Against the backdrop of widespread international criticism and muted senior official comment regarding Israel’s actions in the Free Gaza flotilla raid, the IDF and some ministries, as well as individual volunteers, turned to social media to counter bad publicity over the incident. While IDF YouTube videos apparently succeeded in attracting attention to Israel’s message, the government’s overall social networking effort appears to have been hastily and clumsily organized compared to a more effective effort at the time of the Gaza incursion from December 2008 to January 2009. Several prominent commentators rebuked the government for what they perceived as a tardy and unprofessional public diplomacy campaign during the incident.
In the wake of Fouad Mourtada’s conviction for impersonating Prince Moulay Rachid on facebook.com, Moroccan bloggers have voiced concern that his arrest sets a precedent for repressing bloggers who were formerly allowed to flourish. In contrast to the outpouring of sentiment on the Internet, Morocco’s mainstream press has thus far displayed only limited attention to the case. Moroccan security services arrested Fouad Mourtada, 26, an IT engineer from the southeastern town of Goulmima, on 6 February for creating a facebook.com profile in the name of King Mohammed VI’s brother, Prince Moulay Rachid on 15 January. Mourtada’s defenders argued that he clearly had no malicious intent since he used his home IP address instead of a cyber cafe and also argued that he did not expect his posting to be taken seriously since there are so many false celebrity profiles on facebook.com (French President Sarkozy has 41). Nevertheless, on 22 February, Mourtada was sentenced to three years in prison and a fine of 10,000 dirhams (approximately $1,350) (helpfouad.com). Beginning with prominent French-language blogger Larbi el Hilali on 7 February, Moroccan bloggers have charged that Mourtada’s arrest and conviction portends a government crackdown on Internet free speech.
Indonesia has one of the world’s freest media environments, with countless new mainstream and Islamic extremist outlets appearing since the fall of former President Suharto in 1998. Reporting and critical commentary range from thoughtful analysis of government policy to harsh critiques of alleged US “conspiracies” for world domination. The top broadcast stations and publications are all privately owned; state-run media have limited impact.
The Tunisian State mobilizes various arms of the state apparatus and bureaucracy to restrict critical reportage and hobble emerging independent media, even though the government maintains that the country enjoys freedom of speech and the press. Measures the authorities employ include the seizure of journals, coverage restrictions, financial controls, imprisonment, and censorship. Such direct bureaucratic obstruction is complemented by more subtle/surreptitious methods of physical intimidation used to control the media environment and keep dissenting Tunisian voices in check. Journalists and human rights organizations continue to protest against the restrictions.
The Burmese Government strictly regulates media across all outlets and genres. Print and broadcast media predominantly carry formulaic reports on the military regime’s activities and accomplishments, and even literature and entertainment are censored. The public does, however, receive uncensored media through widespread access to foreign radio, and a limited number with satellite TV can view Western and Burmese exile news. Low household income is a constraint on media consumption.
Pyongyang during the past month has opened accounts with three popular online social media outlets that are not accessible inside North Korea. Content in these channels is taken directly from official propaganda, and Pyongyang is not currently using the sites for online discussion or exchange. The North’s use of social media appears designed to circumvent Seoul’s efforts to block access by South Koreans to North Korean online content. Pyongyang began its foray into global social media on 14 July with the launch of a YouTube channel. This was followed by the opening of accounts on Twitter (12 August) and Facebook (20 August). Average North Korean citizens do not have access to the Internet, so they almost certainly are not participating in these sites.
Thai academics have sounded the alarm over the appearance of online groups dedicated to harassing and mocking red-shirt members, warning the government’s failure to stop such campaigns could lead to further division and bloodshed. One of these newly emergent online groups, “Social Sanction”, posts personal information on red-shirt supporters and encourages its members to mete out “social punishment.” Academics warn these online campaigns, which they speculate the government quietly endorses, could create an environment “full of fear and hatred” and lead to open violence, outcomes at odds with ongoing government efforts to promote reconciliation.
Reporters Without Borders’ 2008 Press Freedom Index ranks Moldova 98th, a significant drop from its 2007 spot (81). The year was characterized by continued attempts by the government to control the media and by increased harassment of journalists and media organizations critical of the government. The problem is less the legal framework, which is generally adequate, than it is inconsistent implementation. Pro-government media receive preferential treatment. In several instances in 2007 and 2008, journalists from more critical organizations were hindered from attending or covering events. More recently, the entry of Romanian journalists into Moldova to cover protests after the 5 April 2009 elections was blocked.
Global governance—the collective management of common problems at the international level—is at a critical juncture. Although global governance institutions have racked up many successes since their development after the Second World War, the growing number of issues on the international agenda, and their complexity, is outpacing the ability of international organizations and national governments to cope.
The attempted bombing in Times Square on 1 May 2010 highlights the need to identify Homegrown Violent Extremists before they carry out a terrorist act. The ability of the bomber to operate under the radar demonstrates the difficulties associated with identifying terrorist activity and reinforces the need for law enforcement, at all levels, to be vigilant and identify individuals who are planning violence or other illegal activities in support of terrorism.
FOUO Open Source Center South African 2010 Soccer World Cup Media Highlights, June 7, 2010.
Open Source Center brief on Advanced Googling for Senior Executives, Open Source Academy, September 2009.
Open Source Center Walking Time to Medical Facilities and Food Distribution Centers in Port-au-Prince, Haiti
This analysis shows the average walking time from medical facilities and primary food distribution centers in Port-au-Prince. Results of the analysis show locations of extreme road obstruction and the relationship between camps to medical facilities and food distribution centers. The analysis was conducted by creating a road network in a GIS, outlined in the methodology below. This road network can be used in future analysis to describe walking or driving distance from specific location, or to find best route information.
Open Source Center Digital Audio Video Enterprise Brochure, December 3, 2008.
Elements of the U. S. government hosted an interdisciplinary, unclassified workshop to better understand the potential threat from independently acting terrorists with biological expertise. Such lone-actor terrorists have the potential to carry out high-impact biological attacks while generating few signatures, making detection or disruption of their efforts challenging. The one-day workshop explored the possible motivations, intents, and objectives of lone-actor terrorists who might consider conducting biological attacks; examined scientific infrastructure vulnerabilities that these individuals could exploit; and identified strategies to mitigate this potential threat.
The Intelligence Community’s (IC) Accounting Standards Working Group requests the Accounting and Auditing Policy Committee (AAPC) review the National Security Agency (NSA)’s interpretation of internally developed software (IDS) as it relates to the internal use software definitions outlined in Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Board Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (SFFAS) No. 10, Accounting for Internal Use Software.
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This product may contain copyrighted material; authorized use is for national security purposes of the United States Government only. Any reproduction, dissemination, or use is subject to the OSC usage policy and the original copyright.
Sweeping social and economic changes triggered by more than two decades of reform in China have led to equally sweeping changes in China’s vast, state-controlled media environment, particularly in the quantity and diversity of media sources and the development of the Internet. The Communist Party of China (CPC) not only tolerates much greater diversity in the media, but has strongly encouraged greater efforts to provide media content that resonates with the lives and interests of the population. Despite these changes, however, all pertinent information continues to be filtered through party censors to ensure that it is consistent with official policy. The party exercises especially tight control over the core mainstream media which deliver domestic and international news along with politically sensitive information. These media constitute the main vehicle for conveying the policy preferences and decisions of the central leadership.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is pleased to provide to Congress its second report pursuant to the Data Mining Reporting Act. The Data Mining Reporting Act requires “the head of each departrnent or agency of the Federal Government” that is engaged in an activity to use or develop “data mining,” as defined by the Act, to report annually on such activities to the Congress.
On behalf of the Director of National Intelligence, I am pleased to make available the Fall 2007 Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book. The Intelligence Community draws much of its authority and guidance from the body of law in this collection. As the Director of National Intelligence seeks to better integrate the Intelligence Community, we hope this proves to be a useful resource to intelligence professionals across the Community. This document is the result of many hours of hard work. I would like to extend my thanks to those across the Community who assisted the Office of General Counsel in recommending and preparing the authorities contained herein.
The Open Source Information System was an unclassified network of computer systems that provides the intelligence community with open source intelligence. As of 2006, the OSIS name was retired and the network and content portions of the system were decoupled. The network portion of the system is now called DNI-U and the content portion is known as Intelink-U. According to the Army Foreign Military Studies Office, “Intelink-U is a virtual private network — a government intranet. It provides a protected environment to exchange unclassified and FOUO/SBU US Government and other open source data among Intelligence Community and other selected organizations. The Intelink-U firewalls safeguard government information resources and allow customers access to both the Intelink-U network and the public Internet. This gives Intelink-U users a single point of access to an unprecedented amount of unclassified open source information. “
This Intelligence Community (IC) Directive (ICD) establishes Director of National Intelligence (DNI) policy and specifies responsibilities for the oversight, management, and implementation of IC open source activities . This ICD recognizes and establishes the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Deputy DNI for Open Source (ADDNI/OS), the DNI Open Source Center (the Center). and the IC to ensure efficient and effective use of open source information and analysis.
The structure of this chart is primarily taken from a reference pamphlet published by the South Korean Ministry of Unification in January 2009, which appears to be based on the DPRK constitution. As such, this chart is a representation of the formal relationships between the various entities and does not necessarily reflect the actual hierarchy and power relationships in the North Korean system. Other sources include: DPRK, ROK, PRC, and Japanese media; the ROK National Intelligence Service website; the Ministry of Unification’s Key Figures of North Korea 2009; and Japan’s Radiopress North Korea Directory 2008.