A large-scale research project was thus planned and conducted from March to August 2010. This research included a deep probe into the media sector and the public’s behaviors and expectations. The methodology used to achieved this included a combination of: literature review; direct observations; key informant interviews with most relevant actors involved in the media sector; 6,648 close-ended interviews in more than 900 towns and villages of 106 districts, covering all 34 provinces of the country; an audience survey on more than 1,500 individuals run daily for a week; about 200 qualitative, openended interviews; and 10 community case studies. Such an effort guarantees that results presented here are fairly representative of the Afghan population at large.
U.S. Department of the Treasury Overview of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 1390/2011 Budget Process from May 6, 2011.
U.S. Army Afghanistan Regional Command East Stability Operations Overview from May 2011.
In May 2011, the USAID Office of the Inspector General published a report on the agency’s supervision and oversight of assistance activities in Afghanistan and the Kabul Bank crisis. This report was quickly withdrawn and the Federation of American Scientists’ Steven Aftergood quoted a USAID official as saying that “At the time our report was issued, it was written utilizing information from non-classified sources. After our report had been issued, USAID subsequently classified two documents that were cited in our report. This action resulted in the report becoming classified and we removed it from the web site.” Now that an “Unclassified” version of the report has been released, a comparison of the two versions reveals the “classified” portions of the report that were concealed by USAID. These sections of the report indicate that a material loss review was commissioned by USAID/Afghanistan and completed in May 2010 indicating that $850 million, or 94 percent of the value of the bank’s outstanding loans, had been fraudulently diverted to “insiders” connected with the bank. The concealed sections also indicate that Deloitte and Da Afghanistan Bank failed to provide this report to USAID for nearly six months.
This paper is designed to act as a guide for working with local communities in rural Afghanistan at the wuluswali (district) level, primarily in the east and south. Afghan society has always been extremely diverse from district to district, requiring a flexible, multi-faceted approach to governance. This multi-faceted approach blended tribes, Islam and the state. The political upheaval of the past 40 years has disrupted Afghan society and the traditional structures which historically provided governance and social order, not just the Kabul-based government. It is important that the information in this guide is not seen as absolute or universally applicable, but rather as a baseline guide for understanding the complexities of local governance, or the lack thereof, in rural Afghanistan. There is no standard formula for success in Afghanistan due to its diversity; the only constant is the need for flexibility.
The mission of CJTF Phoenix is to train and mentor the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to conduct independent, self-sustained Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Security Operations in order to defeat terrorism and provide a secure, stable environment within the borders of Afghanistan. The ANSF is primarily composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Patrol (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).
Dubai real estate led depositors to rush to withdraw funds from Kabul Bank, the largest bank in Afghanistan. According to the Report of Kabul Bank in Conservatorship dated October 30, 2010, cited in a draft material loss review commissioned by USAID/Afghanistan, fraudulent loans were used to divert $850 million to insiders. This amount reportedly represented 94 percent of the bank’s outstanding loans.
Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A) SOP February 2011.
The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) is active. It provides for both reintegration (where fighters leave the fight and peacefully rejoin their communities) and reconciliation (where entire insurgent groups reach a settlement with GIRoA that ends hostilities). Reintegration is the focus of this guide. Information is presented on the APRP, its place in the COIN Campaign and ISAF‟s role. It provides those in ISAF with what they need to work with community leaders and GIRoA and ANSF partners to build their understanding of the Programme and its opportunities. It is an Afghan Programme and ISAF‟s role is to assist and encourage GIRoA to implement it fully.
The purpose of this handbook is to assist small-unit leaders and Soldiers as they prepare to deploy to and conduct actual operations in Afghanistan. These operations are different from operations in Iraq in several ways. Soldiers and small-unit leaders will face unique difficulties and challenges when operating in the very distinct and disparate provinces of Afghanistan.
Human terrain teams (HTTs) consist of five to nine personnel deployed by the HTS to support field commanders. HTTs fill the socio-cultural knowledge gap in the commander’s operational environment and interpret events in his AO. The team, individuals with social science and operational backgrounds, deploys with military units to bring knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework. The teams also assist in building relationships with the local community in order to provide advice and opportunities to commanders and staffs in the field.
The following data represents a complete breakdown of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development spending in 2010-2011 by province. The data includes information on more than 2500 projects beginning or ending in 2010-2011.
This data represents a complete breakdown of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) planned spending in 2010-2011 by province and per capita as reported in CENTCOM’s CIDNE (Combined Information Data Network Exchange). The data includes information on more than 4300 projects going back as far as 2001.
With this new five-year Strategic Intent, MRRD reaffirms its determination to respond to longterm poverty challenges in rural areas. It remains committed to improve the quality of its services while establishing itself as a leader in policy-making for the rural development sector, using its extended presence in the field and its deep understanding of communities for designing evidence-based policies. MRRD’s ultimate goal is to reduce poverty in rural areas and to pave the way for other actors to complement its endeavours. For MRRD, poverty alleviation can only be pursued by tackling all complex causes of poverty, in a holistic manner. The essence of rural development thus lies in partnerships, which will continue to be nurtured, cultivating a virtuous circle of development.
This paper attempts to analyze the initial lessons learned after the launch of DDP in the districts of Nad Ali and Marja in Helmand. The analysis covers four major areas of program governance: organization, vision, leadership and stakeholder engagement, benefits realization management, and planning and control. The analysis is based on direct observations made during IDLG field missions to Kandahar, Nad Ali and Marja as well as a number of discussions held with various stakeholders during regular DDP planning meetings and a conference held at the UK Embassy on 11 April 2010.
The objective of the District Delivery Program (DDP) is to establish or improve the visibility of the Government by holistically engaging the governance system at the district level to ensure that the basic level public services are available directly to communities. The District Delivery Program is a process that results in a package of services to be delivered to the districts. It aims to establish or visibly improve the government capacity at the local level in key terrain districts. It is not meant to replace ongoing activities in those districts. Parallel planning at the national and local level will preclude duplication of effort. The District Delivery Program is centered on two principles: 1) the Provincial Governor and District Governors offices, in conjunction with line Ministries, deliver services; and 2) that the services provided are a result of a consultative process with a local Council (representative body of the people).
Qarghayee is relatively secure area of Laghman province, being 98% is under government control with the exception of some remote areas such as Tour Ghar, Trager, Zengoor, Shade Bagh , Chon Gay and China Ray. Within these areas insurgents is a potential threat against government actions. The total population of the district is 324500 people living in 139 large villages and 500 smaller settlements. The District Development Assembly is active at the local level with a total membership of 16 people. There is also a tribal shura present with a membership of 65 people from different tribes of Qargahaee. The ulema shura has 15 members, all of which religious elders with good reputations within their communities.
Overall the banking system is profitable and well capitalized for the month ending August 2010. So far, however four banks were in loss for the month under review. Liquidity and FX positions are in accordance with the ratios set by the Central Bank, except for five banks that crossed the set limit on overall and individual currency basis. Total loans and total deposits of the banking system have positive growth, while total assets of the system have a negative growth for the month ending August 2010.
Complete provincial assessments of the security and accessibility of polling centers used in the recent parliamentary elections in Afghanistan in September 2010.
Thirteen reports and maps from the NATO Information Dominance Center ranging from NATO UNCLASSIFIED to the NATO RESTRICTED level of classification
(U//FOUO) BLUF: The People of FAQIR KHIEL and AFGHANYA villages are not allowing the Taliban to have a presence in their villages and have even used force to run a Taliban commander and his group out.
(U//FOUO) ATMOSPHERIC VALUE: Neutral; The Taliban has suffered heavy losses, including several commanders at the hands of Hezb-e-Islami. These losses have caused them to flee the UZBIN areas of the TAGAB District, KAPISA Province.
In 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee initiated an inquiry into private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. In the course of the inquiry, the Committee reviewed hundreds of thousands of pages of documents from the Departments of Defense and State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and private security contractors. Committee staff conducted more than 30 interviews of military and contractor personnel and solicited written answers from several others. This report is a product of that inquiry.
This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.
OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN REQUIRE ARMED CONTRACTORS (ACS) AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSCS) TO FULFILL A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND OTHER ENTITIES OPERATING IN THE COMBINED JOINT OPERATIONS AREA – AFGHANISTAN (CJOA-A). INCLUDED IN THESE ARMED CONTRACTORS AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES ARE TRADITIONAL PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES, THE AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS AND DOD CONTRACTORS WHO ARE ARMED FOR PERSONAL PROTECTION. TRADITIONAL PSC’S PERFORM CONVOY ESCORT, STATIC SECURITY AND PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS. AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS (ASG’S) PROVIDE LOCAL STATIC SECURITY TO FOB’S, COP’S AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE WITH LOCAL AFGHAN COMPANIES. DOD CONTRACTORS MAY BE ARMED EITHER AS A FUNCTION THE SERVICE THEY PROVIDE OR THEIR OPERATING LOCATION. THESE AC/PSC’S ARE NOT COMBATANTS; THEY EXECUTE SERVICES TO PROTECT PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT AND FIXED FACILITIES. WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY AC/PSCS ARE FOR PURELY DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY.