The Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) assesses and tracks trends (since 2005) in Army leader attitudes of leader development, the quality of leadership, and the contribution of leadership to mission accomplishment. CASAL provides research guidance for policy decisions and program development. CASAL is a reliable source because a rigorous scientific approach is used for survey development, data collection, and data analysis including a large random representative sample and high precision. Additionally, findings are calibrated with other Army research. This report will establish a framework, present qualitative and quantitative findings from the 2009 CASAL, quantitative findings from the 2010 CASAL, initial data from the 2011 Profession of Arms campaign (PoA) survey and senior leader survey, and open literature regarding toxic leadership.
The People’s Republic of China is one of the global leaders in vaccine research and production, and an active participant in international PI initiatives, but despite steps to improve influenza surveillance and ministerial coordination, major challenges remain to Chinese PI response preparedness. Substantial global concern has emerged in recent years regarding China’s ability to effectively monitor, prevent, and contain infectious disease threats within its borders. Factors including potential Avian Influenza (AI) outbreaks in poultry, China’s immense size and population, a largely underdeveloped health care infrastructure, and a sizable poultry industry all contribute to make China a global PI hotspot and an important area of focus for the potential emergence of human influenza pandemics that threaten the rest of the world.
DHS Interagency Remote Sensing Coordination Cell (IRSCC) briefing from July 2011.
The recent ten-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks brought a deluge of news regarding the transformation of the United States in the wake of the most devastating terrorist attacks in the country’s history. Many reports focused on debating the efficacy, or lack thereof, of policies implemented over the decade since the attacks occurred. One set of particularly revealing reports from the Center for Investigative Journalism discussed suspicious activity reporting at the Mall of America and the transformation of Homeland Security following September 11. Some publications discussed the waste inherent in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its various grant programs. In addition to these critical evaluations of security policy, a number of public relations pieces from the national network of fusion centers appeared in local publications around the country. A local television station in Michigan covered the state’s local fusion center, having “unprecedented access” to walk around inside without cameras. Another piece from Tennessee discussed the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s fusion center, ending with appeals for viewers to report suspicious activity and “say something” if they “see something”. Articles from other states including Arkansas and Alabama, sometimes written by Homeland Security officials, emphasized the important work of their local fusion centers and the continued need for funding and support.
Contact list by region including the names and phone numbers of approximately 68 Intelligence Officers and Regional Directors assigned to fusion centers around the United States.
Version 3.0 Federal Interagency Geospatial Concept of Operations (GeoCONOPS) final draft from June 2011.
DHS presentation titled “The National Network of Fusion Center: Where We Have Been and Where We are Going” containing general overview information on fusion centers from August 1, 2011.
David Shankbone – http://blog.shankbone.org/ Paul Weiskel – http://www.flickr.com/photos/31167233@N08/ Pamela Drew – http://www.flickr.com/photos/pameladrew/
Le ministère des Transports du Québec signe de plus en plus de contrats puisque le volume de ses travaux est en pleine croissance. Sa planification quinquennale fait état de plus de 4 000 projets routiers qui en sont à différentes étapes de préparation. En moyenne, seulement pour les travaux de construction, plus de 700 nouveaux contrats sont octroyés annuellement’. Or dans ce contexte d’externalisation croissante des dépenses de l’État dans ce secteur d’activités, on craint que des entreprises concluent entre elles des ententes secrètes à leur bénéfice, mais qui sont préjudiciables au bien public. On parle ici de collusion entre quelques joueurs majeurs de l’industrie, ce qui permet une prise de contrôle occulte du processus d’attribution des contrats de sous-traitance, réservés alors à quelques initiés. Et si la collusion prend une telle importance dans le domaine particulier de la construction routière, c’est sans contredit en raison du caractère massif et continu des investissements qui y sont faits et qu’on nous annonce encore pour les années à venir.
(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Mobilizing Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) Behavioral Indicators
A US Government interagency study of homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) revealed four major mobilizing patterns shared by a majority of HVE cases between 2008 and 2010, providing officials with an emerging picture of distinct behaviors often associated with an individual mobilizing for violence. These four patterns—links to known extremists, ideological commitment to extremism, international travel, and pursuit of weapons and associated training—repeatedly appeared in the case studies, reinforcing initial assessments of potential trends. Awareness of the patterns can help combat the recent rise in these cases while providing a data-driven tool for assessing potential changes in the HVE threat to the Homeland.
US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand Joint Public Key Infrastructure Cross-Certification Standards
This section provides the long-term Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) interoperability architecture for the CCEB Allies as agreed at the February 2005 Canberra Collocated Meeting. The architecture enables interoperability through direct cross-certification of each National Defence PKI (NDPKI) in a mesh configuration.
This manual provides organizational relationships, responsibilities, requirements and procedures for aircraft and related support operations aboard CVN ships.
An email from the Chief Spokesperson for the Bay Area Rapid Transit District Linton Johnson obtained by the San Francisco Bay Guardian from August 11, 2011. In the email, Johnson describes how a script could be written to be given to “volunteers” who would be escorted to a press conference to describe their dissatisfaction with how the recent BART protests are making them late.
GAO U.S. Agencies Are Not Able to Fully Account for U.S. Nuclear Material Located at Foreign Facilities
DOE, NRC, and State are not able to fully account for U.S. nuclear material overseas that is subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms because the agreements do not stipulate systematic reporting of such information, and there is no U.S. policy to pursue or obtain such information. Section 123 of the AEA, as amended, does not require nuclear cooperation agreements to contain provisions stipulating that partners report information on the amount, status, or location (facility) of special nuclear material subject to the agreement terms. However, U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements generally require that partners report inventory information upon request, although DOE and NRC have not systematically sought such data. We requested from multiple offices at DOE and NRC a current and comprehensive inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas, to include country, site, or facility, and whether the quantity of material was rated as Category I or Category II material. However, neither agency has provided such an inventory. NMMSS does not contain the data necessary to maintain an inventory of U.S. special nuclear material overseas. DOE, NRC, and State have not pursued annual inventory reconciliations of nuclear material subject to U.S. cooperation agreement terms with all foreign partners that would provide the U.S. government with better information about where such material is held. Furthermore, according to DOE, NRC, and State officials, no U.S. law or policy directs U.S. agencies to obtain information regarding the location and disposition of U.S. nuclear material at foreign facilities.
The growing popularity of methamphetamine over the past 15 years has increased the risk of exposure to the surrounding community and law enforcements personnel. Methamphetamine is a controlled substance that is “cooked” using many common household ingredients which can be volatile and generates by‐products that can be very harmful to humans. When these products are combined, they emit toxic fumes and may cause chemical burns upon contact. Toxic residue from the cooking process saturates every surface and can remain there for months or years if not properly sterilized. Since the chemicals can be inhaled, ingested, or absorbed through the skin, everyone coming in contact with those surfaces is vulnerable. Acute exposure occurs over a relatively short time and produces symptoms that include: shortness of breath, cough, chest pain, dizziness, lack of coordination, chemical irritation, and burns to the skin, eyes, nose, or mouth. If toxicity levels are fairly high or a person is particularly vulnerable (i.e. pre‐existing breathing problems), acute exposure can cause death. Less significant exposure can result in headaches, nausea, dizziness, fatigue, or lethargy, and can lead to other long‐term health problems.
Documents concerning CIA rendition of terrorism suspects, with the help of the UK, recovered from the offices of Libyan intelligence and published by Human Rights Watch.
Compare with: 9/11 Pentagon Damage High-Resolution Aerial Photos
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Potential Al-Qaeda Threat to New York City and Washington, DC During 9/11 Anniversary Period
We assess that al-Qa‘ida has likely maintained an interest since at least February 2010 in conducting large attacks in the Homeland timed to coincide with symbolic dates, to include the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also remain concerned that the May 2011 death of Usama bin Ladin (UBL), coupled with the subsequent removal of several key al-Qa’ida figures, could further contribute to al-Qa’ida’s desire to stage an attack on a symbolic date—such as the 10-year anniversary of 9/11—as a way to avenge UBL’s death and reassert the group’s relevance, although operational readiness likely remains the primary driving factor behind the timing of al-Qa’ida attacks.
We recognize that PRPD faces significant challenges as Puerto Rico’s primary law enforcement agency. The unconstitutional acts that we have identified arise at a time of crisis in public safety. Contrary to national trends, violent crime increased overall in Puerto Rico by 17% from 2007 to 2009. In 2010, Puerto Rico saw the second highest number of murders in its history, a trend that is escalating in 2011. The clearance rate for murders remains below the national average. Some Puerto Rico officials maintain that drug trafficking and social deterioration are fueling the wave of violent crime. However, increasing crime cannot be used to justify continued civil rights violations or the failure to implement meaningful reforms. Constitutional policing and effective law enforcement are inextricably bound. Public safety depends on the trust and cooperation of the community, which in turn depends on constitutional police practices that respect civil rights. Our previous efforts in working with large police departments strongly suggest that by addressing the civil rights concerns we raise in this report, the Commonwealth will not only meet its constitutional duty, but also reduce crime, improve public safety, and increase community confidence.
Al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates have maintained an interest in obtaining aviation training, particularly on small aircraft, and in recruiting Western individuals for training in Europe or the United States, although we do not have current, credible information or intelligence of an imminent attack being planned against aviation by al-Qa‘ida or its affiliates.
Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Division presentation on “Cyber Resilience” with overviews of recent hacking incidents, including many connected with the hacktivist group Anonymous.
The Assembly considers that judicial and parliamentary scrutiny of government and its agents is of vital importance for the rule of law and democracy. This also applies especially to so-called special services whose activities are usually kept secret. Security and intelligence services, the need for which cannot be put into doubt, must nonetheless not become a “state within the state”, exempted from accountability for their actions. Such lack of accountability leads to a dangerous culture of impunity, which undermines the very foundations of democratic institutions.
THIS IS ADVANCE WARNING OF AN ANTICIPATED DECISION BY USNORTHCOM PENDING SECDEF APPROVAL TO INCREASE FPCON IN PREPARATION FOR ACTIVITIES COMMEMORATING THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS. WE ANTICIPATE THAT CDRUSNORTHCOM WILL DIRECT CHANGES TO THE FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION (FPCON) LEVELS ACROSS THE USNORTHCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). ALL DOD ELEMENTS TACON FOR FP TO USNORTHCOM WILL PLAN FOR EXECUTION OF FPCON LEVEL BRAVO AND IMPLEMENT SUPPLEMENTAL FP ACTIONS, AS DIRECTED HEREIN, NOT LATER THAN 070600Z SEPTEMBER 2011.
Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS’s accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs.
This STAC information note is intended to enhance law enforcement community understanding of training venues observed to have been used by gang members and to provide insight into their reasoning for engagement in these observed activities.