The purpose of the Agreement is to set forth terms by which DHS and DoD will provide personnel, equipment, and facilities in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning for the Nation’s cybersecurity, mutual support for cybersecurity capabilities development, and synchronization of current operational cybersecurity mission activities. Implementing this Agreement will focus national cybersecurity efforts, increasing the overall capacity and capability of both DHS’s homeland security and DoD’s national security missions, while providing integral protection for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
United States
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Multi-Jurisdiction IED Security Planning Guide
The Multi-Jurisdiction Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Security Plan (MJIEDSP) Planning Guide assists multi-jurisdiction areas in developing a detailed IED security plan. The IED security plan outlines specific bombing prevention actions that reduce vulnerability and mitigate risk against the primary terrorist IED attack method within a multi-jurisdiction area.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Report: Small Unit Tactics in Terrorist Attacks
The DHS/Office for Bombing Prevention TRIPwire team is providing this Information Product to private sector owners and operators and law enforcement to alert them to small unit tactics used by terrorists throughout the world. This report is derived from a variety of open sources and government reports. At this time, there is no credible or specific information that terrorists are planning operations against public buildings in the United States, but it is important for Federal, State, and Local authorities, and private sector owners and operators to be aware of potential terrorist tactics.
Mexico, Texas
(U//FOUO) Texas-Mexico Border Security Carnage Update
(U//FOUO) Texas-Mexico Border Security Carnage Update, July 2010.
U.S. Marine Corps
USMC Reserve Security Office WikiLeaks Guidance
The information found on the website “WIKILEAKS” is classified information that was transmitted to that public domain site illegally. Per reference (a) and the enclosures, “Classified Information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information.” Despite the circumstances surrounding WIKILEAKS, we must continue to protect similar or identical information commensurate with the level of classification assigned per reference (b), until the information is assessed by the appropriate Original Classification Authority (DCA).
Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DoE-DHS Energy Sector Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan
In its role as Energy SSA, DOE has worked closely with dozens of government and industry security partners to prepare this 2007 Energy SSP. Much of that work was conducted through the Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) for electricity and for oil and natural gas, as well as through the Energy Government Coordinating Council (GCC). The electricity SCC represents more than 95 percent of the electric industry and the oil and natural gas SCC represents more than 98 percent of its industry. The GCC, co—chaired by DHS and DOE, represents all levels of government—Federal, State, local, and tribal-that are concerned with the Energy Sector.
National Security Agency
(U//FOUO) NSA Progress in Near-Real Time Attack Detection Brief
The overall objective of the this task was to architect and implement a capability that will enable automated parsing, normalization, extraction, aggregation, filtering and then detection of attack patterns based on log and log like data in near real time depending on local network settings. We call this the Audit Data Extraction Utility (ADEU).
Customs and Border Protection
Customs and Border Protection Colombian US Army Imposter Briefing
Customs and Border Protection Colombian US Army Imposter Briefing, 2010.
Department of Justice
(U//FOUO//LES) NGIC Gangs Targeting Law Enforcement for Weapons Theft
(U//LES) Gang members and criminals nationwide are targeting law enforcement officials, military, government vehicles, and residences in search of weapons, equipment, police badges, body armor, and uniforms.a These incidents suggest that some gangs are becoming more brazen, tactical, and willing to engage law enforcement and rival gang members in potentially lethal encounters. The National Gang Intelligence Center assesses that these thefts could also allow gang members and criminals to impersonate law enforcement officers to gain better access to their targets.
FEMA
FEMA Director Battle Book
The purpose of this ―battle book is to provide the FEMA Director with background information and recommended checklist actions on scenarios that may require a significant response operation under the National Response Plan. This document is intended to serve as a ―one stop reference that includes information on the agency’s emergency teams and resources.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Project 12 Report: Critical Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships
The United States relies on critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) for government operations and the health and safety of its economy and its citizens. The President issued National Security Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD-54)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (HSPD-23), which formalized the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). NSPD-54/HSPD-23 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the heads of other Sector-Specific Agencies, to submit a report detailing the policy and resource requirements for improving the protection of privately owned U.S. critical infrastructure networks. The report is required to detail how the u.S. Government can partner with the private sector to leverage investment in intrusion protection capabilities and technology, increase awareness about the extent and severity of cyber threats facing critical infrastructure, enhance real-time cyber situational awareness, and encourage intrusion protection for critical information technology infrastructure.”
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO//LES) DHS Law Enforcement Information Sharing (LEIS) Service
Simply stated, the LEIS Service is the “pipe” used to connect state and local law enforcement with DHS law enforcement.
Afghanistan, United States
Senate Report on Private Security Contractor Oversight in Afghanistan
In 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee initiated an inquiry into private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. In the course of the inquiry, the Committee reviewed hundreds of thousands of pages of documents from the Departments of Defense and State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and private security contractors. Committee staff conducted more than 30 interviews of military and contractor personnel and solicited written answers from several others. This report is a product of that inquiry.
Department of Homeland Security
DHS Retail Sector Suspicious Activity Reporting Video
DHS video designed to raise the level of awareness for retail and shopping center employees by highlighting the indicators of suspicious activity, this video provides information to help employees identify and report suspicious activities and threats in a timely manner.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) Asymmetric Warfare Group “Attack The Network” Counterinsurgency Methodology
This document continues discussion on effective targeting methods (lethal and non-lethal) at the Battalion and Brigade level. It continues dialogue on Attacking the Network by further describing Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability analysis themes and their link to network modeling. This document also discusses the use of detailed, Observable Indicators to focus Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets against the enemy’s vulnerabilities. A modified Intelligence Synchronization Matrix (ISM) ensures integration and synchronization to the friendly course of action in a Counter-Insurgency environment. Using doctrinal and situational templates and a modified ISM helps the S2 understand the insurgent networks operating in his Area of Interest, focus assets against the known or suspected Critical Vulnerabilities, and synchronize ISR to give the commander the information he needs at the Decision Points.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCS Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Exord
THE PURPOSE OF THIS EXORD IS TO DELEGATE LIMITED APPROVAL AUTHORITY TO SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDERS, WHO HAVE DSCA RESPONSIBILITIES, FOR ROUTINE PA REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE (RFA), INCLUDING THE TYPES OF RFA HISTORICALLY SUBMITTED BY PA, TO PROVIDE A RAPID AND FLEXIBLE DOD RESPONSE TO FEDERAL PRIMARY AGENCIES FOR POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL EMERGENCIES AND OR DISASTERS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES, POSSESSIONS, AND PROTECTORATES.
Department of Defense
DoD Defense Support to Civil Authorities Handbook
The most legally sensitive function in DSCA is Military Law Enforcement. Consequently, to prevent violations of the law, all military personnel should be educated on MLE. The main legal obstacle to the use of the military for law enforcement is the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), discussed briefly in Section 2.3.1 of this chapter. (For more detail on PCA, see Annex A.) The PCA affects National Guard (either in State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32) and federal forces (Title 10) differently. Thus, it is very important to understand the status of military personnel prior to mission assignment.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) Insurgent Tactics in Southern Afghanistan 2005-2008
This short book provides an up-to-date introduction to the tactics employed by insurgents in southern Afghanistan during the years 2005-2008. It includes vignettes and maps on 19 different tactically significant engagements. The book covers three types of attacks: ambushes, attacks on fixed positions, and defensive engagements. The intended audience is Marines and soldiers going into theatre.
California
California State Terrorism Threat Assessment System (STTAS) Concept of Operations
This Concept of Operations (CONOPS) provides California law enforcement and other agencies ensuring the security of our state, a primer on the State Terrorism Threat Assessment System (STTAS). This includes an overview of the California Joint Regional Information Exchange System (CAL JRIES), the state’s principal, real-time information sharing communication platform. Homeland security stakeholders will substantively influence the ongoing evolution of this CONOPS as enhancement cycles inevitably refine California’s response to terrorist and other homeland security threats.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U//FOUO) FBI Civil Aviation Security Program Brief
FOUO FBI Civil Aviation Security Program Brief, April 15, 2010.
Corporate, Department of Defense
DoD Biometrics HIIDE Device User Guide
The HIIDE includes two separate cameras for imaging an individual’s irises and face, and a sensor pad for scanning fingerprints. These three sensors capture the minute details of a subject’s iris, fingerprint and face, as digital photographs, or “scans.” The HIIDE™ translates the photographic data into a binary code and links that code to biographic data about the individual, such as name and a personal identification number. The HIIDE then processes the code and biographic data and builds a portfolio for the individual that is stored in a database. Once an individual has had a record created, or has been “enrolled,” that individual is part of the HIIDE database. One can “recognize,” or confirm that individual’s identity in the future by comparing a live scan of the subjects: iris, fingerprints and/or face to the biometrics contained in the database.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
(U//FOUO) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Needs Analysis
This document presents the results of the Functional Needs Analysis/Functional Solutions Analysis (FNA/FSA) for the functional area of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND). The FNA/FSA are structured in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01D, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and its companion manual, CJCSM 3170.01A, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) US-CERT Advisory “Here You Have” Malware Campaign
The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and US-CERT are aware of malicious e-mails received on September 9, 2010, by public and private sector stakeholders. Organizations should warn users to avoid opening suspicious e-mails and monitor activity to the following URL:
Members[dot]multimania[dot]co[dot]uk/yahoophoto/PDF_Document21_025542010_pdf[dot]scr
Department of Justice
(U//LES) NGIC Gangs Infiltrating Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies
(U//LES) Gang infiltration of law enforcement, government, and correctional agencies poses a serious security threat due to the access they have to restricted areas vulnerable to sabotage, sensitive information pertaining to investigations, and access to personal information or protected persons, whom they may view as potential targets for violence. Gang members serving in law enforcement agencies and correctional facilities compromise security, criminal investigations and operations, and agency integrity. Compromised law enforcement officers and correctional staff assist gang members in committing their illicit activities, disrupt legitimate law enforcement efforts to investigate such activities, thereby protecting members from discovery and apprehension. Gang members, gang associates, and their family members most commonly infiltrate law enforcement through non-sworn civilian positions. Police dispatchers and records clerks have access to confidential information than officers do and are not always subjected to in-depth background checks prior to employment. However, a number of gang members and former gang members have served as sworn law enforcement and correctional officers.
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives
(U//LES) ATF Project Gunrunner Mexican Cartel Strategy
Based on the areas in Mexico controlled by the Gulf, Zetas, and Sinaloa cartels; the locations of U.S.-sourced firearm recoveries in Mexico; and the U.S. locations where firearms recovered in Mexico are most often acquired, the Houston and Phoenix Field Divisions will be primarily responsible for investigating trafficking schemes associated with these cartels. However, this strategy is not intended to limit the initiative of any ATF field division and in fact recognizes the increasingly important role played by non-Southwest border field divisions in combating firearms and explosives trafficking to Mexico. As a result, all ATF field divisions are expected to initiate investigations on cartels and/or their surrogates operating in their geographic areas of responsibility; however, investigations pertaining to the Gulf, Zetas, and Sinaloa cartels must be deconflicted and closely coordinated with the Houston and Phoenix Field Divisions.