The 2008 national suicide rate adjusted for Marine Corps demographics is 20.7 per 100,000. The national adjusted suicide rate is calculated by taking Centers for Disease Control data, and changing the data to look more like the Marine Corps (mostly young and male). Adjusted civilian rates for CYs ’09 and ’10 will be calculated when the data is available.
This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication will assist in advising foreign forces. It serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. This MTTP is intended to provide units and personnel that are scheduled to advise foreign forces (FF) with viable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so that they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Currently, material regarding advising is found in joint and Service doctrinal treatment of foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), security assistance (SA), and unconventional warfare (UW). Several Services are developing documents that focus on basic survival and common advisor skills, but do not sufficiently cover how an advisor team might function at all levels. This MTTP provides guidance that will help to enhance the activities of some advisor functions and improve inter-Service coordination for this joint mission.
Understanding the local culture is critical to mission success. This Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG ) will contribute to an initial Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment that should be continuously updated by line companies. It is intended to aid Marines in the identification of key cultural observables during security and atmospherics patrols, while at the same time helping tactical unit leaders identify the information needed to understand and influence their local environment. The intent is to anticipate the second and third order effects of our actions in order to shape and influence events to our advantage.
A collection of “cultural intelligence” reports for the Afghanistan region were created by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA). They represent some of the only known public examples of MCIA cultural intelligence reports available on the web. In 2008, a MCIA cultural intelligence report on Iran’s culture was obtained and published by the Center for Public Integrity. The following reports on Afghan culture were produced in 2002, but are still believed to be in use by advisers and soldiers today.
Islam is practiced differently in Afghanistan than in any other part of the world. For operations in Afghanistan, it is significant to know the origins of existing cultural influences come from pre-Islamic Central Asian beliefs. This knowledge is necessary for two key reasons. First, understanding the specific cultural-religious mindset of local Afghans is essential to successful operations within the population. Secondly, Afghan cultural Islam conflicts with the fundamentalist Islamic movements that influence the current insurgency. Knowing and exploiting these differences can be beneficial to counteracting insurgent IO campaigns and to discourage local Afghans from identifying with insurgent groups vying for control of the population.
Fully understanding the imperative to balance employment of fires to defeat the enemy with the necessity to protect civilian lives, the Marine Corps has modified the training / education of ground commanders, aviators, forward air controllers (FACs), joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), and others in the fire support approval chain. This incorporates lessons and guidance contained in the USJFCOM investigation into the Farah incident and the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) tactical directive issued in July 2009.
The Marine Corps has a long and storied history of partnering, mentoring, and advising foreign militaries. Marines served as the officer corps of the Gendarmerie d’Haiti and integrated at platoon-level with South Vietnamese Popular Forces. These are only two of many possible examples, but they suffice to illustrate the diversity of relevant Marine Corps experience. This enduring legacy influences Marine counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan as well as theater security cooperation exercises throughout the world.
U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) “Joint Operational Environment” briefing from 2011.
Studying past combat helps gain insight into how insurgents may operate in the future. This guide uses short, simple vignettes to highlight common Afghan insurgent tactics. Each vignette focuses on a particular mission profile, such as raids, ambushes, and defending against a cordon and search. While tactics are continually evolving, the Afghans have a well documented history of using similar techniques against foreign militaries. Most of the vignettes in this guide are from the 1980s when Afghan insurgents fought the Soviet Union. Despite being more than 20 years old, many of the tactics remain in use today. For a more complete description of Afghan insurgent tactics against the Soviets, MCIA strongly recommends reading The Other Side of the Mountain by Ali Jalali and Les Grau, which this guide is based on. The final three vignettes in this guide are from recent operations in Afghanistan and demonstrate the evolution of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) by Afghan insurgents.
In certain parts of the US government, when an operation has unintended negative second or third-order consequences, they are called “blowback.” The radical Islamic movements in the Pashtun areas today were always present, but putting them on steroids in the 1980’s was pretty short-sighted by any reasonable accounting — a classic case of “blowback.” During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Pakistanis had their own agenda. The Pakistani Army’s intelligence branch, called the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, became extremely powerful by cooperating with the United States and the government of Saudi Arabia to channel roughly $7.2 billion dollars worth of covert foreign military aid to their preferred Mujahideen clients. To control the Mujahideen, the ISI formed seven resistance groups, each with a notional political party associated with it. These became known as “the Peshawar Seven.” CIA oversight of the covert money was weak, and much of it went into ISI’s pockets.
The focus of Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) is the personal development of each Marine in a team framework using a standardized, trainable, and sustainable close combat fighting system. As a weapon-based system, all techniques are integrated with equipment, physical challenges, and tactics found on the modern battlefield. The MCMAP is designed to increase the warfighting capabilities of individual Marines and units, enhance Marines’ self-confidence and esprit de corps, and foster the warrior ethos in all Marines. The MCMAP is a weapon-based system rooted in the credo that every Marine is a rifleman and will engage the aggressor from 500 meters to close quarter combat.
U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Micro Mission Guide for Afghanistan published in October 2008.
The Kill Box MTTP reinforces kill boxes as three-dimensional areas used to facilitate the integration of joint fires while also being a permissive fire support coordination measure (FSCM) in accordance with JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. The publication offers a detailed explanation of kill box employment and provides information to effectively organize, plan, and execute kill box procedures.
To inform Deputy Commandants (DCs) Aviation, Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Installations and Logistics (I&L), Commanding General (CG), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Director of Intelligence, operating forces, and others on results of a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) collection conducted April – May 2011 to document lessons and observations regarding unmanned aerial systems (UAS) operations in support of Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
The purpose of this document is to outline the role of female engagement on the ground and best uses of female engagement initiatives. While existing academic literature on females in Afghanistan is limited mostly to the urban areas, it is evident that the lives of women in rural Helmand are complex and difficult than is generally understood from open source and academic literature. Female engagement encompasses methodical, long-term outreach efforts to the entire population, men, women, and children, which is essential in a counterinsurgency. Such engagement efforts provide opportunities to connect with both men and women, counter negative Taliban IO efforts, and improve civil affairs efforts.
This paper summarizes the responses of six Marine battalion commanders who served in stability and support operations (SASO) and counterinsurgency (COIN) environments of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). These commanders were interviewed on their approach to their duties, how they exercised their authority and balanced the use of kinetic and non-kinetic effects in accomplishing their myriad missions and tasks. The content of this report may serve to guide future commanders.
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 4-11.9, Ammunition Logistics, provides guidance for commanders, staffs, logisticians, ammunition and aviation ordnance officers, supply officers, and ammunition and aviation ordnance Marines. This publication discusses the Marine Corps ammunition and aviation ordnance communities’ organization and support structure, the general responsibilities of ammunition and aviation ordnance personnel, the systems used in support of ammunition logistics, planning considerations, safety issues, training, and the regulatory environment in which Marine Corps ammunition logistic operations are planned and executed. Various elements of Navy supporting establishments with ammunition responsibilities that have not been addressed in other USMC Service doctrine are introduced in the MCWP 4-11.9.
Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5239.1 formally establishes the Marine Corps Information Assurance Program (MCIAP) and defines the responsibilities for protecting the Marine Corps information infrastructure as well as delineating Department of Defense (DoD) directives, instructions, and guidance governing DoD Information Assurance (IA). United States Marine Corps (USMC) IA Enterprise Directive 014 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) outlines the security configuration and implementation standards for WLANs within the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) boundary security framework.
USMC Engineer Equipment Technical Characteristics Manual from June 2009.
This Technical Manual (TM), authenticated for Marine Corps use and effective upon receipt, provides technical characteristics information for Marine Corps Motor Transport Equipment.
The Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA) issues Marine Corps Enterprise Information Assurance Directives (EIAD). The EIAD series provides modules that guide the implementation of policy direction established in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5239.2. The modules provide procedural. technical, administrative, and supplemental guidance for all information systems, used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or receipt of data within the MCEN as well as other Marine Corps information systems. Each module focuses on a distinct subject and describes a standard methodology for planning, implementing and executing an element of the Marine Corps Information Assurance Program (MCIAP). The Marine Corps EIAD series will be the authoritative source for implementation of IA policy direction.
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.4, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations, operationalizes the concept of information operations (IO). This publication introduces doctrine for employment of IO in support of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. IO language and organizations continue to evolve and to be debated. This publication gives Marines a warfighter’s orientation to IO, providing a basis to understand the relevance of IO and a framework to implement IO. This publication is intended for MAGTF planners responsible for both operational and IO planning.
This Technical Manual (TM), authenticated for Marine Corps use and effective upon receipt, provides technical characteristics information for Marine Corps Communication-Electronics Equipment.
This Concept of Employment (COE) describes the overall concepts, structures, and roles and responsibilities for NetOps Command and Control (C2), planning, Network Common Operational Picture (NetCOP), and systems management as it relates to the Marine Corps Enterprise Network‘s (MCEN‘s) Garrison Secret Internet Protocol (IP) Router Network (SIPRNet). It bridges strategic guidance and detailed operational procedures to describe how the MCEN Garrison SIPRNet is operated and defended through NetOps, much like the Tri-MEF SOP is to the tactical environment.
This manual provides easy-to-use reference data for the more common items of Marine Corps ordnance equipment. The equipment description sheets, which make up the bulk of the manual, provide a description, function, and technical characteristics of the equipment, including, when applicable, fuel and power requirements, power outputs, major components, and associated components. If available, photographs or drawings of the equipment are provided.