The main document used to train California police officers in the use of force.
The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, Public Law 111-172, requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress on implementation of the President’s strategy to support disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and assistance provided toward a lasting solution to the conflict in northern Uganda.
This policy recognizes that the use of force by law enforcement requires constant evaluation. Even at its lowest level the use of force is a serious responsibility. The purpose of this policy is to provide officers of this department with guidelines on the reasonable use of force. While there is no way to specify the exact amount or type of reasonable force to be applied in any situation, each officer is expected to use these guidelines to make such decisions in a professional, impartial, and safe manner. The use of force by law enforcement personnel is a matter of critical concern both to the public and to the law enforcement community. Officers are involved on a daily basis in numerous and varied human encounters and, when warranted, may use force in carrying out their duties.
The internal “use of firearms” policy for the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department from February 2005.
The internal “use of force” policy for the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department from February 2011.
A series of documents comprised of all publicly available versions of Facebook’s subpoena and legal compliance guides produced for law enforcement information requests. This site previously published the Facebook law enforcement guides from 2007-2010, which included a 2008 version of the manual that was originally published by Cryptome. The guides were referenced by privacy scholars and others in the media, yet Facebook would not even confirm to Reuters the authenticity of the documents. With two more editions provided by the latest #AntiSec leak (including a second expanded copy from 2010 and a shorter version from 2006), there are now 6 separate versions available from 2006-2010. All but one of the guides are labeled with version numbers documenting the evolution of the Facebook process for supplying user information to law enforcement.
TSA informational poster from October 2011 explaining that flood water sensors often resemble improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
A subpoena/legal compliance guide for Microsoft’s MSN Online Services, including Hotmail accounts, that was last revised April 2005.
Multiple versions of the subpoena/legal compliance guides issued by Blizzard Entertainment, makers of World of Warcraft, for law enforcement information requests. Two versions from 2008 and 2009 are included.
A subpoena compliance guide for AOL Inc. describing data retention practices and subpoena guidelines from October 2010.
This brief report was put together by the NYPD Citizen Complaint Review Board in 2002 in response to citizen complaints about officers failing to identify themselves. The report includes a 2003 update to the NYPD Patrol Guide that clearly states that officers are required to “courteously” state their rank, name, badge number and command when asked by any citizen while giving them sufficient time to write down this information.
Leading Democratic party strategists have begun to openly discuss the benefits of embracing the growing and increasingly organized Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement to prevent Republican gains in Congress and the White House next year. We have seen this process of adopting extreme positions and movements to increase base voter turnout, including in the 2005-2006 immigration debate. This would mean more than just short-term political discomfort for Wall Street firms. If vilifying the leading companies of this sector is allowed to become an unchallenged centerpiece of a coordinated Democratic campaign, it has the potential to have very long-lasting political, policy and financial impacts on the companies in the center of the bullseye. It shouldn’t be surprising that the Democratic party or even President Obama’s re-election team would campaign against Wall Street in this cycle. However the bigger concern should be that Republicans will no longer defend Wall Street companies- and might start running against them too. Well-known Wall Street companies stand at the nexus of where OWS protestors and the Tea Party overlap on angered populism. Both the radical left and t he radical right are channeling broader frustration about the state of the economy and share a mutual anger over TARP and other perceived bailouts. This combination has the potential to be explosive later in the year when media reports cover the next round of bonuses and contrast it with stories of millions of Americans making do with less this holiday season.
This handbook provides an understanding of the processes and procedures being employed by joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to plan, execute, and assess counter threat finance (CTF) activities and integrate them into their joint operation/campaign plans. It provides fundamental principles, techniques, and considerations related to CTF that are being employed in the field and are evolving toward incorporation in joint doctrine.
Ian Carmany – http://www.flickr.com/photos/ocmsrzr1/ Timothy Krause – http://www.flickr.com/photos/33498942@N04/ Jessica Lehrman – http://www.flickr.com/photos/jessicalehrman/ bogieharmond – http://www.flickr.com/photos/barmony/
This Policy is to provide an outline of basic steps to be taken and/or considered by UCPD in the management of campus demonstrations. It is recognized that no policy can completely cover every possible situation and thus we rely on the expertise of the commanders and supervisors to manage the situation utilizing this policy as a guideline. This policy is primarily intended to cover demonstrations on campus and involving primarily University affiliates but many of the elements are applicable to any demonstration. “Demonstration”, for the purposes of this policy, includes a broad range of gatherings. Generally they are events with a significant crowd intending to express a particular point of view to others, often “The University”, and often through highly visible and possibly disruptive means. They are distinguished from peaceful meetings but may spring from them.
The City of Toronto hereby directs you immediately to stop engaging in the activities listed above and to remove immediately any tent, shelter, structure, equipment and debris from St. James Park. If you do not immediately remove any and all tents, shelters, structures, equipment and debris from St. James Park, such tents, shelters, structures, equipment and debris shall be removed from St. James Park by or on behalf of the City of Toronto. You are further ordered immediately to stop using, entering or gathering in St. James Park between the hours of 12:01 a.m. and 5:30 a.m..
Under its various legal rights and powers, the Mayor, Commonality and Citizens of the City of London (“the City of London Corporation”) requires you to remove all tents and other structures from the protest camp at St Pauls Churchyard, London EC4 (in the area shown in red and green on the attached plan) forthwith. If any tents and other structures remain after 6pm on Thursday 17th November 2011, proceedings for possession and injunctions will be issued in the high Court of Justice without further notice. Any attempt to establish another protest camp consisting of tents and other structures elsewhere in the City of London Corporation’s area will be likely to be the subject of immediate further proceedings without further notice.
This study grew out of the 1997 STOA report, ‘An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control’ and takes that work further. Its focus is two fold:(i) to examine the bio-medical effects and the social & political impacts of currently available crowd control weapons in Europe; (ii) to analyse world wide trends and developments including the implications for Europe of a second generation of so called “non-lethal” weapons.
This document facilitates discussion, training, and implementation of effective information superiority methods at the Battalion and Brigade level. This paper discusses the Center of Gravity analysis model for identifying threat networks, Critical Capabilities, and Critical Vulnerabilities; use of the methodology to determine the threat vulnerabilities; and as a basis for understanding how to achieve Information Superiority.
U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Reference Card from October 2007.
Decision by the New York Supreme Court to deny extension of a temporary restraining order and maintain previous eviction order from November 15, 2011.
As articulated in the United States Constitution, one of the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment is the right of persons and groups to assemble peacefully. Whether demonstrating, counterprotesting, or showing support for a cause, individuals and groups have the right to peacefully gather. Law enforcement, in turn, has the responsibility to ensure public safety while protecting the privacy and associated rights of individuals. To support agencies as they fulfill their public safety responsibilities, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) developed this paper to provide guidance and recommendations to law enforcement officers in understanding their role in First Amendment-protected events. This paper is divided into three areas, designed to provide in-depth guidance for law enforcement.
There is likely to be an IED threat in all military deployments and this should be a key consideration when undertaking the preparation, planning and execution of current and future NATO deployed operations. Generic detail of the threat environments and the C-IED approach are described in Reference A but for each deployment further specific operational analysis must be undertaken to ensure a mission focussed approach. Key to this is the generation of C-IED awareness and capability within the staff at every level of command. This handbook sits under References A and B and is intended to be complimentary to existing NATO doctrinal publications and formation HQ operational planning and capability development. It should be noted that although the handbook is aligned with the AJP 3.15A, it seeks only to provide an operational and tactical level staff perspective. It is designed for use within military HQs at all levels and is equally applicable for National C-IED capability development. It will be a living document and updated and amended in conjunction with NATO publications and the lessons identified/ lessons learned process.
This standard establishes minimum performance requirements and methods of test, including safety and handling aspects, for hand -held aerosol tear gas (less -than -lethal) weapons used by law enforcement agencies. These devices are used by law enforcement officers to incapacitate or distract one person or several whose behavior must be modified when the situation is not sufficiently dangerous to require the use of a firearm. The scope of this standard is limited to hand-held tear gas weapons that incorporate ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) or alpha-chloroacetophenone (CN) as the active agent (lacrimator), sprayed from an aerosol dispenser.