The purpose of this handbook is to enhance understanding of Army airspace command and control (A2C2) to mitigate risks between small unit unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAVs) and rotary wing operations below the coordinating altitude. This handbook provides leaders at the brigade and below with guidelines in the form of airspace coordination techniques and procedures regarding SUAV mission planning and airspace deconfliction.
A manual produced by the DoD’s Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) and used by instructors in the JPRA’s Survival Evasion Resistance Escape (SERE) courses to train participants for the potential experience of detention. According to Jason Leopold and Jeffrey Kaye of Truthout, the manual was reportedly consulted during high-level discussions in the Bush administration regarding potential “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Several techniques described in the manual are mentioned in a series of controversial memos commonly referred to as the “Torture memos” authored by Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel attorney John Yoo.
FM 6-02.71 provides doctrine for the overall guidance and direction pertaining to the command and control of Army communications networks (voice, video, and data) and information services (collaboration, messaging, storage, mediation, etc.) throughout strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It describes the Army’s portion of the Global Information Grid ( hereafter referred to as LandWarNet), network operations goals and objectives, and the associated roles and responsibilities of applicable organizations, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities that must integrate LandWarNet standards, telecommunications, services, and applications for the purpose of enabling warfighters to conduct the information management and knowledge management tasks necessary to meet achieve information superiority and decision dominance.
Special operations (SO) encompass the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions focused on strategic or operational objectives. These actions require units with combinations of specialized personnel, equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces. SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations. SO are often politically sensitive missions where only the best-equipped and most proficient forces must be deployed to avoid detection and possible mission failure.
This handbook was written to assist Soldiers and leaders at the platoon, company, and battalion level to better understand the importance of their actions on an objective, as well as to teach the fundamentals of tactical site exploitation (TSE) and cache search operations. While selecting the right Soldiers to be on a TSE team is important, the Soldiers and leaders must also understand the importance of the TSE process and the end results of their efforts. Proper TSE fuels the intelligence-operations cycle and may quickly answer the commander’s critical information requirements and assist in the criminal prosecution of detainees.
Joint Special Operations University Report on Convergence of Special Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement
In recent years there has been an apparent convergence of the operations conducted by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and those of civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs), especially Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units, in what were formerly separate and distinct missions. The requirements to obtain warrants prior to execution of raids for high-value targets, collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecution, and on occasion present testimony in courts of law are new missions for SOF. They are not relatively simple changes in the rules of engagement or comparable techniques. As far as can be determined, previously no U.S. military combat arms unit has ever been tasked with such a mission during combat operations. The thesis is straightforward; if such missions are to continue, then consideration must be given to adequate training for them.
A presentation from the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General about military forensics operations in Afghanistan from August 2011.
The effective employment of IO to influence primary target audiences, including the population, local leaders, host nation security forces, government officials, and insurgents, is a key component of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
This publication provides Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) required for Army personnel when conducting Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) operations. The document is designed to serve as a reference for multiple personnel at varying echelons. The ATTP provides specific information for Army personnel operating as part of a DOMEX or other exploitation team for the collection, processing, and reporting of DOMEX activities. The manual serves as a reference for staff planners and intelligence personnel at battalion and brigade combat teams. Additionally, the manual provides an understanding of DOMEX activities, procedures, organizations, products, and databases at joint task force, U.S. Army, and the Department of Defense.
JFIRE is a pocket-size, quick-reference guide for requesting fire support in accordance with approved joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). JFIRE contains calls for fire, joint air attack team (JAAT) techniques, a format for joint air strike requests, close air support (CAS) coordination and planning procedures, communications architecture, and weapons data.
Mirrored copies of multiple articles referencing and containing pictures of Staff Sergeant Robert Bales who has been identified as the man accused of murdering of 16 civilians in Kandahar on March 11, 2012. These two articles along with all other photos and media created by the U.S. Army that references Bales or contains photos of him is being removed from Army websites in an attempt to wipe away traces of the soldier’s online history. We have mirrored the material in the interest of preserving the documents for analysis and historical interest.
The transition from law of war-based detentions to evidence-based criminal detentions is underway. To fully support this aspect of our counter-insurgency (COIN) mission, Coalition Forces, partnered with Afghan units, are working in the field to provide information and evidence that supports detention operations. These efforts will most fully support the COIN effort if detainees suspected of committing criminal offenses are referred to the Afghan criminal justice system for pre-trial detention, prosecution, and serving of sentence for their crimes, based upon evidence which is used and understood in Afghan criminal courts.
The 2008 national suicide rate adjusted for Marine Corps demographics is 20.7 per 100,000. The national adjusted suicide rate is calculated by taking Centers for Disease Control data, and changing the data to look more like the Marine Corps (mostly young and male). Adjusted civilian rates for CYs ’09 and ’10 will be calculated when the data is available.
Office of the Army Surgeon General presentation on “Psychological Issues of War: Valuable Information Learned from Army Surveillance and Research” concerning statistical trends in the occurrence of suicide, PTSD and traumatic brain injury cases among U.S. service members from December 2009.
U.S. Army TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) report on the Taliban’s use of civilian shields from April 2010.
U.S. Army Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) Reference Card produced by the Asymmetric Warfare Group in December 2010.
This handbook is a compilation of tools to help all soldiers collect information through tactical questioning and EPW/detainee and document handling in Offensive, Defensive, Stability, and Support operations. However, most of the handbook was developed specific to small unit patrols, traffic control points (TCPs)/ roadblocks, and other interaction with the local population in the Middle East.
This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counterguerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments. It provides a general overview of US counterinsurgency strategy and the impact that strategy has on counterguerrilla operations. It provides planning, training, and operational guidance for commanders and staffs conducting counterguerrilla operations. The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations. In applying these principles, the commander must be aware that the situation in each counterguerrilla operation is unique. Techniques and tactics applied successfully in one situation may not be suitable if applied in the same manner in another situation. The principles in this manual are guides to be adapted to each counterguerrilla situation.
This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication will assist in advising foreign forces. It serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. This MTTP is intended to provide units and personnel that are scheduled to advise foreign forces (FF) with viable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so that they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Currently, material regarding advising is found in joint and Service doctrinal treatment of foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), security assistance (SA), and unconventional warfare (UW). Several Services are developing documents that focus on basic survival and common advisor skills, but do not sufficiently cover how an advisor team might function at all levels. This MTTP provides guidance that will help to enhance the activities of some advisor functions and improve inter-Service coordination for this joint mission.
Unconventional warfare, or UW, is defined as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. Inherent in this type of operation are the inter-related lines of operation of armed conflict and subversion. The concept is perhaps best understood when thought of as a means to significantly degrade an adversary’s capabilities, by promoting insurrection or resistance within his area of control, thereby making him more vulnerable to a conventional military attack or more susceptible to political coercion. “UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives.”
Understanding the local culture is critical to mission success. This Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG ) will contribute to an initial Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment that should be continuously updated by line companies. It is intended to aid Marines in the identification of key cultural observables during security and atmospherics patrols, while at the same time helping tactical unit leaders identify the information needed to understand and influence their local environment. The intent is to anticipate the second and third order effects of our actions in order to shape and influence events to our advantage.
A collection of “cultural intelligence” reports for the Afghanistan region were created by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA). They represent some of the only known public examples of MCIA cultural intelligence reports available on the web. In 2008, a MCIA cultural intelligence report on Iran’s culture was obtained and published by the Center for Public Integrity. The following reports on Afghan culture were produced in 2002, but are still believed to be in use by advisers and soldiers today.
Islam is practiced differently in Afghanistan than in any other part of the world. For operations in Afghanistan, it is significant to know the origins of existing cultural influences come from pre-Islamic Central Asian beliefs. This knowledge is necessary for two key reasons. First, understanding the specific cultural-religious mindset of local Afghans is essential to successful operations within the population. Secondly, Afghan cultural Islam conflicts with the fundamentalist Islamic movements that influence the current insurgency. Knowing and exploiting these differences can be beneficial to counteracting insurgent IO campaigns and to discourage local Afghans from identifying with insurgent groups vying for control of the population.
This document represents an effort by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) to equip Army special operations forces (ARSOF) with a better tool for understanding religious considerations in mission planning. Today’s culturally centric warfare places ARSOF Soldiers in high demand. Soldiers trained in the skills of cultural competence and cultural analysis provide an effective mission planning tool for developing an understanding of the operational environment.
(U//FOUO) Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study
The intent of Phase I initial impressions is to provide rapid support to the Warfighter. In parallel, these insights serve as part of a broader Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study, which JCISFA will publish in the spring of 2011. These observations and insights may support planning and decision-making within the NTM-A/CSTC-A as well as joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) organizations responsible for force generation supporting the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission. Specifically, this report addresses contemporary issues and senior leader perspectives within the NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministerial-Level Advisor program to include prospective gaps across joint DOTMLPF-P domains. The following illustrates the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission.