Daunting Challenges, Hard Decisions by Aris A Pappas and James M. Simon, Jr. CIA Editor’s Note: The authors intend this article to provoke a broad discussion of the role of intelligence in a constitutional republic during an era of accelerating…
Care should be taken to protect the quality of information available for friendly decisions and public dissemination. This will ensure the JFC has accurate information by not allowing staffs to unknowingly perceive the joint task force’s (JTF’s) MILDEC efforts as accurate information. This will also ensure the information made public by the JFC is not part of any MILDEC action and lose the public’s trust.
This assessment examines the potential threat to homeland security from cyber attacks conducted by leftwing extremists, a threat that DHS/I&A believes likely will grow over the next decade. It focuses on the more prominent leftwing groups within the animal rights, environmental, and anarchist extremist movements that promote or have conducted criminal or terrorist activities (see Appendix). This assessment is intended to alert DHS policymakers, state and local officials, and intelligence analysts monitoring the subject so they can better focus their collection requirements and analysis.
Rightwing extremist paranoia of foreign regimes could escalate or be magnified in the event of an economic crisis or military confrontation, harkening back to the “New World Order” conspiracy theories of the 1990s. The dissolution of Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the end of the Soviet Union in the 1990s led some rightwing extremists to believe that a “New World Order” would bring about a world government that would usurp the sovereignty of the United States and its Constitution, thus infringing upon their liberty. The dynamics in 2009 are somewhat similar, as other countries, including China, India, and Russia, as well as some smaller, oil-producing states, are experiencing a rise in economic power and influence.
This Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) provides direction to the Federal executive branch for developing continuity plans and programs. Continuity planning facilitates the performance of executive branch essential functions during all-hazards emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations. The ultimate goal of continuity in the executive branch is the continuation of National Essential Functions (NEFs).
This regulation provides Army policy and guidance for establishing civilian inmate labor programs and civilian prison camps on Army installations. Sources of civilian inmate labor are limited to on– and off–post Federal corrections facilities, State and/or local corrections facilities operating from on–post prison camps pursuant to leases under Section 2667, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2667), and off–post State corrections facilities participating in the demonstration project authorized under Section 1065, Public Law (PL) 103–337. Otherwise, State and/or local inmate labor from off–post corrections facilities is currently excluded from this program.
Eighty-three of the 100 largest publicly traded U.S. corporations in terms of 2007 revenue reported having subsidiaries in jurisdictions listed as tax havens or financial privacy jurisdictions. Sixty-three of the 100 largest publicly traded U.S. federal contractors in terms of fiscal year 2007 federal contract obligations reported having subsidiaries in such jurisdictions. Since subsidiaries may be established in listed jurisdictions for a variety of nontax business reasons, the existence of a subsidiary in a jurisdiction listed as a tax haven or financial privacy jurisdiction does not signify that a corporation or federal contractor established that subsidiary for the purpose of reducing its tax burden.
Continuity programs provide the foundation for Enduring Constitutional Government (NSPD-51/HSPD-20) and the Nation’s First Essential Function, “Ensure the continued functioning of our form of government under the Constitution, including the functioning of the three separate branches of government.”
H.R. 1 Requirements
Title IV of H.R. 1, the “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” directs the Administrator of FEMA to:
1. (NLT 02 AUG 08) Develop standards for credentialing and typing Federal/Emergency Response Officials (F/ERO)
– FEMA Policy memo to OMB dated June 9, 2008, defined the F/ERO standard to be HSPD-12 eligible NRF, NIPP,
NCPIP (FCD 1) population
– NIMS Credentialing Guidelines posted on the Federal Registry on 24 December, 2008, formalized policy memo
This HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan provides a blueprint from which to prepare for the challenges that lie ahead of us. Being prepared and responding effectively involves everyone: individuals, communities, businesses, States, Federal agencies, international countries and organizations. Here at home, we can use this Plan to create a seamless preparedness network where we are all working together for the benefit of the American people.
Endgame is the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) multi-year strategic enforcement plan. It stresses the effective and efficient execution of the critical service DRO provides its partners and stakeholders to enforce the nation’s immigration and naturalization laws. The DRO strategic plan sets in motion a cohesive enforcement program with a ten-year time horizon that will build the capacity to “remove all removable aliens,” eliminate the backlog of unexecuted final order removal cases, and realize its vision.
Biometric capabilities shall be developed to be interoperable with other identity management capabilities and systems, both internal and external to the Department of Defense, to maximize effectiveness. System development and capability implementation strategies shall be harmonized, integrated, and unified with identity protection and management stakeholder organizations to ensure consistency with DoD identity management principles, directives, and vision.
a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.
b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05 (Reference (b)).
c. Conduct IW independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare.
(1) IW can include a variety of steady-state and surge DoD activities and operations:
counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state.
(2) While these activities may occur across the full range of military operations, the balance or primary focus of operations gives a campaign its predominant character.
All DoD continuity planning and programming shall:
(1) Be based on the assumption that no warning of attack or event will be received.
(2) Ensure the performance of MEFs during any emergency for a period of up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed. The capability to perform MEFs at alternate sites must be fully operational as soon as possible, but no later than 12 hours after COOP activation.
(3) Be based on risk-management assessments to ensure that appropriate operational readiness decisions consider the probability of an attack or incident and its consequences.
(4) Emphasize the permanent and routine geographic distribution of leadership, staff, and infrastructure in order to increase survivability and maintain uninterrupted capability to accomplish DoD MEFs.
These regulations conform to regulations of the United States Departments of Health and Human Services; Agriculture; Treasury; Interior; and Commerce. The regulations are intended to prevent the introduction and dissemination, domestically or elsewhere, of diseases of humans, plants and animals, prohibited or illegally taken wildlife, arthropod vectors, and pests of health and agricultural importance. Introduction and dissemination may occur by movements of vessels, aircraft, or other transport of the Armed Forces arriving at or leaving Armed Forces installations in the United States and foreign countries or ports or other facilities under the jurisdiction of the above Federal agencies in the United States and its territories, commonwealths, and possessions.
This document was developed expressly for emergency management practitioners as an overview of the process, roles, and responsibilities for requesting and providing all forms of Federal assistance. This overview also presents a summary of each of the 15 Emergency Support Function Annexes and 8 Support Annexes including their purpose, capabilities, membership, and concept of operations. The complete annexes are contained in the online NRF Resource Center.
This National Response Framework (NRF) [or Framework] is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation. It describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. This document explains the common discipline and structures that have been exercised and matured at the local, tribal, State, and national levels over time. It describes key lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, focusing particularly on how the Federal Government is organized to support communities and States in catastrophic incidents. Most importantly, it builds upon the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent template for managing incidents.
This product is one in a series of reference aids designed to provide operational and intelligence advice and assistance to other elements of DHS, as well as state, local, and regional fusions centers. DHS/I&A intends this background information to assist federal, state, local, and tribal homeland security and law enforcement officials in conducting analytic activities. This product provides definitions for key terms and phrases that often appear in DHS analysis that addresses the nature and scope of the threat that domestic, non-Islamic extremism poses to the United States. Definitions were derived from a variety of open source materials and unclassified information, then further developed during facilitated workshops with DHS intelligence analysts knowledgeable about domestic, non-Islamic extremism in the United States.