Afghanistan

NATO/ISAF Afghanistan Strategic Communications Framework

NATO/ISAF engagement in Afghanistan in 2010 was characterised by a refreshed, comprehensive civ-mil strategy as reflected in a substantial force uplift, significant progress in the growth and development of the Afghan National Security Forces, and discernable campaign progress in priority districts. These were reflected in the NATO/ISAF Strategic Communications Framework 2010. In parallel, political events, including the London Conference, the Consultative Peace Jirga, the Kabul Conference, Afghan Parliamentary elections and the NATO Summit in Lisbon, helped define a clear political roadmap for Afghanistan. These developments are reflected in the Lisbon Summit Declaration which provides political guidance for the focus of our efforts in 2011 and reaffirms that NATO’s mission in Afghanistan remains the Alliance’s key priority.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Afghanistan Civilian Casualty Prevention Handbook

The U.S. military has long been committed to upholding the law of armed conflict and minimizing collateral damage. This includes the killing or wounding of noncombatant civilians — described in this handbook as civilian casualties or CIVCAS — as well as damage to facilities, equipment, or other property. Due to several factors, the impact of CIVCAS has increased to the point that single tactical actions can have strategic consequences and limit overall freedom of action. These factors include: the increased transparency of war, where tactical actions can be recorded and transmitted worldwide in real time; increased expectations for the United States’ conduct of war in light of improved precision and overall capabilities; and the enemy exploitation of CIVCAS to undermine U.S. legitimacy and objectives.

NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan Report August 2012

Despite the continuous counter-narcotics efforts of the international community and the Afghan government throughout the past decade, Agence France-Presse wrote in April 2012 that Afghanistan continues to be a major contributor to the global drug supply. Approximately 90% of the world’s opium, most of which is processed into heroin, originates in Afghan fields. While potential opium production in Afghanistan peaked in 2007, poppy cultivation has recently risen. For instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) marked a 61% increase in the potential opium production between 2010 and 2011. A separate UNODC report from 2010 states that drugs and bribes are equivalent to approximately a quarter of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP).

Money As A Weapon System-Afghanistan (MAAWS-A) Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP) SOP

The aim of reintegration is to stabilize local areas by convincing insurgents, their leaders and their supporters to cease active and/or passive support for the insurgency and to become peaceful members of Afghan society. Reintegration will supplement the continuing lethal and non-lethal activities that form a part of counterinsurgency operations. Reintegration will complement efforts to support political, governance, social and economic opportunity within communities. U.S. support for the Afghan Reintegration Programs must be attuned to Afghan culture.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Security Force Assistance: Shaping and Mentoring the Afghan Police

Afghanistan presents a unique challenge to U.S. Army forces in the geographical, cultural, economic, political, and security dimensions. Providing protection and security to a unique and diverse tribal population is an essential aspect of our counterinsurgency strategy. The proficiency, integrity, and loyalty of Afghan police forces are essential to accomplishing a secure environment and to sustaining success. The following articles cover a range of issues related to SFA and the training of Afghan national police and border police with the specific intent of establishing best practices and lessons learned. The collection should not be considered all-inclusive. This is an effort to capture relevant articles published in recent professional journals or maintained by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and other joint archives to inform Soldiers about relevant observations, insights, and lessons and to provide a historical document for future reference.

ISAF Joint Command Information Dominance Center Paper: Police in Afghanistan

This paper provides a comprehensive introduction to Afghanistan’s various police agencies, where their authority originates, how they are organized, and the stated purpose and responsibility of each. The paper does not include status or capability information on these agencies with the intent to preserve its utility as a long-lasting reference document. The reader should refer to the IJC IDC’s State of the ANSF and other available intelligence and open source products for current status and capability information on Afghan police agencies.

U.S. Army Human Terrain Team Report: Afghan National Army and Coalition Forces Partnership in Khost and Paktiya

Members of Human Terrain Team AF01 embedded with a U.S. cavalry squadron from November to December 2011. Our goal was to understand the dynamics that influence partnering between the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Coalition Forces (CF) and how those dynamics impacted ANA effectiveness in gaining the Afghan population’s support. We conducted 22 interviews with U.S. Army personnel, including U.S. enlisted Soldiers and officers, U.S. troop commanders, police trainers, and ANA mentors. In addition, we conducted 21 interviews with high- and low-ranking ANA enlisted Soldiers and officers and Afghan police officers. We accompanied U.S. forces on non-kinetic missions to villages throughout Khost and Paktiya to gather perceptions from the Afghan civilian population.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan: Key Bases and Figures of the Mujahideen

Afghanistan’s Pashtun rural population has been the source of manpower, funds, shelter, support, and intelligence for the repeated insurgencies that have plagued that unfortunate county since their monarch, Zahir Shah, was overthrown in 1973. In the general unrest that followed, insurgents opposed Mohammad Daoud’s army until he was overthrown by the communists who served in succession – Taraki, Amin, Karmal, and Najibullah. The communist leadership figures, in turn, were deposed by the anti-communist “Seven Party Alliance” that was soon battling among itself for control of Kabul until the Taliban Movement emerged. The Taliban was also faced with resisting insurgent forces, primarily from the non-Pashtun ethnic groups inhabiting Afghanistan’s northern provinces. Afghanistan’s rural insurgents are generally poorly educated, if literate at all, and succeeding generations of insurgents rely upon story-telling from earlier generations of fighters to gain knowledge of tactics that are applicable to their particular culture and terrain.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs Detachment Operations in Afghanistan Lessons Learned

The Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds were the primary mechanism employed by Det L in using money as a weapons system. CERP funds were most readily available and afforded CA flexibility and responsiveness. CA Marines also used Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF), an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) NATO fund available for named operations. With the MEB higher headquarters (Regional Command-South) able to authorize single expenditures of up to 17,500 Euros (approximately U.S. $23,301) and as much as 70,000 Euros (approximately U.S. $93,204) available at a given time, the benefits of POERF included the ability to fill gaps when CERP was not available or could not be used due to statutory restrictions. For example, governed by ISAF SOP 930 and described as having fewer bureaucratic hurdles to overcome than CERP, POERF was used to rapidly fund programs such as providing emergency financial assistance to internally displaced people who were forced to relocate due to MEB military operations.

UNODC Afghan Poppy Eradication Report May 2012

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have joint responsibility of monitoring and verifying opium poppy eradication activities led by the Governors. Governor-led eradication activities are envisaged in all poppy cultivating provinces. Two MCN/UNODC reporters are deputed in MCN for collection of daily reports from the field verifiers and two MCN staffs are assigned for preparing weekly report under UNODC supervision as a part of capacity building activity.

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan Counterinsurgent’s Guidebook

The purpose of The Counterinsurgency Training Center—Afghanistan (CTC-A) “Counterinsurgent’s Guidebook” is two-fold. First, to provide a common language and framework for counterinsurgents currently engaged in Afghanistan, as well as those involved in yet-foreseen conflicts. While each insurgency is unique, the principles, processes, and tools in this Guidebook are intended to be broadly applicable. The second purpose is to provide a structured cognitive process—and supporting tools—whereby counterinsurgents can translate existing counterinsurgency doctrine and theory into practical application. The intended audience for this Guidebook is operational and tactical level U.S./NATO/Coalition counterinsurgents, military and non-military alike.

Money as a Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A) SOP 2012

The Money As A Weapon System – Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program Standard Operating Procedure supports the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan and ISAF Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The Theater Campaign Plan lists objectives that include improving governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population. CERP provides an enabling tool that commanders can utilize to achieve these objectives. This is accomplished through an assortment of projects planned with desired COIN effects such as addressing urgent needs of the population, promoting GIRoA legitimacy, countering Taliban influence, increasing needed capacity, gaining access, building/expanding relationships, promoting economic growth, and demonstrating positive intent or goodwill.

Afghan Uniformed Police Smartbook

Task Force Phoenix has been working in partnership with other nations in training the Afghan Uniformed Police. Civilian Mentor Teams are mentoring senior police leadership at the Kabul police academy. The U.S. is providing basic training courses at a central training facility in Kabul and eight Regional Training Centers in other provinces. More than 62,000 members of the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan National Auxiliary Police, and Border Police have completed Police Academy Training programs at U.S. facilities. Over 12,000 have also completed more advanced training courses in specialized areas such as firearms, crowd control, investigative techniques, and domestic violence. In the past year, the Task Force Phoenix has enhanced the Afghan National Police training program with over 200 Mobile training teams and advisors around the country.

Censored U.S. Army Articles on Afghan Massacre Suspect Staff Sergeant Robert Bales

Mirrored copies of multiple articles referencing and containing pictures of Staff Sergeant Robert Bales who has been identified as the man accused of murdering of 16 civilians in Kandahar on March 11, 2012. These two articles along with all other photos and media created by the U.S. Army that references Bales or contains photos of him is being removed from Army websites in an attempt to wipe away traces of the soldier’s online history. We have mirrored the material in the interest of preserving the documents for analysis and historical interest.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Afghanistan Theater of Operations Evidence Collection Guide

The transition from law of war-based detentions to evidence-based criminal detentions is underway. To fully support this aspect of our counter-insurgency (COIN) mission, Coalition Forces, partnered with Afghan units, are working in the field to provide information and evidence that supports detention operations. These efforts will most fully support the COIN effort if detainees suspected of committing criminal offenses are referred to the Afghan criminal justice system for pre-trial detention, prosecution, and serving of sentence for their crimes, based upon evidence which is used and understood in Afghan criminal courts.

ISAF Guide to Collecting Evidence for Prosecution in Afghan Courts

For the National Security Prosecutor’s Unit (NSPU) or a provincial court to prosecute and convict detainees, including Afghan murder suspects or National Security criminals, capturing units must provide evidence and witness statements against the suspects for use in an Afghan court of law. Appropriate evidence collection may result in admissible evidence in support of effective prosecutions. Turn all evidence associated with the suspect over to Afghan authorities and obtain a thoroughly documented receipt for the evidence.

U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan Cultural Intelligence Reports

A collection of “cultural intelligence” reports for the Afghanistan region were created by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA). They represent some of the only known public examples of MCIA cultural intelligence reports available on the web. In 2008, a MCIA cultural intelligence report on Iran’s culture was obtained and published by the Center for Public Integrity. The following reports on Afghan culture were produced in 2002, but are still believed to be in use by advisers and soldiers today.

(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Report: Cultural Islam in Afghanistan

Islam is practiced differently in Afghanistan than in any other part of the world. For operations in Afghanistan, it is significant to know the origins of existing cultural influences come from pre-Islamic Central Asian beliefs. This knowledge is necessary for two key reasons. First, understanding the specific cultural-religious mindset of local Afghans is essential to successful operations within the population. Secondly, Afghan cultural Islam conflicts with the fundamentalist Islamic movements that influence the current insurgency. Knowing and exploiting these differences can be beneficial to counteracting insurgent IO campaigns and to discourage local Afghans from identifying with insurgent groups vying for control of the population.