUE: Negative: The local people of Zabul Province do not believe that there can be peace made with the Taliban by giving in to some of their demands because there are so many different Taliban leaders fighting for different reasons and goals it would be hard to satisfy all of their demands.
Afghanistan 2010-2011 Complete Provincial Development Budget Allocations in English and Dari, June 2010.
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has a clearly defined role serving the government and people of Afghanistan, in terms of mobilizing revenue and managing government finances. To efficiently undertake these functions, the Ministry prepared a five year strategic plan in 1384 and much progress has been made in the past three years towards establishment of an effective and transparent public financial management system as well as in tax reforms and increase of the domestic revenues. MoF developed the MTFF and MTBF (Annex B), which has been approved by the cabinet and parliament. As part of the MTBF, budget ceilings for the operating and development budget as well as revenue targets are set for the next five years 1387-1391, moving towards fiscal sustainability.
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Mines, Mineral Mining Law and Regulations, February 14, 2010.
ISAF Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) Profile and Branch Locations, August 2009.
Saffron, referred to by some as “red gold,” has been in demand for centuries. The Latin name for the plant which bears the delicate spice is Crocus sativus L. Saffron growing has been promoted in Afghanistan in recent years in response to a call from the Afghan government to investigate economically viable licit alternatives to poppy. Due to the significant labor costs inherent to saffron production, saffron is the world’s most expensive spice. Not only are saffron profits competitive with opium, in relation to other licit crops, but saffron needs little water during growth, requires minimal refinement, and has a low volume and weight, making it easily transportable.
Afghanistan is in many ways an unlikely home for radical Islamic ideologies. Afghan religious life until the 1950s was, and in many places still is, traditional, conservative, rural, and mystical. Just as Afghanistan was politically and ethnically highly fragmented, religious life has also varied tremendously depending on region, ethno-linguistic group, and degree of urbanization.
(U) Many students of insurgency and counterinsurgency attest to the importance of popular support to each side’s quest to achieve its objectives. Key aspects of popular support, including type (passive or active) and scope (limited or significant), are inarguably important in analyzing an insurgency. However, focusing solely or immediately on these aspects risks glossing over insurgent efforts to set conditions necessary to mobilize such support in the first place. Most notably, these conditions include the generation of compliance and the establishment and institutionalization of control.
(U) Recent Civilian Casualties Have Damaged ISAF. Stories of civilian casualties in Uruzgan and Helmand in February 2010 had a clear and widespread negative impact on Kandahar residents’ attitudes toward international forces. Though the casualties occurred in other provinces, the effects felt by patrolling ISAF troops in Kandahar City included having rocks thrown at them by residents and, in a couple of cases, being spit upon. The negative feelings were not limited to Afghan civilians. Afghan National Police officials in Kandahar City repeatedly brought up the civilian casualties in the Uruzgan air strike with their American police mentors. For more on this subject, see p. 13.
(U//FOUO) Murghab District is a significant poppy cultivation and opiate trafficking region, largely due to its poor, agriculture-based economy and the presence of Taliban forces encouraging cultivation.
ISAF Joint Command District Assessments, April 10, 2008.
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Police Strategy, January 2010.
Afghanistan National Development Strategy Reconstruction Framework, August – December 2009.
The majority of the 20 Afghan provinces that were poppy-free in 2009 will remain so this year. Yet, three provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sari Pul, all in the north) risk showing the beginning of a trend reversal, with a minimal increase in cultivation in the districts with higher insecurity. Five other provinces (Kunar, Nangarhar, Kabul, Laghman and Badakhshan), not poppy-free so far, are also expected to have negligible amounts of poppies.
Afghanistan’s government structure is designed around a strong, democratic national government. At the national level, the three branches (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) form the foundation of the government, but other entities, such as ministries, the Afghan National Security Forces (military and police), and commissions also carry out government obligations. Below the national level, the public sector consists of provincial-level governments, municipalities, and finally district-level government. However, unlike the U.S. government, each of the 34 provinces does not operate independently of the national government. Kabul, the capital, is the seat of power. Each province answers to the national government.