National Level Exercise (NLE) 2012 Overview for Northeast Disaster Recovery Information X-Change (NEDRIX) from March 14, 2012.
Tag Archive for For Official Use Only
Maryland
(U//FOUO/LES) Baltimore Police Officer Safety Warning: Fighting Bandanas
Baltimore Police Department Officer Safety Warning on “Fighting Bandanas” from December 7, 2011.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Network Operations (NETOPS) Manual
FM 6-02.71 provides doctrine for the overall guidance and direction pertaining to the command and control of Army communications networks (voice, video, and data) and information services (collaboration, messaging, storage, mediation, etc.) throughout strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It describes the Army’s portion of the Global Information Grid ( hereafter referred to as LandWarNet), network operations goals and objectives, and the associated roles and responsibilities of applicable organizations, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities that must integrate LandWarNet standards, telecommunications, services, and applications for the purpose of enabling warfighters to conduct the information management and knowledge management tasks necessary to meet achieve information superiority and decision dominance.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, Michigan
(U//FOUO) Michigan Fusion Center Energy Substations Copper Thefts Bulletin
Over the last week, approximately 10 Energy Sector substations in the Marshall and Battle Creek area have been the victims of copper theft. Because the current street value for scrap copper is over $4.00 per pound, electric substations have become lucrative targets. The targeting of substations for copper has been an issue for over a year. The recent thefts from substations in the greater Flint area caused significant power outages to the area and safety issues for first responders. The suspects are stealing the grounding system conductors and other wires stored at the substation at night. This is accomplished by digging up sections of the grounding system conductors and cutting it off from the power units. The process is time-consuming and requires the suspects to go inside the substation perimeter fence. A few sites have experienced repeated offenses of copper theft.
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency
(U//FOUO) IARPA Catalyst Entity Extraction and Disambiguation Study Final Report
Catalyst, a component of DDNI/A’s Analytical Transformation Program, will process unstructured, semistructured, and structured data to produce a knowledge base of entities (people, organizations, places, events, …) with associated attributes and the relationships among them. It will perform functions such as entity extraction, relationship extraction, semantic integration, persistent storage of entities, disambiguation, and related functions (these are defined in the body of the report). The objective of this study is to assess the state-of-the-art and state-of-the-practice in these areas.
U.S. Special Operations Command
(U//FOUO) U.S. Special Operations Forces Reference Manual 2nd Edition
Special operations (SO) encompass the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions focused on strategic or operational objectives. These actions require units with combinations of specialized personnel, equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces. SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations. SO are often politically sensitive missions where only the best-equipped and most proficient forces must be deployed to avoid detection and possible mission failure.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Tactical Site Exploitation and Evidence Collection Handbook
This handbook was written to assist Soldiers and leaders at the platoon, company, and battalion level to better understand the importance of their actions on an objective, as well as to teach the fundamentals of tactical site exploitation (TSE) and cache search operations. While selecting the right Soldiers to be on a TSE team is important, the Soldiers and leaders must also understand the importance of the TSE process and the end results of their efforts. Proper TSE fuels the intelligence-operations cycle and may quickly answer the commander’s critical information requirements and assist in the criminal prosecution of detainees.
California, Intelligence Fusion Centers
(U//FOUO) San Diego Fusion Center Terrorism Imagery Recognition
Group logos, flags, and other extremist imagery are prevalent throughout most terrorist and extremist groups. Imagery provides a means of evoking existing emotional and historical memories in addition to communicating ideas to potential recruits. Logos and symbols are often used as visual representation of groups and/or their ideology. Print, internet propaganda, tattoos, clothing and accessories, stickers, and other graphic media are the most common representations of extremist imagery. First responders need to be aware of common extremist imagery as it may indicate involvement or support for a particular domestic extremist organization or international terrorist group.
Department of Justice
(U//FOUO) National Gang Intelligence Center Juggalos Intelligence Report
Increasing criminal activity among Juggalos is of concern due to the ease with which these transitory and loosely affiliated criminal sub-sets are able to form and break off of the well established Juggalo sub-culture of over one million followers. Their crimes are characterized by acts of violence and destruction directed against law enforcement, members of the community, public/private property, and other members of their group. Juggalos are classified as a gang in the states of Arizona, California, Pennsylvania and Utah. Despite this narrow classification, Juggalo-related crime has been documented in at least 20 other states according to law enforcement and open-source reporting.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Ballistics, DNA, Fingerprint Forensic Support in Afghanistan
A presentation from the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General about military forensics operations in Afghanistan from August 2011.
Afghanistan, U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Information Operations in Afghanistan Lessons Learned Report
The effective employment of IO to influence primary target audiences, including the population, local leaders, host nation security forces, government officials, and insurgents, is a key component of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Document and Media Exploitation Draft Manual
This publication provides Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) required for Army personnel when conducting Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) operations. The document is designed to serve as a reference for multiple personnel at varying echelons. The ATTP provides specific information for Army personnel operating as part of a DOMEX or other exploitation team for the collection, processing, and reporting of DOMEX activities. The manual serves as a reference for staff planners and intelligence personnel at battalion and brigade combat teams. Additionally, the manual provides an understanding of DOMEX activities, procedures, organizations, products, and databases at joint task force, U.S. Army, and the Department of Defense.
Afghanistan, U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Afghanistan Theater of Operations Evidence Collection Guide
The transition from law of war-based detentions to evidence-based criminal detentions is underway. To fully support this aspect of our counter-insurgency (COIN) mission, Coalition Forces, partnered with Afghan units, are working in the field to provide information and evidence that supports detention operations. These efforts will most fully support the COIN effort if detainees suspected of committing criminal offenses are referred to the Afghan criminal justice system for pre-trial detention, prosecution, and serving of sentence for their crimes, based upon evidence which is used and understood in Afghan criminal courts.
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Intelligence Bulletin on Homegrown Extremist Retaliation for Afghan Massacre
This Joint Intelligence Bulletin is intended to increase awareness and provide understanding of the nature of potentially emergent threats in response to the alleged killing of civilians by a US soldier in Afghanistan and the burning of Korans and other religious documents on a military base. This Information is provided to support the activities of FBI and DHS and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and the private sector to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, Massachusetts
(U//FOUO) Massachusetts Fusion Center: Schools Receiving White Powder Letters
Two Massachusetts schools received letters postmarked from Dallas, TX today, March 6, 2012, which contained a white powder. The letters were received at the Memorial Elementary School in Milford, MA and the Dedham Middle School in Dedham, MA. The incidents are being investigated by the FBI and the Department of Fire Services Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Division. Additionally, a letter was also received at a school in Warwick, Rhode Island, one at a school in Fort Kent, Maine and one at a school in Goffstown, NH. On 3/5/2012, a school in CT received a white powder letter. A photo of one of the envelopes is shown below as well as maps of the affected MA schools.
Intelligence Fusion Centers, Washington D.C.
(U//FOUO/LES) Washington D.C. Fusion Center: White Powder Letters Warning March 2012
Since 2007 an unknown subject has sent more than 360 letters containing a white, powder substance to various government officials, public schools and other locations. In May, 2011 20 letters were delivered to public schools in Washington, DC. Over the past two days similar letters have been received in Washington, DC; New York, New York; Dallas, Texas and Enfield, Connecticut.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Suicide Activity Report for February 2012
The 2008 national suicide rate adjusted for Marine Corps demographics is 20.7 per 100,000. The national adjusted suicide rate is calculated by taking Centers for Disease Control data, and changing the data to look more like the Marine Corps (mostly young and male). Adjusted civilian rates for CYs ’09 and ’10 will be calculated when the data is available.
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Surgeon General’s Office: Psychological Issues of War
Office of the Army Surgeon General presentation on “Psychological Issues of War: Valuable Information Learned from Army Surveillance and Research” concerning statistical trends in the occurrence of suicide, PTSD and traumatic brain injury cases among U.S. service members from December 2009.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Taliban Use of Civilian Shields
U.S. Army TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) report on the Taliban’s use of civilian shields from April 2010.
California, Intelligence Fusion Centers
(U//FOUO) San Diego Fusion Center: The Role of the Firefighter Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO)
Firefighters’ roles as a first responder and an emergency medical service allow for unique access to people and information, which can generate invaluable tips and leads. Because the presence and effectiveness of firefighters mitigate the impact of a terrorist incident involving massive human casualties, terrorists have historically conducted preoperational planning that target firefighting agencies in order to limit the effectiveness of their reaction capabilities.
Department of Homeland Security
(U//FOUO) DHS Chemical Facilities Threat Assessment
The DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center produced this threat assessment to support implementation of 6 Code of Federal Regulations Part 27, “Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS).” This assessment describes the potential terrorist threat to the chemical and petroleum facilities regulated under CFATS and determined to be high risk by the Secretary of Homeland Security. It does not address facilities that may hold threshold quantities of the chemicals listed in CFATS that fall outside its scope, such as public water facilities or facilities regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Nor does it address the transportation of chemicals, which is regulated under other authorities. Potential terrorist tactics against such facilities—based on DHS’ knowledge of terrorist intentions and capabilities—are included to aid industry security personnel in implementing security measures at their facilities.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST) Reference Card
U.S. Army Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) Reference Card produced by the Asymmetric Warfare Group in December 2010.
U.S. Army
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Tactical Questioning Soldier’s Handbook
This handbook is a compilation of tools to help all soldiers collect information through tactical questioning and EPW/detainee and document handling in Offensive, Defensive, Stability, and Support operations. However, most of the handbook was developed specific to small unit patrols, traffic control points (TCPs)/ roadblocks, and other interaction with the local population in the Middle East.
U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG)
Understanding the local culture is critical to mission success. This Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG ) will contribute to an initial Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment that should be continuously updated by line companies. It is intended to aid Marines in the identification of key cultural observables during security and atmospherics patrols, while at the same time helping tactical unit leaders identify the information needed to understand and influence their local environment. The intent is to anticipate the second and third order effects of our actions in order to shape and influence events to our advantage.
Afghanistan, U.S. Marine Corps
(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Report: Cultural Islam in Afghanistan
Islam is practiced differently in Afghanistan than in any other part of the world. For operations in Afghanistan, it is significant to know the origins of existing cultural influences come from pre-Islamic Central Asian beliefs. This knowledge is necessary for two key reasons. First, understanding the specific cultural-religious mindset of local Afghans is essential to successful operations within the population. Secondly, Afghan cultural Islam conflicts with the fundamentalist Islamic movements that influence the current insurgency. Knowing and exploiting these differences can be beneficial to counteracting insurgent IO campaigns and to discourage local Afghans from identifying with insurgent groups vying for control of the population.