This study examines the history of the fighting in southern and western Afghanistan since 2001. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity sponsored the study. Its purpose is to give Marines a basic understanding of what has happened in southern and western Afghanistan. Most Marines will operate in that area and we hope a historical reference source will be useful. If the study has any single argument it is that government misrule has been a driving factor behind the continuing violence in southern and western Afghanistan. The Afghan government favored warlords, handicapped competent governors, took part in the poppy trade, and allowed the police to abuse the people. Scarcity of security forces and collateral damage from Coalition operations did not help either. Yet above all, we find it unlikely that the instability in southern and western Afghanistan today could have been averted without addressing government misrule.
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki June 1946
The available facts about the power of the atomic bomb as a military weapon lie in the story of what it did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of these facts have been published, in official and unofficial form, but mingled with distortions or errors. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, therefore, in partial fulfillment of the mission for which it was established, has put together in these pages a fairly full account of just what the atomic bombs did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Together with an explanation of how the bomb achieved these effects, this report states the extent and nature of the damage, the casualties, and the political repercussions from the two attacks. The basis is the observation, measurement, and analysis of the Survey’s investigators. The conjecture that is necessary for understanding of complex phenomena and for applying the findings to the problems of defense of the U.S. is clearly labeled.
What distinguishes civil support from homeland defense operations? How do operational variables differ from mission variables? What factors define the operational environment? The vocabulary of conflict in U.S. military operations can be unusually complex and esoteric. There can often be huge doctrinal differences indicated by the addition of a single word to a name or description. The amount of epithets and acronyms can sometimes overwhelm even military personnel, causing military communications to appear as a language unto itself. To eliminate the barriers and confusion created by this technical vocabulary, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) worked with a number of government agencies to produce a lexicon detailing the precise definitions of terms and concepts employed by military personnel in countering enemy networks.
This first edition of the Attack the Network (AtN) Lexicon was produced by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The lexicon contents were developed after extensive interviews with military units who successfully employed AtN principles and practices to reduce the number and effectiveness of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment where they encountered multiple and sometimes interconnected adversary networks. The lexicon contents were further developed and refined by subject matter experts from over fifty organizations across the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security.
Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaida ally, relies on a broad range of funding sources to support its terrorist and paramilitary operations in Somalia. However, little comprehensive information is available on the character and extent of this funding network within the large communities of Somali expats in Kenya. Existing reports suggest that alternative remittance systems (ARS), especially hawaladars, are a reliable source of income for Somalis still living in Somalia. Expat family members living in Kenya rely on these systems to transfer money to their relatives in Somalia. Recent reports suggest al-Shabaab is a beneficiary of these services1. Al-Shabaab could exploit current and future hawaladar networks in Kenya to transit funds to support IED operations against US or allied humanitarian or military operations. Thus, networks of undocumented and unmonitored hawaladars within the country could pose a threat to future counterterrorism or humanitarian operations in the region. Further study of the role of ARS in Kenya in the funding of al-Shabaab operations is recommended.
This study investigates Iran’s strategy of smuggling weapons to Afghan insurgents. Based on the hypothesis that Iran utilizes its weapons smuggling networks as proxies to leverage against foreign threats with predictable results, this study will address Iran’s future weapons smuggling behaviors. Iran, like the United States, is a complex actor pursuing rational, national strategic objectives. The perceived dichotomy between Iran’s words and actions results in an atmosphere of suspicion surrounding Iranian motives that can potentially lead to unintended escalations between Iran and other nations. An increase in tensions between the U.S. and Iran, specifically over perceived threats to Iranian sovereignty, will be matched with an increase in the rate and quantity of weapons, an introduction of more capable weapons, or both. Given the elasticity of realizing strategic success by increasing the rate and quantity of weapons, Iran will likely attempt to quickly counter an imminent threat by deploying more destructive weapons comparable to those Iran supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah.
This newsletter does not strive to make readers environmental experts. However, it does emphasize the importance of incorporating environmental considerations throughout the military decision-making process (MDMP). Through a variety of environmental lessons learned, this newsletter provides tactics, techniques, and procedures in an effort to reduce overall environmental risk.
Over the last 10 years, the U.S. government has made significant investments in science and technology in order to enhance its ability to understand and shape public opinion and behavior abroad—a domain of activity referred to in this report as “shaping,” “influencing,” or “communication and persuasion.” Because this effort is taking place across a vast government bureaucracy, the policy-makers and practitioners engaged in communication and persuasion do not always know what tools are at their disposal and what tools need to be invented. To address this problem, the Department of Defense’s Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) issued a “Strategic Communication Science and Technology Plan” in 2009 that surveyed the government’s programs in this area and their gaps. To keep abreast of the latest technological developments, RRTO commissioned CNA to update this report for FY 2012. The updated report discusses domains for future investment in research and development (R&D); identifies gaps and proposes new science and technology (S&T) initiatives; and surveys current S&T programs.
A list of current, ongoing, and planned Department of Defense Science and Technology Strategic Communication (SC) programs taken from the 2009 Strategic Communication Science and Technology Plan compiled by the Defense Research and Engineering Rapid Reaction Technology Office.
In order to help ensure public safety and security and to detect, deter, and prevent potential terrorist activities, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has developed a networked Domain Awareness System. The Domain Awareness System not only supplies critical supplemental assistance to officers’ ongoing security and public safety efforts, but also enhances the collaborative nature of those efforts by leveraging the resources of the private sector and other City agencies. Given the ongoing threat of terrorist attack, the Domain Awareness System is an important part of the NYPD’s integrated approach to providing protection for those who work in, live in, and visit New York City.
The Director of National Intelligence’s Open Source Center produced a report in June 2012 to help representatives of the U.S. government analyze and communicate with the Syrian people more effectively. The report, part of the Master Narratives series produced in conjunction with a private consulting firm called Monitor 360 and other “partners across the U.S. government”, is focused on “surfacing and articulating master narratives across a range of important geographies. These insights can be used to better understand critical audience segments and key influencers, build analytic capabilities, and develop actionable messaging and counter-messaging strategies.”
Understanding master narratives can be the difference between analytic anticipation and unwanted surprise, as well as the difference between communications successes and messaging gaffes. Master narratives are the historically grounded stories that reflect a community’s identity and experiences, or explain its hopes, aspirations, and concerns. These narratives help groups understand who they are and where they come from, and how to make sense of unfolding developments around them. As they do in all countries, effective communicators in Syria invoke master narratives in order to move audiences in a preferred direction. Syrian influencers rely on their native familiarity with these master narratives to use them effectively. This task is considerably more challenging for US communicators and analysts because they must place themselves in the mindset of foreign audiences who believe stories that — from an American vantage point — may appear surprising, conspiratorial, or even outlandish.
The following photos depict various pieces of art held in the CIA Museum at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The museum’s collection, interestingly, seems to hold only one abstract art piece by artist Gene Davis who was known for paintings…
A formerly classified document from 1952 on the CIA’s Project BLUEBIRD, an offshoot of Project MKULTRA.
A report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence detailing an investigation into the CIA’s MKULTRA program, dated August 3, 1977
A CIA Inspector General report written in 1963 following an investigation into the Agency’s MKULTRA program.
This publication provides multi-Service TTP for the seamless integration of air assets during the conduct of maritime surface warfare. The maritime domain is defined as the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. AOMSW is intended to support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives by providing capabilities/forces in support of joint maritime operations. The end state of this publication is a streamlined support process for maritime surface warfare within the joint force maritime component commander’s (JFMCC’s) area of operations (AO).
James Eagan Holmes, a 24-year-old male, allegedly shot and killed12 people and wounded approximately 38 more after opening fire in a crowded movie theater during a showing of the new Batman movie, “The Dark Knight Rises.” The shooting erupted during the midnight showing at the multiplex in Aurora, Colorado, not far from Denver, where a large crowd had gathered, some dressed as characters from the highly anticipated Batman sequel. Holmes began the attack by throwing two gas canisters into the theater after entering through an exit door that had been propped open. Witnesses stated many assumed it was a promotional stunt related to the movie and did not initially react. After both canisters had deployed, Holmes commenced shooting into the crowd.
DHS Infrastructure Protection Note: Performance Venues – Indicators of Violence and Protective Measures
Performance venues include theaters, concert halls, auditoriums, and amphitheaters, ranging in size and function from small neighborhood movie theaters or community playhouses to high-capacity venues in major metropolitan areas. Performance venues are relatively open-access, limited egress facilities and have been successfully targeted in the past.
A collection of documents released publicly on July 11, 2012 in response to a Freedom of Information request from the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet for material relating to WikiLeaks, Julian Assange and Bradley Manning.
U.S. Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit map from July 19, 2012 depicting locations and numbers of internally and externally displaced persons as a result of the current conflict in Syria.
(U//FOUO) FBI Counterfeit and Substandard Lithium Batteries Pose Serious Health Risks to Law Enforcement
The FBI assesses with high confidence, based on multiple incident reports from a collaborative source with direct access to the information, that counterfeit and substandard lithium batteries pose a serious health and safety risk to consumers, specifically law enforcement officers, emergency medical services providers, and military personnel who use these batteries extensively. The FBI has received numerous reports of such batteries, which are not manufactured with the safety mechanisms of legitimate US branded-batteries, spontaneously combusting while being used, transported, or stored, resulting in serious injuries to consumers and damage to tactical equipment and property.
For the last two fiscal years, the President’s Budget Submissions for the Department of Defense have included purchases of a significant amount of combat equipment, including armored vehicles, helicopters and even artillery, under an obscure section of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the purposes of “homeland defense missions, domestic emergency responses, and providing military support to civil authorities.” Items purchased under the section include combat vehicles, tanks, helicopters, artillery, mortar systems, missiles, small arms and communications equipment. Justifications for the budget items indicate that many of the purchases are part of routine resupply and maintenance, yet in each case the procurement is cited as being “necessary for use by the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces for homeland defense missions, domestic emergency responses, and providing military support to civil authorities” under section 1815 of the FY2008 NDAA.
Shadow banking, as one of the main sources of financial stability concerns, is the subject of much international debate. In broad terms, shadow banking refers to activities related to credit intermediation and liquidity and maturity transformation that take place outside the regulated banking system. This paper presents a first investigation of the size and the structure of shadow banking within the euro area, using the statistical data sources available to the ECB/Eurosystem.
The FSB has roughly estimated the size of the global shadow banking system at around € 46 trillion in 2010, having grown from € 21 trillion in 2002. This represents 25-30% of the total financial system and half the size of bank assets. In the United States, this proportion is even more significant, with an estimated figure of between 35% and 40%. However, according to the FSB estimates, the share of the assets of financial intermediaries other than banks located in Europe as a percentage of the global size of shadow banking system has strongly increased from 2005 to 2010, while the share of US located assets has decreased. On a global scale, the share of those assets held by European jurisdictions has increased from 10 to 13% for UK intermediaries, from 6 to 8% for NL intermediaries, from 4% to 5% for DE intermediaries and from 2% to 3% for ES intermediaries. FR and IT intermediaries maintained their previous shares in the global shadow banks assets of 6% and 2% respectively.