Despite past denials by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders that the group intends to target Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, TTP Mohmand Agency leader Omar Khalid said in a 21 March video that the TTP aims to use Pakistan’s nuclear technology, among other assets, to ensure Islam’s survival. This is the first time that OSC has observed a TTP leader publicly list Pakistan’s nuclear weapons among its goals. Other elements of Khalid’s statement suggest that he may be seeking to boost his own stature within the group.
Open source reporting indicates the Afghan political landscape, presently dominated by four political groupings and a number of prominent politicians, is likely to undergo further changes in the lead-up to the presidential elections and withdrawal of ISAF forces in 2014. Differing views of the Taliban threat as ISAF withdraws is likely to help drive the realignment and consolidation of political forces. This realignment may result in two major groupings: President Hamid Karzai and allies keen on working with the Taliban versus former anti-Taliban forces and others opposed to the government’s alleged appeasement toward the militants. Such consolidation would likely lead the emerging generation of younger leaders to choose between joining one of the groupings or risk being marginalized at the national level. Four main political groupings — Karzai’s camp, the National Front of Afghanistan (NFA), the National Coalition of Afghanistan (NCA), and the Truth and Justice Party (TJP) — are currently dominating the Afghan political scene.
Catalyst, a component of DDNI/A’s Analytical Transformation Program, will process unstructured, semistructured, and structured data to produce a knowledge base of entities (people, organizations, places, events, …) with associated attributes and the relationships among them. It will perform functions such as entity extraction, relationship extraction, semantic integration, persistent storage of entities, disambiguation, and related functions (these are defined in the body of the report). The objective of this study is to assess the state-of-the-art and state-of-the-practice in these areas.
Director of National Intelligence Knowledge Assertions and Knowledge Organization Systems Presentation
Presentation on Knowledge Assertions and Knowledge Organization Systems from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Chief Information Officer dated July 16, 2009.
Three presentations on the DNI’s Blackbook semantic data management framework are from 2008-2009 and reflect information on versions 2 and 3
Director of National Intelligence 2012 Report on Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay
Based on trends identified during the past 9 years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Posing a particular problem are transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations.
A body of open-source reporting suggests that fighters leaving the Afghan insurgency are doing so in greater numbers this winter (1,865 fighters) than last winter (443 fighters). As with the winter of 2009-2010, the majority of defecting fighters have continued to reintegrate into Afghan Government entities in the comparatively peaceful northern and western provinces of Afghanistan. The Taliban have rejected these reports, claiming that those joining the government are not Taliban fighters. Because of variations in the level of detail provided in media reports, this compilation could understate the number of reported militants leaving the battlefield. However, even 2,000 defections over six months would not appear to represent a major blow to an insurgency estimated to have 25,000 to 36,000 current fighters,12 and it is likely that at least some of those taking advantage of government reintegration programs were not committed fighters.
The Implementation Manual is a companion document developed to provide amplifying and explanatory guidance on the syntax and use of the markings contained in the CAPCO Register. While not the policy basis for individual agencies’ use of any particular marking, the Implementation Manual cites the applicable authority and sponsor for each marking. Some of the Dissemination Controls and Non-Intelligence Community Dissemination Control Markings are restricted to use by certain agencies. They are included to provide guidance on handling documents that bear them. Their inclusion in the manual does not authorize other Agencies to use these markings. Non-US Classification and Joint Classification Markings are restricted to the respective countries or international organizations.
The 2008 version of the Director of National Intelligence’s Classification and Control Markings Register was released via a FOIA request and is available in a redacted form via the Federation of American Scientists. We have obtained an unredacted version and are presenting selected pages alongside the previously released version to highlight the information that was redacted, including several NSA dissemination control markings such as FRONTO, KEYRUT, SEABOOT and SETTEE.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Report on Security Clearance Determinations for Fiscal Year 2010 discussing 4.2 active security clearances as of 2010.
(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Mobilizing Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) Behavioral Indicators
A US Government interagency study of homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) revealed four major mobilizing patterns shared by a majority of HVE cases between 2008 and 2010, providing officials with an emerging picture of distinct behaviors often associated with an individual mobilizing for violence. These four patterns—links to known extremists, ideological commitment to extremism, international travel, and pursuit of weapons and associated training—repeatedly appeared in the case studies, reinforcing initial assessments of potential trends. Awareness of the patterns can help combat the recent rise in these cases while providing a data-driven tool for assessing potential changes in the HVE threat to the Homeland.
Mysterious guesthouses have been established in Abottabad’s famous residential area. It has been revealed that Blackwater officials are living there. Important persons regularly visit these guesthouses, and there are fears that the peace and stability in Abottabad may be affected. According to the details received, there are many guesthouses in Abottabad where immoral activities take place at night and meetings in the name of NGOs are arranged during the day. As soon as the night falls, suspicious persons start coming to these guesthouses.
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, U.S. Northern Command
This Joint Special Event Threat Assessment (JSETA) addresses potential threats to the National Football League (NFL)USPER Super Bowl XLV, which will be played on 6 February 2011 at Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas. It focuses on potential threats to the game—and to various NFL-sanctioned events scheduled for the Dallas/Ft. Worth Metroplex-area during the 12 days prior to the game—from international and domestic terrorists, cyber actors, criminals, and foreign intelligence services.
Examples of weekly reports created by the Director of National Intelligence’s Open Source Center analyzing the organization’s continual monitoring of People’s Republic of China internet users’ discussions and online postings.
(U//FOUO) Open Source Center Peru Leaders Claim Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) Infiltration
A recent spate of Peruvian press reports allege widespread penetration of domestic social and political groups by Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) member states and affiliated entities. President Garcia’s administration has used the controversy to support its claim that Peru is under attack from an ALBA-directed “conspiracy” and has linked the supposed threat to opposition leader Ollanta Humala as well as to NGOs.
(U//FOUO) Open Source Center Cuban Officials, Media Celebrate People’s Republic of China Anniversary
Cuban officials and state media marked the recent celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Communist Party rule in China by emphasizing China’s economic might and the importance of bilateral ties. State media also extensively covered the PRC ambassador’s praise for China’s economic achievements under Communist rule, but may have intended this and other coverage more to justify the Cuban Government’s chosen limited economic measures than to signal any shift in Cuba’s economic policy. Cuban officials have continued to cultivate close Chinese ties since the November 2008 visit by President Hu Jintao.
A small but growing number of bloggers who appear to be writing from Cuba are using externally hosted websites to voice dissent and developing inventive ways to circumvent government restrictions on Internet access that limit their freedom to post. While the blogs’ emergence has coincided with the move toward more openness in state media about discussing social and economic problems in the past two years, the bloggers go well beyond that limited criticism by blaming the ruling system rather than individuals or external pressure. The government thus far largely has acted indirectly against the bloggers, warning about the dangers of the Internet and reportedly blocking access to a host website. The bloggers tend to express pessimism about prospects for change under Raul Castro, but they currently are not promoting a specific political agenda or calling for any organized movement against the government. Although readership is mostly international, their on-island audience — including possible imitators — is likely to increase if access to information technology becomes more widespread. See the appendices for details on Internet access in Cuba and the individual blogs discussed.
During the current presidential election campaign, the five most prominent candidates — President Viktor Yushchenko, Premier Yuliya Tymoshenko, opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych, Front for Change leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and businessman Serhiy Tihipko — all established an Internet presence as part of their election campaign strategy. According to media assessments, however, the Ukrainian candidates have not understood the intricacies of Internet marketing and therefore have not used the web in an effective manner during this election campaign. Internet use is growing rapidly in Ukraine and future candidates’ sophistication in the use of web tools will likely increase out of necessity.
An Indian social messaging platform that enables users to build mobile communities is drawing parallels to Twitter. Called SMS GupShup [gossip], this Twitter-like service allows users to create communities. With nearly 26 million users, the platform claims to capture a significant chunk of total SMS traffic in India. According to the cofounder of SMS GupShup, Beerud Sheth, there are over 550 million mobile phone users in India and only 50 million web users. “With a 10 to 1 mobile to PC ratio and SMS serving as the most popular communications platform, the market is ripe for SMS Gupshup,” he said. Launched in April 2007, SMS GupShup is currently processing over 480 million messages a month and accounts for nearly five percent of all texts sent within India (techtrunch.com, 15 December 2009).
Malaysia’s mainstream media are state controlled through indirect ownership of media conglomerates and closely adhere to the government line. Some mainstream outlets, especially Chinese newspapers, raise contentious issues such as the treatment of the country’s predominant Malay and minority Chinese and Indian communities. Newspapers are the preferred choice for political news, but TV and radio have nearly twice the audience, with about 90-percent reach, compared to 50 percent for newspapers. Internet use is increasing, and alternative news portals and blogs provide an important venue for dissent and criticism despite government defamation suits against bloggers and the use of the Internal Security Act.
The use of flashmobs in South Korea has evolved from “just for fun” gatherings to a means of mobilizing new media-savvy users into civic and political action. Flashmobs became increasingly political in 2004 during the run-up to the ROK general elections and reached a peak of influence in 2008, when political flashmobs helped mobilize online citizens to take part in anti-mad cow candlelight street protests. The protests lasted for over 100 days and involved millions of people. As one of the most wired countries in the world, South Korea is especially fertile ground for future flashmobs, given the fun, anonymous, and easily-organized nature of the gatherings. Facilitated by emerging media tools — such as Internet blogs, smart phones, and mobile phone text messaging — potential organizers have ready access to prospective protesters against controversial policies and developments.
Former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz formally launched Aaj News Television in Karachi on 21 May 2005 (www.dawn.com/2005/05/22/top3.htm, website of leading mainstream English daily Karachi Dawn, 22 May 2005). According to its website (www.aaj.tv), it has fully equipped bureaus in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad, making Aaj the first private channel to broadcast from inside Pakistan. Aaj also has “an Earth Station in Pakistan that broadcasts directly to the AsiaSat satellite with a footprint of over 60 countries.” Aaj offers “well defined programming blocks” of news, current affairs, infotainment, and entertainment. It has collaboration agreements with “partner news sources in more than 100 countries.”
Based on the current observed levels of participation on social network sites (SNS) in Pakistan and the country’s past experience with street protest movements during the 2007 State of Emergency and 2009 lawyers Long March, it is possible that Internet users could leverage such sites to organize grassroots protest movements, but the intensity of such efforts would likely be limited by several factors.
Authoritative PRC media reports of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s live online appearances illustrate authorities’ expanding use of the Internet to set and control policy discourse in Chinese-language virtual space. They also suggest ongoing efforts to manage leaders’ images and portray them as accessible and soliciting online public opinion. While some apparent missteps suggest a cautious, evolving approach to interactive Internet media in relation to top leaders, reported leadership statements indicate sustained attention to the goal of incorporating new technologies into the propaganda system.
This report surveys 10 prominent PRC commentators on military affairs who appear to write blogs hosted on PRC and PRC-owned Hong Kong websites. All of these commentators appear to maintain an online presence using these blogs to promote their viewpoints. Commentators cover such topics as PRC military strategy, air defense, navy issues, army aviation, information technology, defense spending, foreign military developments, military-to-military relations, political education, military history, training, and exercises. These blogs appear on China’s authoritative government websites, popular PRC commercial portal sites, and independent Hong Kong news websites.