This paper is designed to act as a guide for working with local communities in rural Afghanistan at the wuluswali (district) level, primarily in the east and south. Afghan society has always been extremely diverse from district to district, requiring a flexible, multi-faceted approach to governance. This multi-faceted approach blended tribes, Islam and the state. The political upheaval of the past 40 years has disrupted Afghan society and the traditional structures which historically provided governance and social order, not just the Kabul-based government. It is important that the information in this guide is not seen as absolute or universally applicable, but rather as a baseline guide for understanding the complexities of local governance, or the lack thereof, in rural Afghanistan. There is no standard formula for success in Afghanistan due to its diversity; the only constant is the need for flexibility.
The following photos were released by the DoD and NATO over the last month. See also: US/NATO Troops Patrolling Opium Poppy Fields in Afghanistan
This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.
The human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan is escalating in 2010. In the first six months of the year civilian casualties – including deaths and injuries of civilians – increased by 31 per cent over the same period in 2009. Three quarters of all civilian casualties were linked to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), an increase of 53 per cent from 2009. At the same time, civilian casualties attributed to Pro-Government Forces (PGF) decreased by 30 per cent compared to the first half of 2009.
Afghanistan 2010-2011 Complete Provincial Development Budget Allocations in English and Dari, June 2010.
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has a clearly defined role serving the government and people of Afghanistan, in terms of mobilizing revenue and managing government finances. To efficiently undertake these functions, the Ministry prepared a five year strategic plan in 1384 and much progress has been made in the past three years towards establishment of an effective and transparent public financial management system as well as in tax reforms and increase of the domestic revenues. MoF developed the MTFF and MTBF (Annex B), which has been approved by the cabinet and parliament. As part of the MTBF, budget ceilings for the operating and development budget as well as revenue targets are set for the next five years 1387-1391, moving towards fiscal sustainability.
DoD Afghan Economic Sovereignty, Mineral Wealth Briefing, June 14, 2010.
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes the United States plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In accordance with subsection (a), it includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the ANSF, with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy and budget, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. This report is the first of the annual reports required through 2010 on the long-term plan for Afghanistan.
(U//FOUO) CIA Open Source Works Report on Afghanistan: Lessons of the Soviet War, March 27, 2009.
The recent capture of the Taliban’s code of conduct manifesto, “Rules and Regulations for Mujahidin,” has offered analysts critical clues into how the Taliban intend to operate as well as how the movement is structured according to the Taliban. Importantly, the new document provides Coalition and Afghan forces a catalog of weak points, vulnerabilities and fears currently entrenched within the Taliban organization and its top echelon of leadership. A thorough examination of the document reveals the Taliban’s attempt to wage a guerrilla campaign implementing a rudimentary population-centric strategy; while calling upon elements of Pashtunwali and Shariat (Islamic) Law into the doctrine as well.
FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Lessons Brief, February 17, 2010.
FOUO U.S. Army Combined Arms Center: Afghan Counterinsurgency Overview Brief, February 17, 2010.
The following material was extracted from MCCLL reports based on interviews, lessons and observations from operational units that participated in OIF/OEF over the past 36 months. Although this material is based on collections that took place in 2005 through 2007, comments from recent observers and currently deployed individuals indicate that issues on the ground likely remain the same. Content of this paper is grouped in response to specific questions in the TECOM tasking dated 2 April 2008.
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.
The Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan for Afghanistan provides guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. The Plan represents the collaborative effort of all the USG Departments and Agencies operating in Afghanistan and the range of different equities, resources, and approaches. The Plan is based on close collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and partner nations to build effective civilian and military mechanisms for integrated assistance.
Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. The efforts of PRTs take place every day during a time when major conflict is commonplace in both countries. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the indigenous people. Integrated appropriately, PRTs serve as combat multipliers for maneuver commanders engaged in governance and economics, as well as other critical lines of operation. In addition, PRTs serve as force multipliers for U.S. Government (USG) development agencies engaged across the stability and reconstruction sectors.
The first 100 days of any deployment are the most dangerous. It is the time when you know the least about your environment, the time when most of the team really comes together. The enemy knows the first 100 days are when units are the most vulnerable. This handbook is written for Soldiers and leaders. It is intended to help you accomplish your mission and stay alive during the most dangerous and uncertain period. The information presented in this handbook was collected from combat experienced Soldiers, company leaders, and battalion leaders, and it will help you develop your leadership and training skills before deployment and during the first 100 days after deployment.
Clear Evacuate an area of approx 300 meter
• Evacuate the area as quickly as possible.
• Move people away from the device and not past it.
• Mark your location and note the direction and distance to the device. Move to a minimum distance of 200 meters from the suspect item.
• The On-Scene Commander will make the decision on how large an area to clear. The below danger areas are from ISAF SOP 10370:
• 200 meters – small device/postal bomb
• 300 meters – car bomb
• 600 meters – large device e.g. truck bomb. If an open area, then increase to 1000m.
• Identify and establish an Incident Control Point which must always be searched.
• Make maximum use of hard cover, and ensure personnel are out of the direct Line of Site (LOS) from the suspect area to cleared positions. If cover cannot be obtained, maximize distance from the device.