Studying past combat helps gain insight into how insurgents may operate in the future. This guide uses short, simple vignettes to highlight common Afghan insurgent tactics. Each vignette focuses on a particular mission profile, such as raids, ambushes, and defending against a cordon and search. While tactics are continually evolving, the Afghans have a well documented history of using similar techniques against foreign militaries. Most of the vignettes in this guide are from the 1980s when Afghan insurgents fought the Soviet Union. Despite being more than 20 years old, many of the tactics remain in use today. For a more complete description of Afghan insurgent tactics against the Soviets, MCIA strongly recommends reading The Other Side of the Mountain by Ali Jalali and Les Grau, which this guide is based on. The final three vignettes in this guide are from recent operations in Afghanistan and demonstrate the evolution of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) by Afghan insurgents.
U.S. Air Force presentation detailing human interface systems for drone ground control stations from May 2010.
In certain parts of the US government, when an operation has unintended negative second or third-order consequences, they are called “blowback.” The radical Islamic movements in the Pashtun areas today were always present, but putting them on steroids in the 1980’s was pretty short-sighted by any reasonable accounting — a classic case of “blowback.” During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Pakistanis had their own agenda. The Pakistani Army’s intelligence branch, called the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, became extremely powerful by cooperating with the United States and the government of Saudi Arabia to channel roughly $7.2 billion dollars worth of covert foreign military aid to their preferred Mujahideen clients. To control the Mujahideen, the ISI formed seven resistance groups, each with a notional political party associated with it. These became known as “the Peshawar Seven.” CIA oversight of the covert money was weak, and much of it went into ISI’s pockets.
A script produced by the military for the Article 32 hearing of PFC Bradley Manning was released as part of a public court filing and was first reported on by Politico.
The focus of Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) is the personal development of each Marine in a team framework using a standardized, trainable, and sustainable close combat fighting system. As a weapon-based system, all techniques are integrated with equipment, physical challenges, and tactics found on the modern battlefield. The MCMAP is designed to increase the warfighting capabilities of individual Marines and units, enhance Marines’ self-confidence and esprit de corps, and foster the warrior ethos in all Marines. The MCMAP is a weapon-based system rooted in the credo that every Marine is a rifleman and will engage the aggressor from 500 meters to close quarter combat.
This report is an executive summary of interviews conducted by CALL in support of the JCOA comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS. Topics included CIVCAS incidents, pre-deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with recent operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq.
U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Micro Mission Guide for Afghanistan published in October 2008.
U.S. Army instructional presentation from 2008 on the history and major sects within Islam.
To effectively defeat an enemy, one must first understand the enemy. Intelligence professionals have forgotten the basic principles on which intelligence analysis is conducted, instead they sub-scribe to the paradigm that the enemy faced in this Global War on Terror has no structure or doctrine. Any organization, military or civilian, must have a structure and a way of doing business if they are to have any chance of being successful.
The Kill Box MTTP reinforces kill boxes as three-dimensional areas used to facilitate the integration of joint fires while also being a permissive fire support coordination measure (FSCM) in accordance with JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. The publication offers a detailed explanation of kill box employment and provides information to effectively organize, plan, and execute kill box procedures.
The purpose of the NLW Reference Book is to provide a single source document that contains key information about NLW descriptions, effects, characteristics, concepts of employment, and associated operational parameters and considerations to enhance NLW education and training.
Multi-National Forces West Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) SOP and TTP from June 2007.
The Smart Book contains information designed to enhance Soldier’s knowledge of Afghanistan, including history, politics, country data and statistics, and the military operational environment. The Smart Book concludes with an overview of the culture of Afghanistan including religion, identity, behavior, communication and negotiation techniques, an overview of ethnic groups, a regional breakdown outlining each province, a language guide, and cultural proverbs, expressions and superstitions.
This guide assists in three areas. First, it aides military leaders and all personnel to be aware of the indicators associated with insider threat activity while serving in a partnering environment. Second, this guide informs commanders and other leaders by giving them options on how to deal with insider threat activities. This guide is not all encompassing so there are other options a commander has dependent on their operating environment. Lastly, this guide is meant to generate open dialogue between coalition partners and partner nation personnel. Partnering in itself is a sensitive mission and only by creating trust and having an open dialogue with all forces will the mission be accomplished.
(U//FOUO) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Iraqi Federal Police Advisor Guide
As the U. S. Defense Department scales back operations in Iraq, one of the most significant questions that remains is whether the Iraqi security forces will be capable of maintaining civil order on their own. This manual was produced by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) to help prepare deploying advisors, trainers, and partner forces that will work directly with Iraqi police. The intent is to provide a basic understanding of the country of Iraq and a solid understanding of the current organization and utilization of the Iraqi police. This manual also provides guidance on what it means to work ” by, with and through” a counterpart, and includes observations and insights learned by your predecessors.
U.S. Army report on “Taliban Top 5 Most Deadly Tactics Techniques and Procedures” from June 2010.
To inform Deputy Commandants (DCs) Aviation, Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Installations and Logistics (I&L), Commanding General (CG), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Director of Intelligence, operating forces, and others on results of a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) collection conducted April – May 2011 to document lessons and observations regarding unmanned aerial systems (UAS) operations in support of Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
U.S. Army TRISA handbook on “Political Groups in Afghanistan” from December 2009.
RPAs are revolutionary surveillance and weapons delivery systems – changing the way the Air Force builds situation awareness and engages enemy forces – but their full potential has yet to be realized. To begin to address this issue, the Air Force initiated this study to review the state-of-the-art in RPA operations, focusing on control and connectivity in an irregular warfare (IW) environment. The Panel was specifically tasked to identify RPA architectures and operational concepts centered on human-systems integration, distributed systems operations, and effective command and control – a cluster of concepts and technologies we subsequently labeled as “mission management” enablers. The Panel was also tasked to recommend mid- to far-term S&T development roadmaps for advancing these technologies to improve the flexibility and capability of RPA operations.
TC 2-50.5 replaces FM 34-8-2, dated 1 May 1998. This publication does not replace the fundamental principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures contained in the other FM 2-series manuals; however, it does focus on their application. It is to be used in conjunction with the other FM 2-series manuals and conforms to the overarching doctrinal concepts presented in FM 3-0 and FM 2-0. The target audience for this manual is the intelligence officers serving as the G-2/S-2 and their staffs— intelligence warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted Soldiers. TC 2-50.5 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.
The purpose of the JFIIT Tactical Leaders Handbook (version 5) is to provide ground maneuver commanders, battle staffs, and soldiers with information regarding Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and attack systems and how to leverage these combat multipliers during planning, preparation, and execution of military operations. JFIIT publishes a classified version of this document on the SIPRNET.
Restricted U.S. Army training presentation on “Taliban Insurgent Syndicate Intelligence Operations” from October 2009.
U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group Afghan Key Leader Engagement (KLE) Tactical Pocket Reference from October 2009.
The purpose of this document is to outline the role of female engagement on the ground and best uses of female engagement initiatives. While existing academic literature on females in Afghanistan is limited mostly to the urban areas, it is evident that the lives of women in rural Helmand are complex and difficult than is generally understood from open source and academic literature. Female engagement encompasses methodical, long-term outreach efforts to the entire population, men, women, and children, which is essential in a counterinsurgency. Such engagement efforts provide opportunities to connect with both men and women, counter negative Taliban IO efforts, and improve civil affairs efforts.
The MWD program endured four decades of peace and brief contingency operations from the end of the Vietnam era to the current Global War on Terrorism. The program remained firmly embedded in the Military Police Corps combat support, law and order, and force protection missions. In late 2001, the onset of military operations in Afghanistan provided the impetus to expand MWD capabilities in support of commanders in the field. In 2002, as a direct result of an immediate operational need in Afghanistan, Army leadership directed the establishment of an Army mine detection dog unit and embedded it in the Corps of Engineers. In 2004, as a result of cooperation between the U.S. Army Engineer School and the U.S. Army Military Police School, the Army added a non-aggressive, specialized search dog (explosives detection dog) to the MWD inventory. Combat tracker dogs are returning to Army use as well, along with a very limited number of human remains detector or cadaver search dogs. Two constants emerge in the 60-plus-year history of Army MWD use: working dogs are used in a variety of units for a wide range of missions, and the size of the MWD program has expanded and contracted over time based on the needs of the Army. In the current and projected future operating environment, the MWD program will undoubtedly expand once again.