The Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates is a product of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). Its content is derived from statutes, Executive Orders and Directives, national policy, DoD Directives, joint publications, service regulations and field manuals, and lessons learned by judge advocates and other practitioners throughout federal and state government. This edition includes a substantial revision of Chapter 3, it incorporates new guidance as set for forth Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), it provides amplifying information on wildfire response, emergency mutual assistance compacts, the role of the National Guard and Army units such as Army North and Joint Task Force—Civil Support, and it discusses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
This report sets forth the statutes, Executive Branch documents, regulations, and Department of Defense (DoD) internal directives that define and govern Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). The policies and responsibilities of the military departments and staff agencies of DoD are reviewed, as they have evolved from the early 1950s to the present. The events of September 11, 2001, have placed the MSCA function in the larger context of homeland security, and documents setting forth homeland security policy as it defines MSCA have been reviewed as well. This report also discusses DoD civilian and military responsibility for MSCA, and the states’ position regarding the National Guard’s role in support of civil authorities. Finally, this report evaluates the criteria for providing MSCA, and assesses how DoD compares this function with its warfighting mission.
A Defense Intelligence Agency presentation concerning geopolitics in the region surrounding Afghanistan and Pakistan from February 2012.
Even More Photos of US/NATO Troops Patrolling Opium Poppy Fields in Afghanistan
More Photos of US/NATO Troops Patrolling Opium Poppy Fields in Afghanistan
US/NATO Troops Patrolling Opium Poppy Fields in Afghanistan
(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan: Key Bases and Figures of the Mujahideen
Afghanistan’s Pashtun rural population has been the source of manpower, funds, shelter, support, and intelligence for the repeated insurgencies that have plagued that unfortunate county since their monarch, Zahir Shah, was overthrown in 1973. In the general unrest that followed, insurgents opposed Mohammad Daoud’s army until he was overthrown by the communists who served in succession – Taraki, Amin, Karmal, and Najibullah. The communist leadership figures, in turn, were deposed by the anti-communist “Seven Party Alliance” that was soon battling among itself for control of Kabul until the Taliban Movement emerged. The Taliban was also faced with resisting insurgent forces, primarily from the non-Pashtun ethnic groups inhabiting Afghanistan’s northern provinces. Afghanistan’s rural insurgents are generally poorly educated, if literate at all, and succeeding generations of insurgents rely upon story-telling from earlier generations of fighters to gain knowledge of tactics that are applicable to their particular culture and terrain.
The PM RS JPO initiated development of an integrated GRMP in response to direction from senior Army and Marine Corps leadership in 2005. The GRMP is intended to provide Army and Marine Corps ground robotic stakeholders a common information resource document, as well as a comprehensive plan that links robotic S&T Projects and Acquisition/Contingency Programs to User Current Capability Gaps, Future Capability Gaps, and S&T Shortfalls. The pressing need for reliable ground robotic systems capable of detecting and warning of the presence of hidden improvised explosive devices (IEDs), chemical and biological agents, and related threats to ground troops employed by insurgents in combat zones greatly increases the importance of making every S&T dollar count toward filling critical User capability gaps. In addition, the GRMP provides decision makers a tool for making critical resource decisions.
A spokesman for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has provided statements to publications in New Hampshire and Oregon indicating that information regarding domestic drone activities provided by Public Intelligence is inaccurate, despite confirmations from the offices of two U.S. Senators. Following our publication last week of a map of current and proposed Department of Defense drone activities within the U.S., several journalists with local publications around the country wrote articles regarding drone activities that were listed in their area. David Brooks of the Nashua Telegraph wrote about the listing of New Hampshire’s Mt. Washington as the site of a USSOCOM drone activity involving small unmanned aerial vehicles including the Raven and Wasp. Corey Pein of the Willamette Week wrote about a planned USSOCOM drone activity in Portland that was listed as utilizing the same types of drones.
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations
In general, operations during the first half of the decade were often marked by numerous missteps and challenges as the US government and military applied a strategy and force suited for a different threat and environment. Operations in the second half of the decade often featured successful adaptation to overcome these challenges. From its study of these operations, JCOA identified overarching, enduring lessons for the joint force that present opportunities for the US to learn and improve, best practices that the US can sustain, and emerging risk factors that the US should address. These lessons were derived from JCOA’s 46 studies during this past decade and vetted through the Joint Staff J7-sponsored Decade of War working group in May 2012; input from working group members was consolidated into this report. This initial effort is envisioned to be the first volume in a sustained, multi-phased effort to identify critical, high-level lessons for the joint force.
A presentation authored by an Army Reserve Warrant Officer who is described as an Arabic linguist and presented at an unknown event describing perceived ethical problems with Islamic theology.
Past statements from al‐Qa’ida Central, as well as their franchise groups, highlight the importance of targeting the U.S. economy as part of their strategy of confronting the West. Most recently, militant propagandists, such as Adam Gadahn, American mouthpiece for Al‐Qa’ida in Pakistan, have made statements advising Muslims in the West to “…undermine the West’s already struggling economies with…targeted attacks on symbols of capitalism which will shake consumer confidence and stifle spending”. Additionally, in November 2010, al‐Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula introduced the “strategy of a thousand cuts”, where they encouraged their mujahideen brothers to “attack the enemy with smaller, but more frequent operations…the aim is to bleed the enemy to death”.
Vignettes put the rules of engagement (ROE) into context. Rules can be memorized, but without context, those rules have little meaning or value. There is not a repository of vignettes readily accessible to Soldiers. This handbook addresses that shortcoming for units heading to Afghanistan. Soldiers can use this handbook individually, but its value is greatly increased through group discussion and interaction with leaders and judge advocates.
On the morning of November 9, 2011, thousands of students, faculty, staff, and community members gathered for a noontime rally in Sproul Plaza. Protestors voiced their opposition to a variety of issues including recent tuition increases and state cuts to public education, and their support for the Occupy movement, which began in New York City a few months prior. In the early afternoon, hundreds of protestors convened a “General Assembly,” in which they voted to set up tents near Sproul Hall. The first tents to be erected in the grassy area near Sproul Hall were quickly removed by campus police without incident. Two later incidents in this same area, however, one in the mid-afternoon and one at night, involved the use of force by police against large numbers of protesters. Around 3 p.m., another set of tents was erected. In an effort to remove the tents, the police used batons and other means of force to move protestors that were locking arms and blocking access to the tents. After tense interaction with protesters, the police removed this second set of tents and withdrew to their command post in the basement of Sproul Hall. During this period, six individuals were arrested and more were injured and in some instances handled roughly.
In 2004, the Government of Canada issued its first National Security Policy (NSP), Securing an Open Society, to ensure that Canada would be prepared for and could respond to future threats. Recognizing that threats to national security are beyond the capacity of individuals, communities or provinces to address alone, the NSP envisaged greater integration and more strategic co-ordination of key security functions, particularly those related to intelligence collection, threat assessments and emergency preparedness through the implementation of a strategic framework and an action plan. To make substantive improvements in integration and co-ordination with regard to terrorist threats, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), in co-operation with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP), are developing National Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Requirements (NCTIR). The NCTIR is envisaged as an integral component of a broader national strategy involving training, information-sharing and a co-ordinated response to terrorist threats involving the whole of government.
The Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation are warning business owners and emergency personnel around the country to be on the look out for terrorists and criminals asking too many questions. In a bulletin from earlier this year, DHS and FBI warned that terrorists and criminals often exhibit the highly suspicious behavior of asking “pertinent, intrusive or probing questions” about security and operations at sensitive facilities. According to the document, terrorists or criminals “may attempt to identify critical infrastructure vulnerabilities by eliciting information pertaining to operational and security procedures from security personnel, facility employees or their associates” and that this type of questioning by individuals “with no apparent need for the information” can provide an “early warning of a potential attack.”
Terrorist or criminals may attempt to identify critical infrastructure vulnerabilities by eliciting information pertaining to operational and security procedures from security personnel, facility employees, and their associates. Persistent, intrusive or probing questions about security, operations or other sensitive aspects of a facility by individuals with no apparent need for the information could provide early warning of a potential attack.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group (SSG) is chartered with generating revolutionary naval warfighting concepts. SSG XXVIII has been tasked to generate innovative concepts for the operational and tactical employment of unmanned systems, in all domains, as an integral part of the Naval Force for 2020 and beyond. From these innovative concepts, SSG XXVIII is also tasked to produce recommendations and actionable steps for implementation of unmanned systems integration into the Navy’s force structure. This Way Ahead Plan provides a framework for SSG XXVIII’s approach to address this task and challenge. It includes a summary of the SSG’s preliminary thoughts on the value of unmanned systems, an initial overarching concept, and associated concept teams and areas of interest.
Last month the Ohio State Highway Patrol partnered with the Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) to survey local police departments about their encounters with suspects under the influence of bath salts. Since its release last month, the survey has been circulated by law enforcement around the country, discussed online in forums by concerned police officers and has even begun to garner press attention for its disturbing reports of the effects of the designer drug, including superhuman strength and highly bizarre hallucinations that often result in violent behavior.
The Ohio State Highway Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit recently partnered with the Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) and gathered information regarding bath salts via a survey. The objective of the study was to assist Law Enforcement by creating an officer safety awareness product relating to the dangers of encountering people on bath salts.
(U//FOUO) New York Fusion Center Bulletin: Use of Cloned Vehicles in Terrorist or Criminal Operations
Criminals and terrorists have long used official vehicles, “cloned” vehicles (those painted/decorated to appear official), or seemingly legitimate vehicles (e.g. livery, maintenance or delivery) to circumvent security measures at targets of interest. There have been numerous terrorist attacks overseas wherein operatives used police vehicles or ambulances (or vehicles painted to resemble same) to conceal improvised explosive devices. Within the US Homeland, the most common use of cloned official vehicles by criminals is for drug smuggling; however, at least one terrorist targeting New York envisioned misusing vehicles that would appear to be legitimate, in order to conduct an attack. Dhiren Barot, an al Qaeda operative involved in the 2004 Financial Centers Plot, allegedly plotted to detonate three limousines packed with explosives and gas cylinders in underground parking lots in Manhattan. While the limousines would not have masqueraded as “official vehicles” per se they would have appeared to be legitimately entering those parking structures.
Several tables displaying the current Department of Defense unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) inventory levels (FY2012 budgeted inventory) and planned inventory through FY2017. The information in the tables was taken from the recent Department of Defense Report to Congress on Future Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training, Operations, and Sustainability.
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to increase its investment in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to meet battlefield commanders’ demand for their unique capabilities. The emphasis on long-endurance, unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets -many with strike capabilities – is a direct reflection of recent operational experience and further Combatant Commander demands. This increase in demand has resulted in a large number of UAS capable of a wide range of missions. This large number of fielded UAS has also driven a strong demand for access within the National Airspace System (NAS). This need for airspace access to test new systems, train operators, and conduct continental United States (CONUS)-based missions has quickly exceeded the current airspace available for military operations. The situation will only be exacerbated as units return from overseas contingencies.
An early April 2012 suicide bombing of a theater in Somalia and a violent extremist communication advocating attacks on US theaters highlight terrorists’ continued interest in attacking such venues. Although we have no specific or credible information indicating that terrorists plan to attack theaters in the United States, terrorists may seek to emulate overseas attacks on theaters here in the United States because they have the potential to inflict mass casualties and cause local economic damage.
The following map depicts the approximate locations of current and planned Department of Defense unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) activities inside the U.S. The locations, service branches, and types of UAS flown were obtained from several publicly released DoD presentations. If…
This report is focused on helping US communicators and analysts better identify opportunities to undermine AQ messaging. With this in mind, the report analyzes how AQ portrays itself and its objectives to the public through statements and multimedia releases – the messaging used to attract recruits, build public sympathy, and undermine adversaries such as the United States. Research for this analysis included AQ messaging dating back to 2000, with particular attention paid to recent messaging from 2009-2011. In addition to primary sources and open source research, interviews with 25 SMEs were used to surface master narratives, test hypotheses, and validate assertions. These SMEs were asked a combination of expansive, open-ended questions designed to surface new hypotheses as well as targeted questions designed to verify assertions. Combining these interviews with open source research, this report highlights how each master narrative reflects perceived history, themes, and objectives that are central to AQ’s public identity. Each of these master narratives appear with varied frequency across AQ messaging and propaganda, and collectively they represent a unified narrative system used by AQ and affiliate communicators.
This report serves as a resource for addressing this challenge in two ways. First, it surfaces a set of nine master narratives carefully selected based on their potency in the context of France’s Muslim communities, and their relevance to US strategic interests. Second, this report follows a consistent structure for articulating these narratives and explicitly identifies initial implications for US communicators and analysts. The set outlined here is not exhaustive: these nine master narratives represent a first step that communicators and analysts can efficiently apply to the specific messaging need or analytic question at hand. For seasoned experts on French Muslim communities, these narratives will already be familiar — the content contained in this report can be used to help check assumptions, surface tacit knowledge, and aid customer communications. For newcomers to European Islam accounts, these narratives offer deep insights into the stories and perceptions that shape French Muslim identity and worldviews that may otherwise take years to accumulate.